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Introduction 
 
An analysis of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act (2007):   
A Badly Flawed Reform? 
 
A conviction of a large corporation for manslaughter was in practice impossible. This 
statement was accurate when the prosecution was mounted using the old 
identification/ “directing mind and will” doctrine. The position in relation to 
prosecutions against small companies was very different. It was relatively straight-
forward to successfully prosecute a “one-man band” style company due to its simple 
corporate structure. The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007
1
 
(hereafter “CMCHA”) was enacted to resolve this issue. 
It was the desire of Parliament that this Act would eliminate the difficulties that were 
faced by the courts when dealing with large complex corporate structures. This thesis 
will consider whether Parliament’s desire has been achieved or whether the same 
problems associated with the old doctrine still exist.   
It is arguable that the CMCHA has simply provided a gloss upon the old identification 
doctrine and that we now have an “identification-plus” doctrine in the form of the 
“senior management test”. It is questionable whether the new test would be any more 
effective when tested against a large corporate structure, than the old doctrine.  
                                                        
1
 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act (2007) (c.19) 
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This thesis is structured into five chapters. The first four chapters will develop a key 
part of the progression of the law of corporate manslaughter. The fifth chapter will 
consider the approach taken by another jurisdiction, Canada.   
There are other relevant approaches that can be taken in relation to the regulation of 
companies, whether criminal or non-criminal strategies such as corporate governance 
and corporate social responsibility, but both are beyond the remit of this thesis.  
The issue of individual liability does feature at certain points in the thesis and is 
referred to when necessary, but it is not the focus of the thesis. 
 
Chapter One - The Basis of Corporate Criminal Liability 
 
This chapter will consider the basis of corporate criminal liability in England and 
Wales and the approach taken by the courts by considering decisions from both the 
criminal and civil branches of the law. The chapter will identify the uneven approach 
taken by the courts that ultimately resulted in a doctrine that was largely ineffective 
when posed against a large and often complex corporate structure.  This will be 
followed by a discussion of the interpretation and application of the identification/ 
“directing mind and will” doctrine. 
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Chapter Two - Successful and Unsuccessful Prosecutions for Corporate 
Manslaughter 
 
The second chapter will briefly consider the law relating to the common law offence 
of manslaughter both in respect of the earlier form of reckless manslaughter and the 
subsequent development of gross negligence manslaughter. 
This chapter will demonstrate how all successful prosecutions for corporate 
manslaughter were, in fact against small companies, where identifying the requisite 
“directing mind and will” was straight-forward. By contrast, prosecutions against 
large corporate entities were invariably unsuccessful, with the “directing mind and 
will” test proving deeply problematic. This point is central to our discussion, 
particularly bearing in mind that the bigger companies that were subject to 
investigations and/ or prosecutions were the cause of major disasters and significant 
human casualties. 
  
Chapter Three - The road to reform 
 
The third chapter will consider the process of law reform. Given the difficulties that 
were encountered with the then existing law as discussed in chapter two, calls for 
reform of the law increased. A consideration of the recommendations from the Law 
Commission report in 1996 will be undertaken. The Law Commission recommended 
the creation of the new offence of corporate killing. Contained within this proposed 
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offence was a new test and the development and amendment of this test runs through 
this chapter.   
One consistent theme is the delay in the Law’s reform. The chapter will move onto 
the Home Office paper published in 2000 and the Private Members Bill heard briefly 
before Parliament in 2000 that didn’t provide the catalyst to move the law reform 
process on. 
 It wasn’t until the 2005 Government backed Bill that the law reform process gathered 
any detectable momentum. The Bill will be scrutinized and its deficiencies which will 
be highlighted through a consideration of the Joint Committee’s pre-legislative 
scrutiny.   
Throughout the first three chapters there will be three timelines. Each timeline of 
cases or events has been developed in this manner to help with the understanding of 
the development contained in each chapter, and for ease of reading. There are obvious 
cross-overs between the three time-lines but they have been separated so as to suit the 
topic of each chapter. 
 
Chapter Four - The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 
 
The fourth chapter will consider the passage of the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Bill through Parliament, ultimately receiving Royal Assent on 
26
th
 July 2007.  
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The CMCHA itself will be analysed with particular focus on the new statutory offence 
of corporate manslaughter and question whether it will overcome the deficiencies 
associated with the old common law doctrine.  
The chapter will also evaluate the likely effectiveness of the sentencing guidelines 
that have been created to assist sentencing judges. In these early days of the 
CMCHA’s implementation, it is highly likely that the early prosecutions will often 
result in appeals against sentence to the Court of Appeal and thence the Supreme 
Court.  
The chapter will give considerable emphasis to the first prosecution to occur under 
this new legislation, against Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Limited, including its 
subsequent appeal against sentence to the Court of Appeal. A second prosecution 
under this new legislation has commenced against Lion Steel Limited, but this is 
awaiting trial in June 2012 at Manchester Crown Court and will be discussed only 
briefly.    
 
Chapter Five – An alternative approach to corporate criminal liability for 
manslaughter 
 
Having criticised the likely modest achievements of the CMCHA, the fifth chapter 
will consider one particular alternative approach namely that taken by Canada
2
.  
Canada was chosen given the similarities between the UK and Canadian legal systems 
and the similar difficulties both have faced in relation to corporate criminal liability.  
                                                        
2
 Word restrictions have precluded more comparisons with other jurisdictions 
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The Canadian model is a non-offence specific approach and in similar vein to the 
experienced within the UK, law reform has been a lengthy process. Ultimately, it is 
arguable that the Canadians now have an “identification-plus” doctrine that can be 
applied to a number of offences, whereas the UK now has an offence specific 
“identification-plus” doctrine. Both countries have tried different solutions, but the 
result appears to be the same. It is suggested that this is indicative of the central 
problem of how a company is found criminally liable and whether it is simply too 
difficult to achieve and produce a solution and workable doctrine.   
 
Methods 
 
A number of different research methods were utilised so as to obtain the relevant 
material used for the preparation of this thesis.  
A number of University libraries were used both in this country and abroad including, 
Durham University Law Library, the University of Newcastle upon Tyne Law Library 
and Robinson Library, the University of Toronto (Bora Laskin Law Library) in 
February 2010 and the University of Cape Town (Brand Van Zyl Law Library) in 
July 2010.  
An extensive literature review was carried and a large number of textbooks and 
journals were considered. Alongside this, electronic sources were utilised such as 
electronic journals including Westlaw, Lawtel and the internet. The Internet provided 
access to items that were difficult to obtain from other sources such as information 
from the Crown Prosecution Service.  
7 
 
As a Solicitor, I am required to complete continuing professional development 
courses and I have been able to obtain access to training courses that have covered 
corporate manslaughter and these courses are not open to the general public. 
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Chapter One - The Basis of Corporate Criminal Liability 
 
This chapter will consider the basis that a corporation can be held criminally liable by 
considering a number of key decisions. The “directing mind and will” doctrine/ 
identification principle will be analysed from its inception and the crossover between 
civil and criminal law. There have been significant issues and problems with the 
interpretation and application of this doctrine. Historically it has been difficult to 
establish corporate criminal liability which has been exacerbated by the disjointed 
judicial approach where previous court decisions were overlooked or ignored by the 
judiciary. Further to this difficulty were the procedural obstacles that were in place at 
various times.  
Later chapters will consider the application of the “directing mind and will” doctrine 
with regard to corporate manslaughter in greater detail. However, where applicable 
some of the early decisions analysed in this chapter do consider the offence of 
manslaughter.  
The first substantive section in this chapter will consider the legal standing of a 
corporation and how it is separate from those who create it. This will be shown by 
considering cases that have discussed this legal concept. Beginning with the leading 
House of Lords decision of Saloman v. A Saloman and Co Ltd
1
 and thereafter 
considering others cases that further illustrate how corporations have a separate legal 
personality.  
                                                        
1
 [1897] A.C. 22 
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The second substantive section will consider corporate criminal liability and the 
“directing mind and will” doctrine and how it has been developed through the 
criminal and civil law. A series of judicial decisions will be discussed, from the birth 
of the doctrine to the interpretation of the doctrine by various courts thereafter and it 
will be demonstrated how the development and implementation of this doctrine has 
been disjointed and uneven. The historical and procedural obstacles that were present 
will also be discussed. Prior to the use of the “directing mind and will” doctrine, 
vicarious liability was an alternative basis of corporate criminal liability, was utilised 
by the courts and this will be considered where it has featured in the relevant cases. 
 
1.1. Separate Legal Personality 
 
A corporation is a separate legal person and is distinct from those that form the 
corporation. The House of Lords decision in Saloman v. A Saloman and Co Ltd is 
considered to be the leading case and introduced the significance of the separate legal 
personality. Lord MacNaghten explained: - 
“[t]he company attains maturity on its birth. There is no period of minority – no 
interval on incapacity … [t]he company is at law a different person altogether from 
the subscribers …; and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is 
precisely the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the 
same hands receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers 
10 
 
or trustee for them. Nor are the subscribers, as members liable, in any shape or form, 
except to the extent and in the manner provided by the Act”2.  
The then Lord Chancellor, Lord Halsbury stated: - 
“… it seems to me impossible to dispute that once the company is legally incorporated 
it must be treated like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities 
appropriate to itself”3. 
The concept of separate personality was further considered in the two following cases 
which provide useful illustrations, namely the House of Lords decision in Macaura v. 
Northern Assurance Co Ltd
4
 and the Privy Council decision in Lee v. Lee’s Air 
Farming Ltd
5
. In Macaura, the timber owned by an individual was sold to his 
company in which he owned the vast majority of the shares. The timber was insured 
against fire and the policies were in his name. The timber was subsequently destroyed 
by fire and Mr. Macaura tried to make a claim on the insurance policy. The insurance 
company stated that as the individual he had no interest and that the timber was the 
company’s and not his. The House of Lords heard the matter and agreed with the 
insurance company. As Dignam and Lowry recognise “[j]ust as corporate personality 
facilitates limited liability by having the debts belong to the corporation and not the 
members it also means that the company’s assets belong to it and not the 
shareholders. Thus corporate personality can be a double edged sword”6. 
The Privy Council decision in Lee v. Lee’s Air Farming Ltd came by appeal from 
New Zealand. Mr Lee was the majority owner of the company that employed him and 
                                                        
2
 Ibid. at pp.50-51 
3
 Ibid. at pp.30-31 
4
 [1925] A.C. 619 
5
 [1961] A.C. 12 
6
 Dignam, A. and Lowry, J. “Company Law” (2009) 5th Edition at p.24 
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he was also appointed “governing director” for life. Mr Lee was killed in the course 
of his employment. Mr Lee’s widow and his young children were dependent on him 
and a claim was made against an insurance policy as it was claimed that Mr Lee was a 
“worker” under the terms of the Workers Compensation Act 1922. However, the 
Court of Appeal in New Zealand disagreed. The Privy Council accepted the separate 
legal status of the company, with the logical consequence that Mr Lee was able to 
make a contract with “his” own company. Therefore, Mr Lee was able to give orders, 
acting as the Director, to himself, when acting as the pilot. Lord Morris observed:-  
“In their lordships’ view it is a logical consequence of the decision in Saloman v. A 
Saloman and Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 22 that one person may function in dual capacities. 
There is no reason, therefore, to deny the possibility of a contractual relationship 
being created as between the deceased and the company”7. 
Therefore, a master and servant relationship was found to be in existence and 
compensation should be paid to the widow.  
The concept of a company’s separate legal personality has been considered by a 
number of legal theorists. On a theoretical level, French contends that companies are 
more than a group of persons with a purpose “they have a metaphysical-logical 
identity that does not reduce to a mere sum of human-being members”8. Furthermore 
French expounds a “theory that allows treatment of corporations as fully-fledged 
members of the moral community, of equal standing with the traditionally 
acknowledged residents: human beings”9, namely recognising the companies as 
distinct and separate. As a result of this distinction the law is able to recognise a 
                                                        
7
 See note 5 at p.26 
8
 French, P.A. “Collective and Corporate Responsibility” (1984) at p.32 
9
 Ibid. 
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company’s separate legal personality, so that a company can be labelled and 
sanctioned/ and or punished as a criminal entity. 
 
1.1.1. Why do we punish companies? 
 
The question that flows from the previous discussion is why do we punish 
corporations? As an artificial legal creation, it has no physical existence. Therefore, 
the corporation cannot be punished like an individual. The corporation cannot be 
incarcerated nor can it receive any form of physical punishment. French argues that 
“justice is generally not served by the prosecution of some natural person who 
happens to work for the corporation”10 and further contends that there is the need for 
the company itself to face justice. This illustrates that even though the company is an 
artificial legal person, justice still needs to be done and seen to be done by the public. 
This is a view echoed by Leigh, who states “it is important that the public realise that 
powerful entities are not above the law”11.  
Further to the above, is the central point that the company is an artificial legal person 
and arguably has no conscience and as is well quoted “has no soul to be damned, and 
no body to be kicked”12. How therefore can this artificial legal entity be punished? 
The usual punishment is that a corporation receives a fine. However, the impact of the 
fine on a corporation is not the same as it would be upon an individual. A corporation 
                                                        
10
 Ibid. at p.186 
11
 Leigh, L.H. “The Criminal Liability of Corporations and Other Groups” Ottawa 
Law Review (1977) Vol. 9, 247-302 at p.287  
12
 Attributed to Edward, First Baron Thurlow, Lord Chancellor 
13 
 
does not have basic human needs and therefore will not “feel” any loss of food, heat 
or housing like an individual would.   
It is therefore worthwhile pausing here and considering the larger implications of 
punishing these artificial legal entities by way of financial penalty. There will be the 
potential for implications for those beyond the company, namely shareholders; 
consumers of products by the raising of prices as an economic consequence of the 
sanction/ bad publicity and also the employees of the company whose employment 
may be placed in jeopardy. It is those individuals associated with the company that 
may feel the “pain” of the financial penalty imposed by the court. 
As French argues, “the moral psychology of our criminal-legal system … is based on 
guilt”13. French refers to a number of arguments put forward by various legal 
theorists, including Herbert Morris’s view where wrongdoing is integral to guilt and 
that some form of harm must have been suffered as a consequence. However, as a 
contrast to the guilt, there is another alternative, such as shame. This aspect of shame 
is a notion that is discussed in later chapters in light of the impact of Publicity Orders 
that can be made under the CMCHA. However, as the corporation is an artificial legal 
entity, it is impossible for it to have any sensations of shame, remorse or repentance. 
However, the reputation of a company can be argued to be a central or at the very 
least a key factor to its success. Therefore the company may have “no soul to be 
damned, and no body to be kicked”, but its reputation is a valuable commodity that 
could be weakened by public shame.  
Although as French suggests that he has “made no claim that adverse publicity orders 
will always suffice to achieve the retributive ends of the courts. A mix of sanctions 
                                                        
13
 See note 8 at p.190 
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will undoubtedly be required, if deterrence and retribution are to be accomplished”14. 
This issue will be further discussed in more detail in the fourth chapter when 
considering the sentencing options available under the CMCHA.   
As with all criminal offences and the associated punitive sanctions available to the 
courts, there is a deterrent aspect that is integral to the criminal justice system. For 
example, corporations are punished as a form of control for other potential corporate 
defendants to be mindful of. Whether this aim is achieved is questionable and is a 
larger question for the whole criminal justice system to answer. The new CMCHA has 
been enacted firstly to punish the guilty, but also to deter other corporations. 
However, given the recidivism rates throughout the criminal justice system, it is 
debatable whether the deterrent effect behind the sentences handed down by the 
courts offers any real deterrent to defendants whether corporate or individual 
defendants. 
It may also be asked why we need an offence specifically of corporate killing/ 
manslaughter?  What is the real objective and what purpose will it serve? Is the 
motive behind it a political decision, by providing a so-called panacea to significant 
corporate wrong-doing? To be sure, the death of an individual or group of persons is 
evocative, particularly if the death was caused by a faceless corporation, but surely, 
all offences caused by a corporation should be treated robustly. Given that, why do 
we not have a “Corporate Offences against the Person Act”, rather than one restricted 
merely to deaths? Some of the victims involved in the disasters outlined in the second 
chapter were not killed, but nonetheless suffered horrific life-changing injuries. But 
the justification for an offence restricted to killing is, it is argued that we already do 
                                                        
14
 See note 8 at p.200 
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have a myriad of Health and Safety laws, which already deal with injuries falling 
short of death.  
An offence of corporate manslaughter is necessary as a human life has been lost 
unnecessarily. From a general perspective of all homicide offences, when a death is 
caused whether by an individual or a corporation, society demands that the 
perpetrators, whether living or artificial, suffer the requisite punishment and 
retribution is satisfied.      
   
1.2. Corporate criminal liability and the emergence of the “Directing Mind and 
Will” Theory within criminal and civil law 
 
Historically it has been difficult for the courts to establish corporate criminal liability, 
leading to the disjointed and uneven development of the law. Part of the reason for 
this lies in a number of judicial decisions made without reference to, or consideration 
of, previous judicial findings.  
Some of the apparent judicial reluctance that is illustrated in some of the cases can in 
part be explained by the procedural and practical obstacles that were in place at the 
time. Furthermore, it has been problematical for the courts to establish mens rea and 
the use of statutory interpretation features repeatedly through a large number of the 
cases. Some of the more straightforward regulatory offences have not posed as much 
of a dilemma for the courts.  
Burles acknowledges that “[h]istorically, the courts did not consider it either logical 
or feasible to prosecute corporations for any serious offences as the punishment for 
16 
 
the bulk of felonies was imprisonment or death. Furthermore, the idea that a 
corporation could have mens rea presented insurmountable theoretical difficulties … 
The great bulk of offences, however, were not thought capable of being committed by 
a corporate body … This position changed dramatically in 1944 when a trio of 
important cases opened the doors to wider criminal corporate liability”15.  
Winn, writing in 1929, referred to the position and the view taken, to that point, by 
the courts in relation to corporate criminal liability
16
. Winn continues and refers to a 
number of cases and outlines the exceptions
17
. 
A key theme that features through a number of the decisions and those that follow is 
the significant relevance of interpretation of various statutes throughout the centuries. 
As Pinto and Evans recount “[e]ncouraged, no doubt, by s.2(1) of the Interpretation 
Act (1889), by the turn of the nineteenth century, the criminal courts accepted that a 
corporation could be liable for a wide range of criminal offences within the regulatory 
                                                        
15
 Burles, D. “The criminal liability of corporations” New Law Journal (1991) Vol. 
141 (6502), p.609 
16
 Winn, C.R.N. “The Criminal Responsibility of Corporations” Cambridge Law 
Journal (1927-1929) Vol. 3, 398 at p.398. I see also Winn who saw corporate liability 
as arising only in exceptional circumstances.  
 
17
 Ibid. at p.398 – “Where a statute has laid upon a corporation a legal duty to 
execute certain works and the works have not been executed, it was held in 1842 in R 
v. Birmingham and Gloucester Ry. Co (3 Q.B. 223) that the corporation may be 
indicted and fined for its non-feasance. But it was there said, per Patteson J., that a 
corporation may not be indicted “for a felony, or for crimes involving personal 
violence”. In R. v. Severn and Wye Ry. Co ((1819) 2 B and Ald. 646) it was assumed 
that an indictment would have lain against a railway company for not maintaining its 
permanent way. In R. v. Tyler Commercial Co. ([1891] 2 Q.B. 588) Bowen L.J. held 
that where a duty is imposed on a company by statute, such as the duty to register the 
names of its members imposed by the Companies Act, 1862, a breach of such duty is 
indictable in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the statute”.   
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sphere”18. This issue will be further expanded below and analysed throughout the 
cases where applicable.  
 
1.2.1.  The birth of the Directing Mind and Will theory 
 
The “directing mind and will” theory was first enunciated in the case of Lennard’s 
Carrying Co. Ltd. V. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd
19
, specifically within the judgment of 
Viscount Haldane L.C. and his “organic theory”20.  
Academics
21
 have suggested that Viscount Haldane’s views were influenced by his 
time spent studying German Law whilst at Göttingen University. Hicks and Goo
22
 
contend that German Law “distinguishes between the agents and organs of the 
company. A German company with limited liability (GmbH) is required by law to 
appoint one or more directors (Geschäftsführer). They are the company’s organs and 
for legal purposes represent the company. The knowledge of any one director, 
however obtained, is the knowledge of the company”23.     
Viscount Haldane L.C., whilst trying to resolve an issue that had arisen under the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1894, famously stated: - 
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“My Lords, a corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it 
has a body of its own; its active and directing will must consequently be sought in the 
person of somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but who is really 
the directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and centre of the 
personality of the corporation … somebody who is not merely a servant or agent for 
whom the company is liable upon the footing respondent superior, but somebody for 
whom the company is liable because his action is the very action of the company 
itself”24. 
This creates a peculiarity within the law, in that in contrast to the decision in Saloman 
whereby the company and the persons behind the company are to be treated as 
distinct and separate, this decision “treats the individual and the company as the same 
person … [t]he answer is that it is not compatible with it (Saloman) and the theory 
(directing mind and will) has probably caused more problems than it solved”25. 
Some academics consider that Viscount Haldane’s theory “was a narrow approach to 
the notion of identification ... (and) ... such an approach has been castigated by the 
Privy Council through Lord Hoffmann in the Meridian Global case as a misleading 
“general metaphysic of companies””26. The Meridian decision will be considered in 
detail at a later juncture.  
Prior to the 1944 decisions noted above, are the important and relevant cases of 
Mousell Bros Ltd v. London and North West Ry. Co. Ltd
27
 and R. v. Cory Bros and 
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Co. Ltd
28
. Mousell was the first opportunity for an appellate court to consider the 
liability of a corporation for a criminal offence that necessitated proof of the requisite 
mens rea. The case demonstrated clearly the importance of statutory interpretation, 
with the case turning on the court’s interpretation of s.98 Railway Clauses 
Consolidation Act (1845). 
So, Viscount Reading C.J. concluded that: - 
“I think, looking at the language and purpose of this Act, that the Legislature intended 
to fix responsibility for this quasi-criminal act upon the principal if the forbidden acts 
were done by his servant within the scope of his employment. If that is the true view, 
there is nothing to distinguish a limited company from any other principal, and the 
defendants are properly made liable for the acts”29. 
Similarly, Atkin J., found that the liability of the corporation would turn on: - 
“the object of the statute, the words used, the nature of the duty laid down, the person 
upon whom it is imposed, the person by whom it would in ordinary circumstances be 
performed, and the person upon whom the penalty is imposed”30. 
“The penalty is imposed upon the owner for the act of the servant if the servant 
commits the default provided for in the statute in the state of mind provided for by the 
statute. Once it is decided that this is one of those cases where a principal may be 
held liable criminally for the act of his servant, there is no difficulty in holding that a 
corporation may be the principal. No mens rea being necessary to make the principal 
                                                        
28
 [1927] 1 K.B. 810 
29
 See note 27 at p.845 
30
 Ibid. 
20 
 
liable, a corporation is in exactly the same position as a principal who is not a 
corporation”31. 
These early cases applied vicarious liability as the basis for corporate criminal 
liability. The identification doctrine did not become firmly established until the 1944 
cases referred to above and discussed further below. As Wells states: - 
“[v]icarious liability grew out of the development of liability of a master (employer) 
for his servant (employee), and has been applied mainly to offences in the regulatory 
field”32. 
Wells accurately assesses the situation in the judicial development at that time: - 
“In general, the process of judicial interpretation of the statutory object led to 
corporate liability being imposed only for regulatory offences, especially those 
offences which did not require proof of mens rea or a mental element. While the 
general principle that a company can be prosecuted for a criminal offence has long 
been accepted, the question whether a particular statute imposes such liability and 
whether the vicarious or identification doctrine will apply, is rarely if ever spelled 
out, and thus the process of interpretation is open-ended”33. 
However, when considering the decision in Mousell and given its proximity in time to 
the House of Lords decision in Saloman, there was no reference to personal liability 
of the corporation. As Pinto and Evans state: - 
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“the criminal responsibility of the corporation was established on the basis of 
vicarious liability for the act or acts of its servant acting within the scope and course 
of his employment”34. 
Williams has written that “the best explanation of [Mousell] seems to be that it 
belongs to an intermediate stage in the development of corporate criminal 
responsibility”35 meaning between the usage of vicarious liability as the basis for 
corporate liability and the identification doctrine. However, Wells suggests that “it 
was only later that Mousell became confined to its position as an exception, it could 
just as easily have provided a springboard for an entirely different development”36. 
It is debatable whether developing the law closer to vicarious liability rather than the 
identification doctrine would have been more effective. Vicarious liability depends 
upon whether the employee was acting within the scope of their employment. 
However, as recognised by the Law Commission
37
 “[t]he rule that, in general, 
vicarious liability does not form part of the criminal law is a long-established 
principle of the common law”38, save for three exceptions. Two of those are not 
relevant here, namely public nuisance and criminal libel. The third exception to this 
principle is statutory offences and as discussed above in the judgment of Atkin J. in 
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Mousell Bros. Ltd v. London and North-Western Railway Co
39
 is a matter of how the 
statute is constructed.    
Therefore, the use of or impact of vicarious liability arguably can be limited. A 
recurring theme throughout this chapter is the disjointed development of corporate 
criminal liability, whereby previous decisions were too often overlooked or dismissed 
by courts. A good example of this was the House of Lords’ decision in Vane v. 
Yiannopoullos
40
. Mayson, French and Ryan show, the case held, in contrast to 
Mousell, that “unless otherwise specified by statute, there could be no vicarious 
liability for an offence with a mental element unless the employer’s proprietary or 
managerial functions had been delegated to the employee who committed the 
offence”41. Nevertheless, “Lord Evershed glossed over Mousell Bros. v. London and 
North-Western Railway Co., saying that intent, unlike knowledge, was not “mens rea 
in a real sense””42.     
Returning to the chronological treatment of the law’s development, R. v. Cory Bros 
and Co. Ltd.
43
 was the first reported case of manslaughter being brought against a 
corporation. The defendants were the company and three employees of the same 
company. The directors of the company by concord decided to erect an electrified 
fence to avoid looting and damage to property. A miner stumbled against the fence 
and was electrocuted. The basis of the private prosecution was that the company had 
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caused the manslaughter and had prepared a mantrap. The committal stage of the 
proceedings was successful, however at the Glamorgan Assizes; Finlay J. took a 
different view. He noted: - 
“It is always a tempting argument to say that the common law ought to keep pace with 
modern developments, and therefore it ought to be decided that these authorities are 
antiquated and that in 1927 they do not apply. Well, all I can say to that argument is 
this: it may be that the law ought to be altered; on the other hand it may be that these 
authorities ought to still govern the law, but it is enough for me to say, sitting here, 
that in my opinion I am bound by authorities, which show quite clearly that as the law 
stands an indictment will not lie against a corporation either for a felony or for a 
misdemeanour … the company cannot be indicted for these offences”44. 
Despite Lennard’s case being heard by the House of Lords, neither the King’s Bench 
Division in Mousell or Finlay J. in R. v. Cory Bros. referred to it. This is further 
couched with some irony in the above quote Finlay J. states that “the common law 
ought to keep pace with modern developments”. His judgment makes no reference to 
the Lennard’s case which was at the time a reasonably recent House of Lords 
decision, with the judgment handed down only 12 years before R. v. Cory Bros. 
This omission by two different courts is illustrative of the fragmented and disjointed 
evolution of corporate criminal liability. It could be argued that due to this judicial 
insouciance, a decision from the highest court in the land was overlooked.  
The decision of Finlay J. received criticism both at the time and thereafter. Writing in 
1929 Winn argued that: - 
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“… the intra vires decisions and commands of the board of directors, are factually, 
and should be legally, the decisions of the corporations … A corporation should be 
answerable criminally as well as civilly for the acts of its primary representatives”45. 
More recently, Pinto and Evans are critical of Finlay J., “[h]is scrutiny of the law was 
minimal; he referred to only four cases … Although R. v. Cory Bros Ltd no longer 
represents the law, it is typical of the uneven development of corporate criminal 
liability. Early judicial opposition to corporate liability was couched in terms of 
procedural obstacles, but the opposition persisted even after those obstacles were 
removed”46. We now turn to consider those procedural obstacles.  
 
1.2.2. Procedural Obstacles 
 
There were a number of procedural obstacles or difficulties that were in existence that 
were problematical for the judiciary. A company or corporation by its nature could 
not be imprisoned or sentenced to death. This caused practical problems in that for a 
felonious matter, these were the typical sentences in the 19
th
 Century and before. 
Furthermore, an alternative sentencing option, namely a financial penalty, could only 
be enforced with regards to a felony if a statutory provision allowed it. It was only by 
s.13 Criminal Justice Act (1948), that this hurdle was finally overcome and this 
obstacle removed
47
. 
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Additionally, with regard to the practicalities of bringing a criminal prosecution 
against the company, how would the company appear before the court? Insofar as 
matters to be dealt with summarily, this was addressed by virtue of the Summary 
Jurisdiction Act (1848)
48
. However, matters to be tried on indictment were 
significantly more complex due to the requirement of the defendant’s attendance in 
court. Given that the company is a separate legal entity, this posed a problematical 
legal obstacle. Again, it was only by a change in the law in 1925
49
 that this issue was 
eradicated and a company could then enter its plea via its representative. 
 
1.2.3. The landmark 1944 cases  
 
As referred to previously and as Wells acknowledges “[a] trio of cases in the 1940s 
established the corporate liability principle for mens rea offences which is known in 
English law today”50.  
The first of the three cases, DPP v. Kent and Sussex Contractors Limited
51
, was 
initially heard by the Glamorgan Justices and thereafter by the Divisional Court. The 
company had been charged with two offences under the Defence (General) 
Regulations (1939). The Glamorgan Justices refused to convict the company, on the 
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ground that, as Wells notes, “a body corporate could not be guilty of offences 
requiring proof of a dishonest state of mind”52. The appeal of the Prosecutor was 
allowed by the Divisional Court. Viscount Caldecote C.J. observed that: - 
“The offences created by the regulation are those of doing something with intent to 
deceive or of making a statement known to be false in a material particular ... I can 
see nothing in any of the authorities to which we have been referred which requires us 
to say that a company is incapable of being found guilty of the offences with which the 
respondent company was charged”53. 
MacNaghten J. added: - 
“It is true that a corporation can only have knowledge and form an intention through 
its human agents, but circumstances may be such that the knowledge and intention of 
the agent must be imputed to the body corporate”54. 
Hallett J. also observed that: - 
“… the liability of a body corporate for crimes was at one time a matter of doubt, 
partly owing to the theoretical difficulty of imputing a criminal intention to a fictitious 
person and partly to technical difficulties of procedure. Procedure has received 
attention from the legislature, as for instance, in s.33 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1925, and the theoretical difficulty of imputing criminal intention is no longer felt to 
the same extent”55.  
However, as Pinto and Evans note, the decision although clearly based on the doctrine 
of identification, made no reference to Viscount Haldane’s judgment in Lennard’s, 
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and “[p]erhaps for that reason, the Divisional Court gave no consideration to whether 
the transport manager represented the “directing mind and will” of the company”56.  
The decision in Kent and Sussex Contractors was approved by the Court of Appeal in 
the next of the 1944 trio of cases, namely R. v. I.C.R. Haulage Limited and Others
57
. 
The company was charged with the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud. 
Clearly the common law offence has no statutory basis. For this reason this case can 
be distinguished from the other two 1944 decisions. Stable J. as part of the judgment, 
considered the decision from Kent and Sussex Contractors and confirmed “[t]here is 
a distinction between that case and the present, in that there the offences were charged 
under a regulation having the effect of a statute, whereas here the offence is a 
common law misdemeanour, but, in our judgment, this distinction has no material 
bearing on the question we have to decide”58. Unfortunately, no guidance was 
provided by the court on the significance and consequence of the distinction between 
offences that flow from statute and those that are common law offences.  
The offence of conspiracy to defraud requires mens rea. Nevertheless, the company 
was convicted of this offence (as was the company’s managing director).  
As Png recognises that “[w]hile the directing mind theory as expounded in the 
Lennard’s case has since been applied in civil, criminal and regulatory proceedings, 
the cases of Kent & Sussex Contractors and I.C.R. Haulage provide authority for its 
application in criminal and regulatory offences”59. 
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The third of the 1944 trilogy of cases, Moore v. Bressler
60
, was heard by the 
Divisional Court in 1944. The Judgment was provided by Viscount Caldecote, who as 
stated above, provided the judgment in Kent and Sussex Contractors Limited. In this 
case, the employees embezzled the company, and thereafter the company submitted 
incorrect returns and avoided the requisite tax liability under s.35(2) Finance (No.2) 
Act (1940). Viscount Caldecote provided the leading judgment, however Humphrey J. 
agreeing with his senior judicial colleague, provided a clear analysis: - 
“Being a limited company, the company could only act by means of human agents. It 
is difficult to imagine two persons whose acts could more effectively bind the 
company or who could be said in the terms of their employment to be more obvious as 
agents for the purpose of the company than the secretary and the general manager of 
that branch and the sales manager of that branch”61.  
In a similar vein to the other 1944 cases, the directing mind and will doctrine was not 
contemplated in this case. However, this decision was referred to in Meridian by the 
Privy Council
62
. 
As Pinto and Evans state: - 
“These three cases mark the first appearance in the criminal law of the “doctrine of 
identification” which governs the criminal liability of a corporation in cases which do 
not fall within the scope of vicarious liability. Although they have been described as 
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“revolutionary”, they are vulnerable to critical analysis; none considered the 
“directing mind and will” test, or even cited Viscount Haldane’s dictum”63. 
 
1.2.4.  Lord Denning intervenes with “medieval anthropomorphism” 
 
Lord Denning in the civil case of Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd. v. Graham & Sons 
Ltd.
64
 further considered the doctrine of the “directing mind and will” and “sought to 
clearly establish the directing mind test as the simple overarching capstone for the 
civil and criminal liability of companies”65. Lord Denning provided his own 
perspective on the organic theory and further extrapolated the doctrine through the 
use of metaphor, which has been referred to by commentators as “medieval 
anthropomorphism”66: - 
“A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and nerve 
centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in 
accordance with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the company are 
mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and 
cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and managers who 
represent the directing mind and will of the company, and control what it does. The 
state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by 
the law as such. So you will find that in cases where the law requires personal fault as 
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a condition of liability in tort, the fault of the manager will be the personal fault of the 
company”67. 
Ong and Wickins have described Lord Denning’s statement as “a bold attempt ... to 
redefine and unify the law in terms of a simple pervasive theory, rather than to merely 
reiterate what already existed”68. However, there is no reference to Lennard’s case 
and again Ong and Wickins state that “… on a dispassionate reading the only 
authority on criminal law referred to by Lord Denning in support of his proposition, 
namely R. v. ICR Haulage Limited [1944] 1 All E.R. 691 contains no mention of the 
directing mind theory in name or in substance”69. With this in mind, it further 
illustrates how the development of this doctrine has been disjointed. Lord Denning 
should surely have taken Lennard’s case as a starting point and foundation on which 
to build a fuller sense of the identity doctrine. 
 
1.2.5.  A key House of Lords decision - Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass    
 
Both Lennard’s and the Bolton case were considered in the next judgment. Pinto and 
Evans note the significance of the House of Lords decision in Tesco Supermarkets 
Ltd. v. Nattrass
70
, where it “established that the doctrine of identification applied, in 
principle, to all offences not based upon vicarious liability. The decision established 
that a corporation could be convicted of a non-regulatory offence requiring proof of 
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mens rea if the natural person who had committed the actus reus of the offence could 
be identified with the corporation”71. 
Lord Reid stated: - 
“A living person has a mind which can have knowledge or intention or be negligent 
and he has hands to carry out his intentions. A corporation has none of these: it must 
act through living persons, though not always one or the same person. Then the 
person who acts is not speaking or acting for the company. He is acting as the 
company and his mind which directs his act is the mind of the company. There is no 
question of the company being vicariously liable. He is not acting as a servant, 
representative, agent or delegate. He is an embodiment of the company or, one could 
say, he hears and speaks through the persona of the company, within his appropriate 
sphere, and his mind is the mind of the company. If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is 
the guilt of the company”72. 
The Tesco case has been widely discussed and analysed by a number of 
commentators. Png contends that the decision was important as “First, it upheld the 
traditional directing mind theory as expressed in the Lennard’s case and distinguished 
it from liability under employer-employee or principal-agent relationships … 
Secondly, it emphasized the need to construe the relevant legislation in the context of 
corporations … Thirdly, it provided that the class of individuals who may be regarded 
as a corporation’s directing mind does not extend beyond those of whom that are 
empowered under its constitution to exercise its powers”73. 
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The view of the House of Lords in this case was significant in that as mentioned 
above, it confirmed that if a person had committed the physical act of the crime and if 
that person could be identified as a senior officer within the company, then liability 
could follow for the company. However, the narrow test applied by the House of 
Lords in this case has proven problematical as will be seen later in this chapter and 
certainly in the next chapter.    
As Burles acknowledged “[t]he ratio of Tesco, however, is much more important than 
the decision itself. This established the general test of corporate criminal liability. The 
loose and flexible test of the 1944 cases was disapproved and in its place a far stricter 
one laid down. The actions and mens rea of a company, the new test stated, could 
only be derived from the actions and mens rea of those officers representing that 
company’s directing mind and will, i.e. only from the most senior officers of the 
company”74 
After considering these particular cases, a pattern begins to emerge that would cause 
significant difficulties and in some later cases insurmountable difficulties. These 
insurmountable difficulties reverberate through the cases that feature in the second 
chapter, specifically when trying to identify the “directing mind and will” within a 
complex and large corporate structure.   
As Dignam and Lowry recognised from the Tesco case, “[t]he application of the 
organic theory acted effectively as an immunity from criminal prosecution for large 
complex corporate organisations”75. Png realises that: - 
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“a weakness of the directing mind theory under the decisions in Lennard’s and Tesco 
Supermarkets is that it tends to restrict the extent to which a corporation may incur 
liability ... The use of the expression “directing mind and will” seems to convey the 
idea that it is the individuals who are in positions of management and control whose 
conduct or state of mind are attributable to the corporation. 
The practical implication of this interpretation is that it becomes more difficult to 
establish liability against larger corporations since individuals at senior managerial 
positions are not always directly involved in the activities that resulted in the alleged 
infringement and wrongdoing”76. 
By limiting the focus towards the very pinnacle of companies, the identification 
becomes much more difficult, inhibiting successful prosecutions. Within larger 
companies there are invariably many tiers of responsibility making the link between 
those individuals and the acts that occur simply very difficult. A point that features 
throughout the various commentaries and articles is that Managing Directors do not 
drive trains; they make decisions within board meetings and are not intrinsically 
involved with the day to day aspects of company.   
This view is shared by Gobert: - 
“This “identification” model of fault, embraced by the House of Lords in Nattrass, 
can be criticised for the narrowness of its horizons and for its failure to capture the 
complexity of the modern company. When a crime occurs in the course of business, it 
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is likely to be the result of a breakdown in more than one sphere of the company’s 
operation”77. 
Taking Gobert’s point further, requires a simple analysis of a typical large company. 
There will be a board of Directors, also various heads of department with differing 
portfolios such as finance or health and safety, a myriad of middle management and 
thereafter the remainder of the workforce. Decisions that are taken at board level will 
cascade down the management structure for implementation by the Heads of 
Department, through middle management to the employees. Similarly, there will be a 
process whereby information is passed up the chain of command to inform the board 
of problems at shop floor level. As Gobert suggests, if a crime has occurred in the 
course of its business, it is likely that a number of mistakes or omissions of varying 
significance have occurred at different levels within the company. Therefore, a 
number of departments may be at fault and therein lies the difficulties with this 
narrow test, how can the requisite senior officer be identified with the directing mind 
and will?    
Wells continues and elaborates upon Gobert’s point: - 
“The relatively narrow doctrine developed via the leading House of Lords case of 
Tesco v. Nattrass had as its governing principle that only those who control or 
manage the affairs of a company are regarded as embodying the company itself ... 
The identification principle essentially meant that a company would be liable for a 
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serious criminal offence (only) where one of its most senior officers had acted with 
the requisite fault”78. 
The Tesco decision resulted in a narrow approach being taken and adopted by the 
courts. It is this narrow approach - this “tight pyramidal view of decision making” - 
that produced a legal impediment when tested against a large and complex corporate 
structure. This impediment features heavily through the cases that are discussed in 
Chapter Two. The key problem with the identification doctrine is that within a 
complex management structure, it is difficult to establish that directing mind, 
although as will be seen, with a small company or a so-called “one man band” it is a 
much simpler task. It is very difficult to locate any arguments in favour of the 
identification doctrine, although it could be suggested that the larger corporations that 
feature in Chapter Two could constitute its greatest benefactors. 
However, as Pinto and Evans state: - 
“Whatever criticisms there may be of the decision in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v. 
Nattrass it remains the general basis of corporate liability in English criminal law”79. 
The next substantive section will discuss some of the more recent Appellate decisions 
that have considered and interpreted the directing mind and will doctrine.  
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1.2.6.  More recent Appellate Court considerations upon the Directing Mind and 
Will Doctrine 
 
The “directing mind and will” doctrine was, according to Ong and Wickins80, 
“reshaped” by the Court of Appeal decision in El Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings plc81. 
Ong and Wickins continued, “Nourse L.J. did accept the general paramountcy of the 
directing mind theory. His Lordship stated that the directing mind theory had been 
developed with no divergence of approach in both the criminal and civil jurisdictions, 
and the authorities in each area were cited indifferently in the other”82. This was a 
civil case and the facts of which are particularly complex. On the fundamental point 
of the “directing mind and will” doctrine, the court at first instance held that “the 
Chairman was not a directing mind as he played only a minor and perfunctory role in 
the actual management of the company. The Court of Appeal disagreed”83. It was 
arguable that the reasoning of the Court of Appeal did not run parallel to Lennard’s 
and Tesco and that the “re-shaping” was a judicial attempt to move away from the 
narrowness of Tesco. 
“All three judges in the Court of Appeal redefined the directing mind test to cover 
those officers of the company who had control of a certain type or class of 
transaction. Thus they did not have to be in the top level of management, or be in 
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control of the general management of the company. Their role could be far more 
limited”84.  
Despite the mixture of orthodox views suggested by Hoffmann L.J. and Rose L.J., 
and the novel view of Nourse L.J., this unusual conclusion was reached. As Ong and 
Wickins suggest “the reasoning in the El Ajou case runs counter to the spirit, and very 
probably the letter, of the line of cases based on Lennard’s Case and the Tesco 
Supermarkets case”85. However, as will be seen the “orthodoxy” was restored by the 
House of Lords in Seaboard Offshore Limited. 
The House of Lords decision in Seaboard Offshore Limited v. Secretary of State for 
Transport: The Safe Carrier
86
 followed three months after the El Ajou decision. This 
appeal, by way of case stated, focussed on the application of the principles from 
Tesco to section 31 Merchant Shipping Act 1988
87
. This particular section, which 
required a company to take all reasonable steps to ensure that a vessel is operating in 
a safe manner, was introduced following the findings of the Sheen Inquiry into the 
Herald of Free Enterprise disaster in Zeebrugge (see Chapter Two). 
Lord Keith of Kinkel provided the courts judgment in Seaboard (in which all the Law 
Lords concurred), applied the principle from Tesco. Ong and Wickins provide a sound 
assessment of the view of the House of Lords: - 
“His Lordship felt that it was not the intent of the legislation to make owners liable 
for the actions of every officer or member of the crew of a ship ... The Tesco 
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Supermarkets case was the only case cited, and no mention was made of the El Ajou 
case. Lord Keith thus defined the directing mind in conventional terms as 
encompassing only those, who ... were entrusted with the exercise of the powers of the 
corporation, and not those in subordinate positions. Thus orthodoxy seemed to have 
been re-established”88.  
Therefore the House of Lords decided to ally the law along the Tesco approach and by 
not mentioning the El Ajou Court of Appeal decision, made it very clear that the 
decision of the lower court was not relevant. 
As discussed through this chapter, the common thread running through this discussion 
is the uneven development of this aspect of the law. Following the decision in 
Seaboard and the re-affirming of the orthodox approach, the House of Lords then 
considered an alternative set of circumstances in a later case.  
Nakajima reflected upon this next relevant case: - 
“On the other hand, as was dramatically illustrated in the House of Lords’ decision 
in Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete [1995] 1 AC 456, an employee who acts for 
the company within the scope of his employment, even if against the express 
instructions of his employer, may well bind the company as he is the company for the 
purpose of the transaction in question”89. 
The facts of Director General of Fair Trading v. Pioneer Concrete (UK) Limited, also 
known more commonly as Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No.2)
90
 are relevant 
and require analysis. The Director General of Fair Trading had obtained injunctions 
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under s.35 Restrictive Practices Act 1976 against Pioneer Concrete and other 
companies. The nature of the restraint was to restrict the service agreements relating 
to the supply of ready mixed concrete. The companies that were subject to the 
injunction had explicitly instructed their staff/ employees to comply with the terms of 
the injunction. Failure to do so would result in a civil contempt of court action. 
However, some employees were acting, unknown to the company and controlling 
management; beyond the terms of the injunction and the Restrictive Practices Court 
found the company to be in contempt of court; by vicarious liability. This despite the 
company being unaware of the employee’s activities and also having a system in 
place, namely instructing staff to not step outside of the injunction. 
An appeal was made to the Court of Appeal, which reversed the decision of the 
Restrictive Practices Court. However, as will be discussed below, the House of Lords 
in turn disagreed with the Court of Appeal and overruled their decision.  
The House of Lords held that the “company could be found to be in contempt of court 
by disobeying an order as a result of a deliberate act by its servant on its behalf; and 
that ... since the employees ... had, by their deliberate conduct, made their employers 
liable for disobeying the injunctions, both companies were guilty of contempt of 
court”91. As McKittrick recounts in relation to this decision, “the distinction between 
the “brains” and the “hands” was here irrelevant”92. 
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The proposition in the Tesco case can be ignored, as this case illustrates. Lord Nolan 
at page 476 of the judgment referred to the Tesco decision and distinguished it from 
the stance in this case: - 
“... the proposition that in the case of a body corporate the necessary mens rea must 
be found in a natural person or persons who are the directing mind and will of the 
corporation. But that case was concerned with the precise terms of the statutory 
defence provided by the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 for those who could show that 
the offence in question had been committed by another person, and that the person 
charged had taken all reasonable precaution and exercised all due diligence to avoid 
the commission of the offence. The statute expressly distinguished, by section 20(1), 
between “any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of a body 
corporate” and other persons who were merely its servants or agents ... that the 
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd decision does not bear”. 
 As seen above within this decision and in the other decisions outlined previously, 
with the development of corporate criminal liability, is the importance of statutory 
interpretation. McKittrick analyses Lord Nolan’s view of Tesco where His Lordship 
refers to the “precise terms” of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 and comments that 
“[t]hose terms permitted the corporation to escape liability if the “brains” of the 
company could show that they had taken “reasonable precautions” to prevent a breach 
of the law and that it was the “hands” who had broken the law, notwithstanding the 
precautions. The “distinguishing” of the decision of the House of Lords reached in 
that case is illustrative of the fact that the criminal liability of a corporation is as likely 
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to depend on the rules of interpretation of statutes as on theories of corporate 
liability”93.  
As Gray confirms, the decision of the House of Lords in this matter, “is further 
evidence of this shift away from a formula for determining corporate responsibility 
based on a simple model of corporate organisation of vertically structured hierarchy 
with an elite cadre exercising command and control and being the only people in the 
company capable of imbuing it with responsibility”94.  
The decision of the House of Lords in this case and the previous Court of Appeal 
decision in El Ajou could be seen as an augmentation of the “directing mind and will” 
doctrine away from the narrowness of Tesco, although as mentioned above a great 
deal will depend upon the relevant statute and thereafter the statutory interpretation 
itself.   
Png suggests a similar view and states that “[a]s part of the development of principles 
of attribution, the decisions in El Ajou and Ready Mixed Concrete represent 
expansions from the traditional directing mind theory”95. Png continues and expands 
upon this point and provides four key explanations
96
. 
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The following section will consider a leading Privy Council decision. The decisions 
from Tesco and Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete feature significantly in the 
decision of the Privy Council.    
 
1.2.7.  The Directing Mind and Will on the sidelines? 
 
The Privy Council decision in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v. 
Securities Commission
97
 and particularly the judgment of Lord Hoffmann “seems to 
have relegated the directing mind theory completely to the sidelines in matters of 
criminal and even civil liability”98 and as Dignam and Lowry state that “Lord 
Hoffmann considered the organic theory provided a misleading analysis”99. 
Lord Hoffmann placed no dependence on the decision from El Ajou, which could be 
seen as odd as he was sitting in the Court of Appeal at the time. He attempted to bring 
together the House of Lords decision in Tesco and the decision in Re Supply of Ready 
Mixed Concrete (No. 2) and started from the point that a company as separate legal 
entity and that it “must act through human agents… In matters of criminal liability, 
the persons high or low in the management structure whose actions bound the 
company were determined simply by issues of statutory interpretation. Thus the Tesco 
Supermarkets case was easily reconcilable with the Re Supply of Ready Mixed 
Concrete (No. 2) case. Both depended merely on the intent of the legislature in the 
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relevant legislation. Up to this point Lord Hoffmann managed to erect a complete 
system of corporate criminal liability and civil liability without specifically 
mentioning the directing mind theory”100. 
Lord Hoffmann took the view that it was a mistake to “seize on the phrase “directing 
mind and will””101 that had been applied in the Lennard’s case by Viscount Haldane 
and “use that as a criterion for determining whose thoughts and/ or actions will be 
attributed to a company”102. Whilst delivering the judgment, Lord Hoffmann, 
confirmed “that the question is one of construction rather than metaphysics”103 and 
referred to the policy behind s.20 Securities Amendment Act (1988) and there should 
be a “true construction of s.20(4)(e)”104.   
Lord Hoffmann further elaborated with regards to the interpretation of the law: - 
“given that it was (the law) intended to apply to a company, how was it intended to 
apply? Whose acts (or knowledge, or state of mind) was for this purpose intended to 
count as the act etc. of the company? One finds the answer to this question by 
applying the usual canons of interpretation, taking into account the language of the 
rule (if it is a statute) and its content and policy”105. 
In this case, as well as it being the actual statutory language that was interpreted, it 
appears that the policy that lies behind the statute was given credence by the Privy 
Council. Lord Hoffmann continued and made this very important observation: - 
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“It is a question of construction in each case as to whether the particular rule 
requires that the knowledge that an act has been done, or the state of mind with which 
it was done, should be attributed to the company”106. 
This is a key point and Lord Hoffmann provides two examples
107
 within the judgment 
and states there was no inconsistency between them “[e]ach is an example of an 
attribution rule for a particular purpose, tailored as it always must be to the terms and 
policies of the substantive rule”108. As mentioned above, the Privy Council made clear 
that the policy behind the statute is of significance and should receive credence. 
The significance of the particular statute being interpreted by the courts according to 
this decision is paramount. However, as will be seen in the next chapter, the offence 
of manslaughter is a common law offence and therefore there is no statute to interpret. 
The offence of manslaughter and its specific elements will be considered at the 
beginning of the next chapter.    
Robert-Tissot suggested that “[t]he clarity and flexibility of this new approach is 
welcome. There will remain some uncertainty as to the proper construction of 
different statutes, and who within the company is at a sufficient level for their acts 
and knowledge to be attributed to the company”109. Furthermore, the approach taken 
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in Tesco v. Nattrass was “restrictive and did not adequately reflect the management 
structure of many large companies by which responsibility devolves from the 
centre”110.  
The view of Robert-Tissot, namely that the Tesco approach was “restrictive”, in 
essence means that the stance adopted by the House of Lords in that case was as 
argued by Gray, “an overly simplistic reliance on the “directing mind and will” 
approach to the liability of a company for the acts of its employees”111. As mentioned 
and discussed above, following the fuller consideration of the Tesco decision, 
criticism did flow from the decision and the approach that was taken as Pinto and 
Evans state: - 
“The problem with the decision in Tesco is that the case has been understood as 
providing a practically exhaustive list of those whose acts or state of mind can be 
attributed to any corporation. This is to concentrate on the identity of company 
officers instead of the aim of the statutory provisions in question. Over twenty years 
later, this misapprehension was corrected by Lord Hoffmann in Meridian”112. 
Pinto and Evans continue: - 
“The effect of Tesco, at first glance has been to limit criminal liability for practical 
purposes to the very bottom of the corporate scale”113. 
This approach caused many of the difficulties experienced by the cases that will be 
discussed in Chapter Two.   
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As Robert-Tissot acknowledges that a Privy Council decision has no binding upon the 
Courts of England and Wales, however “as a unanimous decision of the Privy Council 
it is likely to be followed”114. Robert-Tissot continues “[a]fter Meridian the search for 
the directing mind and will of a company will only be appropriate where a proper 
construction of the relevant law provides that only the acts and intentions of persons 
embodying the directing mind and will of the company can be attributed to the 
company for the purposes of establishing whether the company is in breach of the 
law”115. 
Put very simply, this decision is an illustration of the primacy of whether the 
particular offence or rule and its application to corporations is a question of 
interpretation of the particular rule as opposed to the dissection of the corporation in 
question and a post-mortem of its metaphysical elements. Therefore, the interpretation 
is the first issue to contend with was the particular offence/ rule supposed to or 
intended to apply to companies and if so how should it apply? Only after this has been 
established, the view of the Privy Council according to Ong and Wickins is “that the 
directing mind test in both criminal and civil cases is a very limited exception based 
purely on the wording of certain exceptional statutes”116.   
Ong and Wickins contend that following this particular judgment “[t]he result, it is 
suggested, is the general collapse of the directing mind and will theory”117. 
In summary, the most recent court decisions, including Meridian that have considered 
the identification doctrine despite “claiming merely to reconcile or explain”118, in fact 
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“have thrown the law into considerable confusion”119. Although despite the criticism 
of some of the approach taken by the Privy Council in Meridian, it is an example of a 
case whereby “the acts or thoughts of an individual who is not part of a company’s 
directing mind and will have been attributed to a company in order to make it 
criminally liable”120. Therefore, it could be argued that this decision has widened the 
net for those that could be identified.   
As seen above, the development of corporate criminal liability has not been straight-
forward and a number of the judgments have not been helpful and some have added 
confusion to this difficult area of the law. Professor Wells appropriately summarises 
the state of the law: - 
“Corporate criminal liability had been a subject undeveloped in theory and little 
explored in practice. This changed in the 1990’s after which developments fell into 
two broad categories: judicial or legal changes in corporate liability generally and 
proposals for the reform of corporate manslaughter. The judicial changes themselves 
fall into two divisions: those concerning the “classification” of offences, and moves to 
extend identification liability”121. 
The Law Commission were equally concerned with the state of the law in a recent 
consultation paper where they stated: - 
“It is clear from the examination of the main authorities dealing with the application 
of the identification doctrine that the law in this area suffers from considerable 
uncertainty ... Certainly, it would have been a considerable improvement if 
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Parliament had stepped in long ago to define the nature and scope of the 
identification doctrine.
122” 
 
1.3.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has considered the development of corporate criminal liability and the 
“directing mind and will”/ identification doctrine. Before the use of the “directing 
mind and will” doctrine, vicarious liability was favoured by the courts. However, it 
could be argued that using vicarious liability as a basis of corporate criminal liability 
results in a wide liability for a company, namely being responsible for all its 
employees. The use of vicarious liability is limited in that it must fall within one of 
the exceptions for its usage, such as the offence being contained within a statute and 
thereafter it is a matter of statutory construction.  
This can be contrasted with the “directing mind and will” post Tesco where a narrow 
and restricted approach was adopted where only those in the highest echelons of a 
company are held to be relevant. It is contended that a more balanced basis is required 
and perhaps the “senior management” test that is stipulated within section 1(3) 
CMCHA will be more appropriate. However, this test is not without its critics and will 
be considered more extensively in later chapters.  
As Wells recognises “[i]n truth ... there is no easy history of corporate criminal 
liability”123. This point of view is accurate in that over the years of development and 
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application of the doctrine, the various courts have not always referred to or 
considered what would be seen as key decisions. For example, the trio of 1944 cases 
did not refer to the decision in Lennard’s case and the judgement of Viscount Haldane 
L.C.; which in itself is peculiar given its significance in the history and genesis of the 
doctrine. Furthermore, the decision in Bolton where Lord Denning extrapolated the 
organic theory, but yet again made no reference to Lennard’s case, which reinforces 
the view that the development has been uneven and disjointed. 
The decision in Tesco is to be seen as important, but the decision was widely 
criticised and the reverberations from this decision are felt throughout the cases that 
will be contemplated in Chapter Two. However, the decision from Tesco remains the 
general basis of corporate criminal liability in English law. 
As discussed previously, the doctrine was re-shaped by the Court of Appeal, moving 
away from Tesco in El Ajou. However, the House of Lords restored the orthodoxy 
after the decision in Seaboard, which was handed down shortly after the El Ajou 
decision and returned the understanding back towards the narrow Tesco stance. Just 
by considering these decisions it is clear why Wells sees the history of corporate 
criminal liability as an uneasy journey. Certainly, when considering Re Ready Supply 
of Mixed Concrete and Meridian, the issue of statutory interpretation and the policy 
behind the legislation is brought to the fore. Statutory interpretation echoes 
throughout a number of the decisions that have been considered. Indeed as discussed 
above, some have considered that the decision in Meridian sidelined the doctrine. 
The doctrine has been criticised widely and it would be counter-intuitive to suggest 
that there are no arguments in favour of it. However, it appears that the only likely 
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proponents of this doctrine and arguably its greatest advocates are the corporations 
that benefitted from its difficulties that will be discussed in Chapter Two. 
It is therefore a curiosity as to why the doctrine remained in place for so long? This is 
most likely due to a lack of plausible alternatives. Vicarious Liability had been used 
previously, but was of limited use. The clear thread that runs through the development 
of this area of the law is that there is no simple solution readily available. This issue 
of alternatives will be considered in Chapter Three.       
There are now difficulties that are incumbent within the doctrine which will be 
discussed in Chapter Two. This is particularly well surmised by Pinto and Evans: - 
“In the case of a substantial corporation, a director will seldom have sufficient 
proximity to the unlawful act to be personally liable and without such personal 
liability on the part of a person who is the “directing mind and will” of the 
corporation liability cannot be attributed to it”124. 
It is this difficulty in identifying the requisite “directing mind and will” that has 
caused insurmountable hurdles within the cases that will now be discussed.  
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Chapter Two - Successful and Unsuccessful Prosecutions for Corporate 
Manslaughter 
 
Historically, the relevant test that was applied when trying to establish corporate 
criminal liability for manslaughter was the identification or “directing mind and will” 
doctrine. This doctrine as seen previously was not without its problems and legal 
difficulties.  
Below will follow a consideration of successful and unsuccessful prosecutions for 
corporate manslaughter and a number of the cases and disasters are well known, such 
as the Herald of Free Enterprise and the Southall Rail disaster.  
Prior to the discussion of the successful and unsuccessful prosecutions for corporate 
manslaughter, will be a consideration of the common law offence of manslaughter.  
The development of this doctrine over the years and when applied to companies 
charged with manslaughter, appeared to work with some success against smaller 
companies, but was somewhat inept when considered against a larger company. This 
point is central to the discussion that follows below, particularly when analysing the 
bigger companies that were subject to investigations and/ or prosecutions following 
major disasters that had resulted in significant human casualties.  
The doctrine and some of the cases that developed and shaped the doctrine have been 
widely criticised for having too narrow a view, particularly the decision of the House 
of Lords in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass
1
. It is this “narrowness” that features 
repeatedly in the section below that considers the unsuccessful prosecutions. As will 
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be seen, as a result of the number of unsuccessful prosecutions of larger companies, 
the reform was both desirable and necessary which will be discussed and analysed in 
Chapter Three. 
The first substantive section will consider the common law offence of manslaughter. 
The section will outline its specific elements as considered by a number of court 
decisions.  
The second substantive section will consider the successful prosecutions for 
Corporate Manslaughter. As mentioned above, these successful prosecutions have all 
featured small companies, where identifying the directing mind has proved 
significantly easier than establishing the directing mind within a larger company.  
The third substantive section will consider the large number of unsuccessful 
prosecutions and investigations into much larger companies. The various cases and 
investigations have been approached in a chronological manner, so as to track the 
growing desire and need for reform. 
 
2.1. The common law offence of manslaughter 
 
To understand the application of the offence of manslaughter to corporations, it is first 
necessary to outline the offence of manslaughter and how it applies to individuals. 
There are two main forms of manslaughter, voluntary and involuntary. The relevant 
type for this thesis is involuntary manslaughter, specifically gross negligence 
manslaughter. 
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As with all common law offences, the offence itself is subject to court interpretation 
and re-statement. This offence has changed and has been modified over the years. As 
discussed below, the trial that followed the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster was 
subject to the law at the time and was tested by the application of Caldwell
2
 type 
reckless manslaughter. The House of Lords in Caldwell considered the application of 
section one of the Criminal Damage Act (1971) and Lord Diplock provided a person 
is Caldwell type reckless if the risk is obvious and either that the person has not given 
any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or that the individual has 
acknowledged that there is some risk involved but has carried on with his conduct. 
The House of Lords decision in R. v. Seymour
3
 and the Privy Council decision in 
Kong Cheuk Kwan v. R.
4
 suggested that there was a form of involuntary 
manslaughter based upon Caldwell type recklessness. 
The law was, however, re-stated following the House of Lords decision in R. v. 
Adomako
5
, which is considered the leading judgment in this area. Lord Mackay of 
Clashfern, the then Lord Chancellor, provided the judgment of the House of Lords. 
There are four elements that must be proved for the offence to be complete. Firstly, 
the defendant must owe a duty of care to the victim; secondly, there must be a breach 
of that duty by the defendant; thirdly, the death of the victim occurred as a result of 
the breach of that duty; and fourthly, the nature of the breach was so gross that it 
would substantiate a criminal conviction.  
Below will follow a brief analysis of each of the four elements in turn beginning with 
the defendant owing the victim a duty of care. 
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2.1.1. A duty of care 
 
It must be established that a duty of care was owed to the victim by the defendant. 
Lord Mackay in Adomako considered the issue of the duty of care and it was decided 
that it should be given its usual meaning in the (civil) law of negligence
6
. Put simply, 
a duty is owed from one person to another if it is foreseeable that they may suffer 
harm as a result of an action or omission. To provide an example, a duty of care is 
owed by a doctor to his or her patient in their care. The Court of Appeal have dealt 
with many cases on this area of the law and more recently in 2009 held that the judge, 
rather than the jury, should make the decision whether a duty existed
7
.  
 
2.1.2. The breach of that duty 
 
It is for the jury to decide whether, as a result of the actions or inactions of the 
defendant, his conduct resulted in a breach of the duty of care owed to the victim. The 
standard that is applied is whether the actions of the defendant fell below that 
expected of a reasonable person.  The Court of Appeal has said that this is a question 
of fact and should be decided on a case-by-case basis
8
.  
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2.1.3. The death of the victim was caused as a result of the breach of the duty 
 
For the third element to be fulfilled, it must be shown that the victim died as a result 
of the defendant’s breach of the duty that was owed. The usual rules of causation 
apply and this was explained in a straightforward manner by Herring whereby the 
“simplest way for the jury to consider the question would be to ask: If the defendant 
had acted reasonably would the victim have been killed?”9 
 
2.1.4. The breach was so gross that it would substantiate a criminal conviction 
 
It must be established that the breach of duty by the defendant was sufficiently 
“gross”. It is a question for the jury to consider whether this breach was so serious 
that it requires a criminal conviction. In Adomako, Lord Mackay referred to a 
statement delivered by Lord Hewart C.J. sitting in the Court of Appeal in 1925 on this 
point: - 
“… the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation 
between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others, as to 
amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving of punishment”10. 
The Adomako decision left juries with the opportunity to consider all the facets of the 
case before them and it presented them with a sizeable discretion.  
                                                        
9
 Herring, J. “Criminal Law – Text, Cases, and Materials” (2010) 4th Edition at p.276 
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Given the law’s movement towards gross negligence manslaughter from reckless 
manslaughter, one question is whether a prosecution for corporate manslaughter 
would be more or less likely to succeed under either approach? Failed prosecutions 
have arisen by courts applying each type of manslaughter, undermining any 
suggestions that one type or another is to blame
11
.  
The following sections of this chapter will consider the application of the offence of 
manslaughter to corporations and will look at the successful and unsuccessful 
prosecutions that have occurred. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
development of the law in relation to the identification doctrine was disjointed.     
 
2.2.  Successful prosecutions for Corporate Manslaughter 
 
As seen in the first chapter, the development and implementation of the identification 
doctrine was discussed in a number of cases. Notwithstanding these developments, 
the approach of the House of Lords in the Tesco case was the leading judgment and at 
this point formed the general basis of corporate criminal liability in English law. The 
narrowness of the Tesco approach ultimately, when tested, provided a very high 
hurdle for prosecutions involving larger corporations to overcome and will be 
discussed in the next section.  
                                                        
11
 The unsuccessful prosecution following the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster (R. 
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Conversely unlike prosecutions against large corporations, it has been much easier 
and a less troublesome task to prosecute smaller companies for manslaughter despite 
some of the difficulties associated with the identification doctrine as discussed in the 
first chapter. In essence, as confirmed by Pinto and Evans “[i]n the case of a very 
small company of the “one-man band” type, there may be no difficulty in proving that 
there was gross negligence by an individual attributable to the corporation because of 
his control over it”12. 
Pinto and Evans refer to the statistics that prove that size does matter when it comes 
to successful prosecutions against companies, namely “[s]ince 1992 there have been 
some 34 prosecutions for gross negligence manslaughter against corporate defendants 
but only seven convictions, each which has been in a case involving a very small 
company”13. 
The first corporation to be convicted
14
 of corporate manslaughter in English legal 
history was OLL Limited
15
. The case is more readily known as the Lyme Bay canoe 
tragedy, where four teenagers were drowned off Lyme Regis during a canoe trip 
organised by OLL Limited. During the trial, it was heard that the managing director, 
Peter Kite and the company had failed to ensure that the group were safe. Peter Kite 
was found guilty of manslaughter and was sentenced to a three-year custodial 
sentence and the company was convicted of corporate manslaughter and received a 
fine of £60,000. Clarkson states “[a]s the trial judge, Ognall J. put it: “Mr Kite and the 
                                                        
12
 Pinto, A. and Evans, M. “Corporate Criminal Liability” (2008) 2nd Edition at p.221 
13
 Ibid. at p.222 
14
 R. v. Kite and OLL Limited, Winchester Crown Court 8
th
 December 1994, reported 
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15
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company, OLL … stand or fall together. One for all and all for one”16. Welham 
identifies the key feature of the case that distinguishes it from the prosecution of 
companies such as P and O Ferries and Great Western Trains that “[i]t was a 
landmark case as it was the first corporate manslaughter conviction under English 
Law. A crucial aspect to this case was the fact that Kite had personal knowledge of 
the safety failings”17.  
Following on from the conviction against OLL Limited, the second successful 
conviction for corporate manslaughter occurred in 1996 in the case of R. v. Jackson 
Transport (Ossett) Limited
18
. The company was fined £22,000 and its director, Alan 
Jackson received a 12-month custodial sentence and a fine of £1500. The clear 
similarity with the OLL Limited case is that the company was small and as Ormerod 
recognises “[t]he smaller the company the more likely the “senior managers” will 
have had a hand in formulating and implementing the relevant policy on safety, etc; 
the breach of which lead to the death”19. In this particular case it was found that the 
director “was totally indifferent to his statutory duties in that he failed to address the 
issue of a safe system of work. He also failed to take precautions against inevitable 
disasters, and that failure to provide a safe system of work, was only the last in a long 
catalogue of deficiencies”20. 
The other five successful prosecutions (English Bros. (2001) (unreported), Dennis 
Clothier and Sons (2002), Telgard Hardwood Limited (2003) (unreported), 
                                                        
16
 Clarkson, C.M.V. “Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning their Souls” MLR 
(1996) Vol.59(4) 557-572, at p.561 
17
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Compliance” (2002) at p.52 
18
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19
 Ormerod, D. “Smith and Hogan Criminal Law” (2008) 12th Edition at p.536 
20
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Nationwide Heating Services (2004) and Keymark Services Limited (2004)
21
) are of a 
similar nature in that the companies were small and this was one of the main catalysts 
for reform. Wells acknowledges that “[p]recisely the big corporate names which 
people may want to blame are those which are most difficult to target under the 
identification rule (or possibly any other)”22.  
   
2.3.  Unsuccessful Prosecutions 
 
In comparison to the successful prosecutions discussed above, the narrowness of the 
Tesco decision with its “tight pyramidal view of decision making”23 provided 
significant and insurmountable difficulties when applied to a large corporate structure.   
During the consideration of the various disasters and failed prosecutions, on a number 
of occasions the CPS decided not to prosecute on the basis of there being insufficient 
evidence. The CPS does make press releases, but they do not explain the specific 
rationale behind the decision and therefore it is impossible to know exactly why there 
was insufficient evidence to proceed. The nature of the insufficient evidence will have 
been discussed between the investigating authority, such as the police, and the 
prosecuting authority, such as the CPS, in confidential circumstances. Unfortunately, 
this information is not readily accessible and unsatisfactorily leaves a sizeable lacuna 
in the understanding of why the prosecutions were not pursued fully.   
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 See www.corporateaccountability.org/manslaughter/cases/convictions.htm (last 
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Below will follow a chronological consideration of a number of high profile disasters 
that have either been the subject of a prosecution or an investigation of some kind has 
occurred. 
 
2.3.1.  Herald of Free Enterprise (1987) 
 
On 6
th
 March 1987, the roll-on, roll-off ferry, “Herald of Free Enterprise” set sail for 
Dover from the Belgian port of Zeebrugge. Tragically, the vessel set sail with its bow 
doors open and was trimmed with its bow down. Seawater flooded into the vehicle 
deck, causing the ferry to capsize very quickly. It was saved from sinking completely 
only by the fact that the port side of the vessel had rested on the bottom in shallow 
water.  As a result, 188 passengers and crew lost their lives, with many others 
suffering injuries.  
A Department of Transport formal investigation (“the Sheen Inquiry24), found that: - 
“There appears to have been a lack of thought about the way in which the Herald 
ought to have been organised for the Dover/ Zeebrugge run. All concerned in 
management, from the members of the Board of Directors down to the junior 
superintendents, were guilty of fault in that all must be regarded as sharing 
responsibility for the failure of management. From top to bottom the body corporate 
was infected with the disease of sloppiness”.  
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 M V Herald of Free Enterprise, Report of Court No. 8074, 29
th
 July 1987, 
Department of Transport, Paragraph 14.1 
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The Sheen Inquiry was strongly critical of the practices implemented by Townsend 
Car Ferries, who were operating the vessel.  
The relevant legal issues that were presented by this disaster were examined in two 
cases. The first came as a result of a judicial review that sought to challenge the 
findings at the H.M. Coroner’s Inquest “that a company could not be indicted for 
manslaughter and that the acts or omissions of the company personnel could not be 
aggregated so as to render the company liable”25.  
As Wells states, “[t]he Coroner had told the inquest jury that they could not return 
verdicts of unlawful killing, an instruction which he based on two reasons. He 
concluded that there was no arguable case of manslaughter against any of the named 
individuals, and that a company cannot in law be indicted for manslaughter”26. 
Bingham L.J., sitting in the Divisional Court, refusing the applications did state that 
there “was no reason why a charge of reckless manslaughter could not be established 
against a corporation under appropriate circumstances, it (the court) does not need to 
decide on the question since the factual issues have not been determined”27.  Pinto and 
Evans explain that the Divisional Court “concluded that a company could be 
convicted of the common law offence of manslaughter, the basis of such liability 
being the doctrine of identification: “the mens rea and actus reus of manslaughter 
should be established not against those who acted for or in the name of the company 
                                                        
25
 R. v. H.M. Coroner for East Kent, Ex parte Spooner and others (1989) 88 Cr. App. 
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but against those who were to be identified as the embodiment of the company 
itself””28 
However the Divisional Court did concur with the Coroner but not his complete 
analysis, in “the Coroner’s dismissal of aggregation as a possible route to corporate 
manslaughter”29. Bingham L.J. stated that: - 
“I do not think the aggregation argument assists the applicants. Whether the 
defendant is a corporation or a personal defendant, the ingredients of manslaughter 
must be established by proving the necessary mens rea and actus reus of 
manslaughter against it or him by evidence properly to be relied on against it or him. 
A case against a personal defendant cannot be fortified by evidence against another 
defendant. The case against a corporation can only be made by evidence properly 
addressed to showing guilt on the part of the corporation as such”30. 
However, following the resumption of the inquest, the jury decided to ignore the 
directions from H.M. Coroner for East Kent, who stated there was no basis for a 
verdict of corporate manslaughter, and verdicts of unlawful death were returned. 
Following threats of a private prosecution and thanks in part to the decision of the 
Inquest Jury to return verdicts of unlawful killing, albeit as Wells identifies “their 
verdicts can be seen as technically “perverse””31, a prosecution was commenced. 
Three years after the Zeebrugge tragedy, the proceedings were brought against P and 
O, who had taken over Townsend Car Ferries, and also seven employees
32
.  
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At a preliminary hearing, Turner J. “was asked to rule on the question whether 
English law recognised the offence of corporate manslaughter … [a]fter argument he 
ruled that an indictment could properly lie against the company”33.  
“Suffice it that where a corporation, through the controlling mind of one of its agents, 
does an act which fulfils the prerequisites of the crime of manslaughter, it is properly 
indictable for the crime of manslaughter”34 
Turner J. relied upon three cases, namely D.P.P. v. Kent and Sussex Contractors
35
, 
I.C.R. Haulage Ltd
36
 and Moore v. Bresler
37
 that established the criminal liability of 
corporations (see Chapter One). This case was heard post-Tesco but pre-Meridian and 
therefore it applied the restrictive conception of identification from Tesco. 
However, at the conclusion of the prosecution case, following a half time submission 
made by the defendant company and its directors that there was insufficient evidence 
to proceed, Turner J. directed their acquittal. The case was then dropped against the 
individuals also on the Indictment.  
“The reason for directing an acquittal against P&O and the senior managers was that 
it could not be proved that the risks of open-door sailing were obvious to any of them. 
The collapse of this prosecution is not surprising. There was no one individual, 
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sufficiently high in the hierarchy of P&O, who could be said to have committed the 
actus reus and mens rea of manslaughter”38. 
This decision must have been hard for the bereaved families to accept, particularly 
given the Sheen Inquiry’s damning view of the company in that “[f]rom top to bottom 
the body corporate was infected with the disease of sloppiness”39. 
 
2.3.2.  Kings Cross Fire (1987) 
 
The Kings Cross Underground Station inferno in November 1987 resulted in 31 
people being killed. Following the inquiry, chaired by Desmond Fennell Q.C., it was 
believed that the fire was started by a discarded match on the wooden escalators 
where there was dirt and grease. No police investigation took place and therefore the 
DPP did not instigate any criminal proceedings. Significant criticism followed this 
decision.  
 
2.3.3.  Piper Alpha Oil Platform Disaster (1988) 
 
The Piper Alpha Oil Platform disaster in 1988 claimed 167 lives.  A Public Enquiry 
was chaired by Lord Cullen and the conclusions it reached, directed serious criticisms 
towards Occidental, the company that operated the oil platform, in essence holding it 
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responsible for the deaths.  However, the Lord Advocate decided there was 
insufficient evidence on which to base a successful prosecution for culpable homicide 
(under Scottish law), despite the criticisms identified by Lord Cullen. The specific 
reasoning behind the Lord Advocate’s decision not to prosecute was not published 
and is therefore not available for analysis or further comment. 
 
2.3.4.  Clapham Rail Disaster (1988) 
 
The Clapham Rail disaster in 1988, resulted from a collision involving three trains 
after a problem with signalling. Anthony Hidden Q.C. chaired a public inquiry and 
this report was critical of British Rail and was passed to the DPP, who: - 
“took Counsel’s advice as to whether to bring manslaughter charges against British 
Rail and the 11 technicians. In May 1990 he (D.P.P.) announced that there was no 
evidence on which to bring a charge of corporate manslaughter against British Rail 
and “insufficient evidence” to justify manslaughter or other criminal charges against 
any employee. In September 1990 the jury at the inquest returned verdicts of unlawful 
killing in respect of all 35 victims. In spite of these findings, the DPP said that he 
would not reconsider bringing criminal prosecutions without fresh evidence
40”.  
British Rail were, in fact, convicted for Health and Safety offences, but not for 
manslaughter, despite 35 people being killed. Despite this accident occurring after the 
Herald of Free Enterprise disaster, the decision not to prosecute for corporate 
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manslaughter was made before the trial in relation to the Herald of Free Enterprise. If 
a prosecution for corporate manslaughter had occurred, it would again have been 
tested against Caldwell type reckless manslaughter. Given that the trial judge in the 
Herald of Free Enterprise case stated that an indictment could properly lie against a 
company for this offence, perhaps the DPP was incorrect not to pursue this matter 
against British Rail, although this point is raised with the benefit of hindsight. 
    
2.3.5.  Marchioness Disaster (1989) 
 
The Marchioness Disaster in 1989 concerned a Thames Pleasure Cruiser, the 
Marchioness, colliding with a dredging vessel, the Bowbelle. The Marchioness 
subsequently sank with the loss of 51 lives. The collision occurred as a result of a 
negligent look-out system on both the Marchioness and the Bowbelle. Christian 
describes the court proceedings: - 
“The private prosecution for corporate manslaughter over the Marchioness disaster 
was halted at the committal proceedings at Bow Street Magistrates’ Court by the 
Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate in 1994, on the grounds that he could not 
conclusively be satisfied on the evidence available that the collision was not caused 
by the Marchioness changing course at the last minute”41.  
An Inquest was held and the jury returned verdicts of unlawful killing, yet the CPS 
decided not to prosecute, due to insufficient evidence. The CPS considered the 
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evidence that had been presented to the Inquest and sought advice from Counsel. The 
CPS provided an official statement to the following effect: - 
“Senior CPS lawyers have decided that there is insufficient evidence to institute any 
further criminal proceedings in connection with the sinking of the Marchioness. 
The CPS conducted a thorough review of all the evidence including that presented to 
an inquest jury which brought back an unlawful killing verdict in April 1995. 
The decision was made by the CPS following written advice from senior Treasury 
counsel and an independent marine expert. Representatives of the families of the 
victims and the survivors have been informed of the decision”42.  
The solicitor acting for the victim’s families, Louise Christian, was quoted in the 
Independent newspaper: - 
“This decision is immensely disappointing to the families but it is no surprise after 
nearly seven years of bungling by the CPS. The families did not learn all the facts 
about what happened until the inquest last year, because until then there had been no 
public inquiry and no inquest. The CPS, however, had access to all the evidence at 
the outset and the verdict of the inquest jury means that a successful prosecution for 
manslaughter could have been brought”43. 
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2.3.6.  Southall Rail Disaster (1997) 
 
The disaster occurred at Southall, London when a Great Western Train (GWT) driver 
did not respond to two warning signs and therefore when the train went through a red 
light there was not enough distance for the high-speed train to stop before a collision 
with a freight train happened. It transpired that the driver of the high-speed train was 
not concentrating and was in the process of packing his bag before the train arrived at 
Paddington Station. As a result of the crash, seven passengers were killed.  
Initially the driver was charged with gross negligence manslaughter. Then as a result 
of failings at the hands of the operator, GWT, due to not repairing the Automatic 
Warning System that would have provided an audible and visual caution to the driver, 
it was charged with corporate manslaughter. Yet again, as has been seen above with 
previous prosecutions, no specific individual was identified within GWT as being the 
“directing mind and will” of the corporation.      
The trial was heard at the Central Criminal Court and Scott Baker J initially had to 
rule upon a preliminary matter
44
.  The key issue was whether the company, instead of 
an individual, could be criminally liable for the manslaughter. The Judge ruled that 
the offence of manslaughter and its requisite component parts had to be found against 
an individual before the company itself could be convicted. Yet again the aggregation 
doctrine was rejected and the identification was found to be the relevant test. 
Similarly with the Herald of Free Enterprise case, it was found to be highly difficult if 
not impossible, to successfully prosecute a sizeable company that centres on a system 
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failure. Therefore, the corporate manslaughter matter did not proceed and GWT 
pleaded guilty to breaches of Health and Safety law and a fine of £1.5 million was 
imposed
45
. According to the Lawtel report of the judgment the fine “reflected the risk 
created by the degree of its failure to reach the highest standard of care, the extent of 
the disaster in terms of the numbers killed and injured and the need to remind those 
who run substantial transport undertakings that their eternal vigilance, to prevent 
accidents of this nature, was required”46. However, as Slapper and Bingham both 
recognise the true economic impact of fines of this level: - 
“The passenger train was one of those operated by GWT, a company with an annual 
turnover of £300 million at the relevant time”47; and “… fines are invariably a small 
proportion of profit”48.  
It is therefore questionable whether convictions for Health and Safety offences 
provided a realistic alternative to a conviction for corporate manslaughter as the law 
stood prior to the passage of the CMCHA. To be sure, fines of this magnitude 
certainly claim newspaper column inches and television news coverage. However, as 
Slapper and Bingham show, fines can be inconsequential to large companies. 
As a result of this decision, the Attorney-General under Section 36 of the Criminal 
Justice Act (1972), on 8
th
 December 1999, referred the following two points of law to 
the Court of Appeal for its opinion
49
: -  
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1. Can a defendant be properly convicted of manslaughter by gross negligence in 
the absence of evidence as to that defendant’s state of mind? 
 
2. Can a non-human defendant be convicted of the crime of manslaughter by 
gross negligence in the absence of evidence establishing the guilt of an 
identified human individual for the same crime?  
Counsel for the Attorney-General, Mr Richard Lissack Q.C., suggested that under the 
law larger companies were much less likely to be successfully convicted of corporate 
manslaughter than a small company and: - 
“Furthermore, it was unnecessary and inappropriate to enquire whether there is an 
employee in the company who is guilty of the manslaughter who could be said to be 
acting as the embodiment of the company”50. 
Mr Lissack Q.C. contended that the identification doctrine should not be applied, 
despite it being the existing and approved basis for “establishing corporate criminal 
liability for crimes requiring proof of mens rea”51 as per Tesco Supermarkets Limited 
v. Nattrass
52
 and that “liability should be based on the theory that the corporate body 
was personally liable”53. 
The Court of Appeal were directed to the Privy Council decision of Meridian Global 
Funds Management Asia Ltd v. Securities Commission
54
 wherein the “identification 
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principle was extended to include persons other than at director level whose actions 
were treated as those of the company”55. 
However, the Court of Appeal dismissed the contention of Counsel for the Attorney 
General that the decision in Meridian suggested a move from the identification 
doctrine. The Court of Appeal were of the view that the cases, as discussed in the later 
part of Chapter One, did not illustrate an abandonment of the identification doctrine. 
The Court of Appeal when considering previous authorities including Meridian 
confirmed “the concept of directing mind and will had no application when 
construing the statute. But it was not suggested or implied that the concept of 
identification is dead or moribund in relation to common law offences”56. 
Additionally the Court reiterated this point and stated “[i]t therefore seems safe to 
conclude that Lord Hoffmann (and, similarly, the members of the Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division) ... did not think that the common law principles as to the need for 
identification have changed”57.  
The Court stated that Lord Hoffmann’s speech in Meridian “proceeded on the basis 
that the primary “directing mind and will” rule still applies although it is not 
determinative in all cases. In other words, he (Lord Hoffmann) was not departing 
from the identification theory but reaffirming its existence”58. 
With regard to the two questions referred to the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Rose, 
sitting with Potts and Curtis JJ., handed down the opinion of the Court. The Court of 
Appeal answered the first question affirmatively: - 
                                                        
55
 See note 50 at p.380 
56
 See note 49 at pp.213-214 
57
 Ibid. at p.214 
58
 Ibid. 
72 
 
“that evidence of a defendant’s state of mind was not a prerequisite to a conviction 
for manslaughter by gross negligence, although there might be cases where his state 
of mind was relevant to the jury’s assessment of grossness and criminality of his 
conduct, so that a defendant who was reckless might well be the more readily found to 
be grossly negligent to a criminal degree”59.      
With regard to the second question referred to the Court of Appeal responded 
negatively: - 
“unless an identified individual’s conduct, characterisable as gross criminal 
negligence, could be attributed to the corporation, the corporation was not in the 
present state of the common law liable for manslaughter”60 
In essence, the Court of Appeal held that “the identification principle remains the only 
basis in common law for corporate liability for gross negligence manslaughter”61.  
As will be discussed below, the Court of Appeal was criticised for missing an 
opportunity to modify the law and move away from the narrowness of Tesco. If the 
Court of Appeal had decided to broaden the principle, then perhaps a successful 
prosecution against a larger company could have occurred.  
This Court of Appeal decision occurred post Adomako
62
 and therefore there was no 
requirement to prove mens rea in the crime of manslaughter by gross negligence.  
This decision of the Court of Appeal was heavily criticised by commentators: - 
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“The Court of Appeal had the opportunity to restate the law relating to corporate 
liability for manslaughter”63. 
“There is a serious gap in the law of crime, which the Court of Appeal failed to fill, so 
there must be legislation. The question is when, if ever, will this be enacted?”64 
Wells confirmed that the above decision: - 
“… did indeed clarify the law but only to tell us that the narrow identification 
doctrine of Tesco v. Nattrass still applied”65. 
Therefore, when considering this Court of Appeal decision in light of the 
consideration of the development of corporate criminal liability discussed in the first 
chapter, illustrating that the House of Lords’ view in Tesco is still good law, despite 
its limitations as a result of its tight, narrow pyramidal perspective of companies and 
company structures.   
“Tesco v. Nattrass relies on an outdated and shallow theory of organisational 
behaviour in assuming that only directors make decisions. It also fails to see 
companies as an organic whole or to capture the “corporateness” of their conduct. 
Given that Tesco v. Nattrass was 30 years old, had no direct bearing on 
manslaughter, and had been diluted by a number of decisions since, and given the 
development of theories in relation to corporate attribution in the ensuing period, this 
was a disappointingly blinkered decision”66.  
Clarkson, Keating and Cunningham also held an unfavourable view of this decision: - 
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“From this, it follows that, for manslaughter at least, a company can only be liable if 
a person representing the controlling mind of the company actually commits the 
offence. This is intolerably narrow. Managing Directors do not drive trains and it 
would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to establish that their gross 
negligence in the boardroom caused the death of workers or members of the public. 
Even if the more flexible Meridian approach were adopted, there would still be 
immense problems with the identification doctrine. It still requires an individual to be 
identified within the company whose acts and knowledge can be attributed to the 
company … the company’s structures may be so complex and impenetrable, with 
decision-making buried at many different departmental levels, that it becomes 
impossible to pin-point any individual with responsibility for a particular area of 
activity”67. 
     
2.3.7.  Paddington Train Crash (Ladbroke Grove) (1999) 
 
The Paddington Train Crash occurred as a result of the driver of a Thames Train’s 
negligence, in that he went through a warning signal at Ladbroke Grove, near to 
Paddington Station. As a result, the Thames Train collided with a First Great Western 
Express Train, and 31 died. Subsequently, the CPS announced “that there is 
insufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction of any individual for 
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any offences in relation to the fatal train crash at Ladbroke Grove, London, on 5 
October 1999”68. 
This press release was issued in December 2005, post the decision from the Hatfield 
trial as discussed below and the CPS therefore elaborated on the reasons for its 
decision: - 
“Having studied the judge’s ruling carefully, the CPS is satisfied that Mr Justice 
Mackay’s approach would be followed by any judge trying a case of manslaughter 
arising out of the Ladbroke Grove crash … Following the Hatfield ruling Counsel 
provided further written advice to the CPS in September 2005, revising their earlier 
conclusions as to the prospects of conviction, acknowledging the effect of the trial 
judge’s ruling in the Hatfield case and to the verdicts of the jury at the conclusion of 
the trial. The CPS accepts and agrees with Counsel’s advice”69.  
Similar to the Southall disaster, Health and Safety convictions were successful against 
Thames Trains, and a fine of £2 million was imposed in April 2004. The Health and 
Safety Executive released a press statement and referred to the comments made, at the 
one day sentencing hearing at the Old Bailey, by Steve Walker, Assistant Chief 
Inspector of Railways: - 
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“HSE’s investigation into the causes of the collision revealed what Thames Trains 
itself described as “serious omissions” in its driver training programme”70. 
The comments that were previously referred to above by Slapper and Bingham can be 
echoed at this point in that this level of fine is only a minor inconvenience to a large 
company. The fines imposed have no real punitive effect upon the company and its 
officers as it is the shareholders that are affected, if a listed company. Therefore, these 
fines do not hold any sway as a deterrent either in real terms.  
 
2.3.8.  Hatfield Rail Disaster (2000)  
 
In 2000, a Great North Eastern Railway express from London to Leeds was derailed 
as a result of a broken rail near Hatfield in Hertfordshire and four people died. 
Balfour Beatty and Network Rail, the successor to Railtrack, were charged with 
corporate manslaughter along with a number of employees who were also charged 
with manslaughter. Verkaik confirmed that “[t]he charges are the first to be brought 
against senior employees arising out of the deaths of railway passengers and represent 
the biggest corporate manslaughter prosecution of its kind”71. However, before the 
trial commenced, the charges of corporate manslaughter against Network Rail were 
dismissed. At the conclusion of the prosecution case on 14
th
 July 2005, Mr Justice 
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Mackay directed the jury to find Balfour Beatty and the individuals not guilty of 
manslaughter.  Clement stated that “[h]is decision highlighted the difficulty of 
securing convictions against companies for corporate manslaughter under present 
legislation. Fresh calls have been made for an urgent change in the law”72. 
The CPS issued a press release
73
, where the then Director of Public Prosecutions, Ken 
Macdonald Q.C. said: - 
“We would be failing in our duty to the public if we ignored evidence that in our view 
showed a case should properly go before a judge and jury... 
I stand by the decision to prosecute for manslaughter and breaches of health and 
safety law. We felt there was sufficient evidence in this case and the seriousness of 
what was alleged meant the public interest demanded a prosecution... 
However, the judge’s ruling on manslaughter demonstrates again the very real 
difficulties the Crown has in securing convictions against corporate businesses or 
individuals”74. 
However, Health and Safety convictions in relation to this disaster resulted in a £10 
million fine for Balfour Beatty and a fine of £3.5 million for Network Rail. It is at this 
point worthwhile to consider again the views raised by Slapper and Bingham in light 
of the level of fines imposed against these companies, given their corporate size. It is 
questionable whether the level of fine is commensurate with the level of offending 
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and also whether it will have any real punitive effect. According to Hencke and 
Milner, “Balfour Beatty’s culpability for the crash was described by Mr Justice 
Mackay as “one of the worst examples of sustained industrial negligence””75. Balfour 
Beatty duly appealed to the Court of Appeal
76
 as they contended the level of fine was 
manifestly excessive. As part of their grounds of appeal, Balfour Beatty quoted Mr 
Justice Mackey as above and furthermore stated that their fine was significantly 
higher than that applied to Network Rail/ Railtrack. The Court of Appeal were 
unimpressed by part of the grounds of appeal, although the Lord Chief Justice of 
England and Wales, Lord Phillips when providing the judgment did state that “[t]he 
fine of £10 million on Balfour Beatty was severe”77. The original fine of £10 million 
was quashed and an alternative fine was imposed of £7.5 million.  
 
2.3.9.  Potters Bar Rail Disaster (2002) 
 
Shortly after the Hatfield disaster, in 2002, a London to King’s Lynn service was 
derailed due a faulty set of points at Potters Bar and seven people died. The CPS 
decided in 2005 that: - 
“After giving careful consideration to the large volume of evidence provided, the CPS 
has advised that it does not provide a realistic prospect of conviction for an offence of 
gross negligence manslaughter against any individual or corporation ... 
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... No individual was identified as having committed that breach of care, in the first 
instance because it was impossible to pinpoint when the faults occurred which caused 
the points failure. Without an individual being identified, no prosecution could 
proceed against a corporation”78.  
Yet again as no specific individual could be identified as having responsibility there 
was no realistic prospect of convictions against the company for manslaughter, thus 
illustrating again the core difficulty with the identification doctrine. 
The Health and Safety Executive’s Director of Rail Safety, Allan Sefton in 2005 
confirmed “that a decision on whether to prosecute for health and safety offences in 
relation to the Potters Bar train derailment will be taken after a Coroner’s Inquest is 
held”79.  
The accident occurred in 2002, yet it took 8 years until the conclusion of the Inquest. 
The Coroner, Judge Michael Findlay Baker Q.C. stated: - 
“Whatever the causes, the passage of eight years from the derailment to the 
conclusion of the hearing of the inquest is indefensible”80. 
Given the nature of the complexity and size of this inquest and the number of 
interested persons it is understandable that there would be some delay, but inquests 
are usually heard more quickly than after an eight year hiatus, meaning that a number 
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of the safety issues that were integral to the disaster were potentially unaddressed for 
a long period of time.   
The Coroner confirmed that a “Rule 43” letter would be sent to the relevant parties to 
address the issues raised during the inquest
81
. In essence, the purpose of a Rule 43 
letter/ report is to advise the relevant parties and to hopefully prevent similar deaths 
occurring in the future. 
The Inquest lasted for seven weeks and the jury: - 
“said the points were in an unsafe condition and there had been failures to inspect or 
maintain them
82”. 
According to various articles
83
, the Office of Rail Regulation, the CPS and the Health 
and Safety Executive would be “re-examining whether criminal charges could be 
brought in light of evidence at the hearing ... Neither manslaughter nor health and 
safety charges have been ruled out”84. 
On 10
th
 November 2010, the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) stated that it had 
commenced proceedings against Network Rail Infrastructure Limited and Jarvis Rail 
Limited under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. However, the ORR had 
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received notification from the CPS that they had found no grounds to reconsider their 
decision from October 2005. The ORR had considered the decision of the recent 
inquest and found that this opened up the opportunity for breaches of Health and 
Safety to be brought against the offending companies. Network Rail were prosecuted 
as the successors to Railtrack and Jarvis Rail Limited, despite being insolvent, were 
prosecuted as they had the responsibility to maintain the track at the station.   
The first appearance occurred in January 2011 before Watford Magistrates’ Court. 
Network Rail indicated that it would plead guilty to health and safety failings. In light 
of the intended plea by Network Rail, on 18
th
 March 2011, the ORR decided that it 
would not continue to prosecute Jarvis despite there being sufficient evidence to do 
so, but the prosecution was no longer in the public interest. A significant 
consideration for the ORR would be the cost of the proceedings and as it had a guilty 
plea from one defendant, it would be sufficient rather than a lengthy and costly trial 
against Jarvis standing alone.  
Network Rail was sentenced on 13
th
 May 2011 before St. Albans Crown Court 
following a guilty plea to s.3(1) Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) and received a 
£3 million fine and were ordered to pay costs of £150,000. In light of the decision, Ian 
Prosser, Director of Rail Safety at ORR stated: - 
“Today marks the end of a long process in which we have sought to gain a sense of 
justice for the families of the victims of the Potters Bar derailment”85. 
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It was indeed a long process, taking almost nine years from the date of the accident to 
the conclusion of the health and safety prosecution. Despite the level of the fine, the 
General Secretary of the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers, 
Bob Crow said that the directors of Railtrack and Jarvis should have been held 
personally responsible and he added that “[i]nstead of coming out of the pockets of 
those actually responsible, this £3m fine will come out of precious, public NR 
(Network Rail) funds that could and should have been invested in improving and 
maintaining safety on our railways”86. This can be seen as an example where a fine is 
imposed by the court as a punitive sanction, but sadly it will be re-paid using public 
money, rather than it being used to develop a safer railway.    
 
2.3.10.  Legionnaire’s disease outbreak – Barrow in Furness (2002) 
 
An outbreak of Legionnaire’s disease occurred in Barrow in Furness in Cumbria in 
2002 and seven people died as a result. The outbreak was traced to a poorly 
maintained air conditioning unit within an arts centre controlled by the local council. 
This set of circumstances is different to the others considered within this section, as it 
involves a Council rather than a corporation, but still requires limited attention.  
The Council’s senior architect and head of the Design Services Group, Gillian 
Beckingham of Barrow in Furness Council was prosecuted along with the Council 
and faced seven charges of manslaughter as the prosecution contended she was the 
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Council’s directing mind. The main thrust of the prosecution’s case was that 
Beckingham had an integral involvement in the cancelling of the contract of 
maintenance and that the new contract did not provide for the monitoring of water 
treatment.  
Despite the Crown’s contention, the trial judge in 2005 decided that Beckingham was 
not a directing mind of the Council, given her position within the Council. Therefore, 
the Council were cleared of corporate manslaughter but pleaded guilty to breaches of 
Health and Safety legislation and were fined £125,000 with £90,000 costs. The irony 
in this case with regard to the fine, is that as a Council, the fine itself would in turn be 
paid by the local council tax payers that lived in and around the Barrow area that may 
have been affected by the tragedy.  
However, the jury in relation to Beckingham were unable to reach a verdict and she 
faced a re-trial at Preston Crown Court in 2006. At the re-trial, facing manslaughter 
charges as an individual, she was acquitted of the seven manslaughter charges but was 
convicted of a Health and Safety offence and fined £15,000.   
Unfortunately, no closer examination of the Judge’s reasoning is possible as the case 
was not reported as Crown Court trials are not formally reported in law reports. 
Matthews summarises the situation left as a result of the lack of successful 
prosecutions against large companies as follows: -  
“In each prosecution that was brought, what proved insurmountable was the common 
law doctrine of identification. This required the prosecution to prove that the act or 
omission causing the death was the act or omission in breach of a duty of care owed 
by an individual who was the embodiment of the corporation. 
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Government, the unions and practitioners had each observed that the law needed 
reform. Industry, too, acknowledged that the common law offence provided no 
certainty in respect of liability”87. 
The position was assessed perfectly by Wells: - 
“We do not imagine that we are transacting with the managing director of Marks and 
Spencer when we shop there, nor that when a plane takes off the airline’s board of 
directors has specific knowledge of its activities, route or condition that day. We do 
however expect that large companies operate according to a set of rules and 
procedures and that these, particularly in relation to public transport systems, have 
addressed the potential risks and developed safety procedures to ensure that those 
risks are minimised. And if they haven’t we look for solace in the criminal law”.88 
 
2.4.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has considered the difficulties and limitations of the identification 
doctrine when applied to companies in relation to corporate manslaughter. In light of 
the first chapter, that plotted the development of corporate criminal liability and the 
disjointed nature of that development.  
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It could be said that a consequence of the uneven and disjointed development of the 
law which resulted in the tight and narrow Tesco approach being applied by the 
judiciary, has created difficulties when trying to identify the requisite “directing mind 
and will” in large and complex corporate organisations. It is arguable that this has 
highlighted the deficiencies within the “directing mind and will” doctrine.   
This chapter has shown, when applied to a small company, the identification of the 
directing mind can be relatively straight-forward, such as in the OLL case whereby 
the managing director was explicitly involved in the day to day running of the 
company and had full knowledge of its activities. Therefore, identifying the directing 
mind and will of that particular company did not present significant difficulty.   
This can be contrasted with the difficulties in relation to bigger companies, whereby 
identifying the directing mind opens up a plethora of corporate layers and decision 
making. The Court of Appeal had the opportunity to consider this and provide real 
guidance, yet as discussed above decided to ally the law along the Tesco approach 
with its much maligned narrow approach. 
As discussed previously, Managing Directors do not drive trains; they make decisions 
in boardrooms but are still involved in the running of the company. Yet there are 
many levels of corporate hierarchy between them and those who perform the duties of 
the company. This is where the doctrine finds itself in difficulty and it becomes very 
difficult to identify the relevant person within the company who has the requisite 
knowledge. This problem has also been encountered in other jurisdictions, 
particularly within Canadian law and this will be considered in a later chapter. 
The identification doctrine when tested against a large corporate structure has proved 
to be ineffective theory. It does not take into account the various levels of 
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management that a large corporate structure may have. It is arguable for this reason 
that larger corporations may have been the doctrine’s only proponent.     
Following, on from these disasters, in 2003 the Government confirmed they would 
publish a bill in relation to the creation of the offence of corporate killing. The 
consideration and analysis of the reforms proposed by both the Law Commission, 
Members of Parliament and by the Government will be considered in the next 
chapter. 
 
  
 
 
 
87 
 
Chapter Three - The road to reform 
 
This chapter will consider the process of law reform that commenced in the early part 
of the 1990’s. This process continued throughout the remainder of that decade into the 
new century. The principal catalyst for reform was the difficulties that were 
experienced during the cases involving larger companies discussed in the previous 
chapter, specifically following the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster.  
These difficulties were considered by the Law Commission (hereafter LC) within 
their 1996 report
1
. Following on from this report a number of Government proposals 
and Bills attempted to solve these difficulties and will be considered in a 
chronological order in this chapter. 
The first substantive section of this chapter will consider the LC consultation paper 
that was issued in 1994 and subsequent report that was released in 1996. The report 
proposed a new offence of “Corporate Killing” that could only be committed by a 
company, with an alternative test based upon “management failure”.  
The recommendations of the LC will be considered and compared, in the second 
substantive section, with the Government proposals and Bills. The process of Law 
Reform was considered by the Home Office in 2000
2
 (hereafter HO 2000) and its 
proposals are considered in the second section. In addition, the recommendations of 
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the Joint Committee
3
 of the House of Commons will be discussed, as the 
Government’s 2005 Bill4 (hereafter, the “2005 draft Bill”) was subject to pre-
legislation scrutiny; which highlighted a number of areas for attention for the 
Government to consider.   
The third substantive section will discuss the continuing process of reform and the 
movement from the “management failure” test suggested by the LC, to the adoption 
of the “senior management” test that was ultimately enacted within the CMCHA.  
 
3.1.  The Law Commission Consultation Paper and Report 
 
Prior to the LC publishing their report in 1996, it initially released a consultation 
paper in 1994
5
. This consultation can be seen as the beginning of the protracted 
process of reform that ultimately resulted in the enactment of the CMCHA some 
thirteen years later. Law Reform is generally not renowned for swiftness, although 13 
years is a substantial period of time. During the consultation process they liaised with 
a number of interested individuals, including the view from academia, from the 
judiciary and from practitioners.  
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3.1.1.  Law Commission Report (1996) 
 
The LC published its report on 4
th
 March 1996
6
 and provided it to the then Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. The LC made it very clear within the opening 
remarks of their report that their intention was to “highlight the problems with the 
present law”7 and in due course considered the disasters that had occurred at the time 
of the report being published, such as the King’s Cross fire, Piper Alpha, the Clapham 
Rail disaster and the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster. The Herald of Free Enterprise 
disaster was particularly relevant as it ultimately resulted in an unsuccessful 
prosecution, as discussed in the second chapter, and at the time of the report was a 
principal example of the deficiencies within the law.   
The Herald of Free Enterprise case was considered at length in the previous chapter 
and the LC again acknowledged the limitations of the identification doctrine, 
particularly when trying to prosecute a company whereby the relevant acts have to be 
committed by those who can be identified as “the people who are the embodiment of 
the company”8. 
The LC stated that at the time of their report being published, there had only been one 
successful prosecution (OLL Limited, as discussed in the previous chapter) that was a 
one-man company, thus illustrating the problems with the law as it stood at that time. 
The LC saw deficiencies within the current law as it stood and they: - 
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“welcomed the opportunity to reconsider the principles of corporate liability in the 
light of the great obstacles now confronting those wishing to bring a prosecution; but 
we are also conscious of the need to ensure that companies are not unjustly convicted 
merely because they are in charge of an operation or a vessel on which there has 
been a disaster”9. 
The most important parts of the LC report are contained in parts Six, Seven and Eight 
of the report. Part Eight will be considered after the alternative bases of liability 
evaluated by the LC.  
Part Six of the Report, “Corporate Manslaughter: The Present Law”, considered the 
law as it stood at that point by looking at the procedural issues and the interpretation 
of statutes. In addition the LC considered the principles of vicarious liability and the 
identification doctrine that had developed on a case by case basis as discussed in the 
first chapter. The LC identified the difficulties that had been faced by the courts as 
discussed in earlier chapters.  
In Part Seven, “Our Provisional Proposal in Consultation Paper No 135, and our 
present view” the LC identified and considered the responses by those consulted, 
including the general view that corporations should be held liable for the offence of 
manslaughter. The reasons, provided by various individuals and organisations, 
included the consideration of the impact on public confidence and the inadequacy of 
the offences under Health and Safety legislation. Considering public confidence 
specifically, especially following the unsuccessful prosecutions such as the Herald of 
Free Enterprise, it was acknowledged that trust in the criminal justice system and 
industry generally was adversely affected. This was seen where “the “perpetrator” 
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appeared to escape prosecution “on a technicality rather than having his culpability 
tested in court by the same standards as that court would apply to a private individual 
on charge of manslaughter””10. This echoes the thread the runs through the entire 
criminal justice system whereby justice must be seen to be done and that no-one is 
above the law, regardless of whether they are an individual or an artificial legal 
creation.   
 
3.1.2.  The Law Commission considers alternative bases of liability 
 
The LC specifically considered four options in Part Seven, to extending liability for 
corporations: firstly vicarious liability, secondly the principle of aggregation being 
implemented to extend the doctrine of identification, thirdly the creation of a new 
corporate regime and fourthly the creation of a new offence of corporate killing 
consisting of the application of the elements of manslaughter by gross carelessness to 
a corporation but without the identification requirement.  
 
3.1.2.1. Vicarious Liability 
 
Turning to vicarious liability first, the LC confirmed that “[t]he rule that, in general, 
vicarious liability does not form part of the criminal law is a long-established 
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principle of the common law”11, save for three exceptions. The first two exceptions 
are not relevant for the purposes of this thesis (public nuisance and criminal libel), but 
the third and relevant exception, discussed in the first chapter, is statutory offences.  
The LC referred to Atkin J. in Mousell Bros Ltd v. London and North-Western 
Railway Co
12
 and the issue of statutory construction; particularly whether the specific 
section imposes vicarious liability as it is contingent upon “the object of the statute, 
the words used, the nature of the duty laid down, the person upon whom it is imposed, 
the person by whom it would in ordinary circumstances be performed, and the person 
upon whom the penalty is imposed”.  
However, the LC recognised in light of the above limited exceptions and as 
manslaughter is governed by the common law, that “the introduction of vicarious 
liability for an offence that requires negligence … seems to us to be open to 
objections of principle, since it would automatically, and in our view unfairly, 
penalise a company for the fault of one of its employees even where it had taken 
considerable pains to prevent the kind of incident that caused the death”13. 
Additionally, the LC recognised the practical difficulties that would follow if 
vicarious liability was preferred as the basis, such as it would be “unrealistic to expect 
the directors and senior management of a company to oversee in person the actions of 
a workforce that may be numbered in thousands”14. The implications of adopting 
vicarious liability as the basis would largely be unworkable in a practical sense. 
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Therefore, the LC in light of these issues, rejected vicarious liability as an alternative 
given its limitations and considered the second potential basis for liability for 
corporations.   
 
3.1.2.2. The principle of aggregation extending the doctrine of identification 
 
The LC secondly considered the application of aggregation extending the doctrine of 
identification. In simple terms aggregation is the adding together of faults not in 
themselves sufficiently significant to satiate the elements of the offence, but by the 
actions or omissions of a number of relevant persons combined together to make up 
the requisite elements of the offence. However, the LC did not find favour with this 
basis and suggested that this approach “would be no more than a gloss on the 
identification principle”15. It is interesting that the LC was mindful of avoiding the 
process of simply adding to or enhancing the identification doctrine, when arguably 
the test that was ultimately adopted within the CMCHA potentially carries with it 
some of the deficiencies associated with the identification doctrine.  
The report also recognised that this approach could be problematical when trying to 
ascertain what particular individuals were aware of and whether they were in 
agreement or maintained a different version of perhaps pertinent information.  
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3.1.2.3. A new corporate regime? 
 
On a theoretical level, the LC contemplated a potential third basis. This was in light of 
a reference made in the consultation paper to a recommendation of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe (No R(88) 18 of 1988). However, given that the 
recommendation was looking at the criminal law more from a macro perspective as 
opposed to a specific offence, the LC did not feel it was appropriate to consider it any 
further. 
 
3.1.2.4. The fourth and favoured option – A new offence of corporate killing 
 
The fourth option as mentioned above was to apply the elements of the individual 
offence of manslaughter by gross carelessness to a corporation and create a new 
offence “but with such adaption as is dictated by the peculiar characteristics of 
corporations”16. By its nature and given the difficulties outlined in the first and second 
chapter of this thesis, this was not a straight-forward process, but nevertheless the LC 
persevered and produced a sensible and potentially workable alternative to the 
identification doctrine.    
Contained within section Eight of the report, the LC re-capped its findings and given 
the failings of the identification doctrine, it was recommended by the LC “that the use 
of the identification principle alone, when applied to the individual offences … would 
impose unacceptable limitations on the scope of corporate liability for involuntary 
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homicide”17.  As mentioned previously in the above sections, the LC believed it to be 
“wrong to adopt, solely for the purposes of the law of homicide, any wider principle 
of corporate liability such as vicarious liability or aggregation”18.  
Therefore, contained within Part Eight of the report, the LC at paragraph 8.35 made 
the following recommendations: - 
“(1) that there should be a special offence of corporate killing, broadly 
corresponding to the individual offence of killing by gross carelessness; 
 (2) that (like the individual offence) the corporate offence should be committed 
only where the defendant’s conduct in causing the death falls far below what 
could reasonably be expected; 
 (3) that (unlike the individual offence) the corporate offence should not require 
that the risk be obvious, or that the defendant be capable of appreciating the 
risk; and 
 (4) that, for the purposes of the corporate offence, a death should be regarded as 
having been caused by the conduct of a corporation if it is caused by a failure, 
in the way in which the corporation’s activities are managed or organised, to 
ensure the health and safety of persons employed in or affected by those 
activities.” 
Wells stated “… the Report sought to overcome the problems of the identification 
principle by introducing a tailor-made test of corporate culpability based on 
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“management failure”19. Contained within Appendix A of the report, the LC prepared 
a draft bill “to create new offence(s) of … corporate killing to replace the offence of 
manslaughter in cases where death is caused without the intention of causing death or 
serious injury”20. The relevant aspects of the draft bill will be considered below. 
Clause 4 reads as follows: - 
“4.(1) A corporation is guilty of corporate killing if –  
(a) a management failure by the corporation is the cause or one of the causes 
of a person’s death; and 
(b) that failure constitutes conduct failing far below what can reasonably be 
expected of the corporation in the circumstances. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above –  
(a) there is a management failure by a corporation if the way in which its 
activities are managed or organised fails to ensure the health and safety 
of persons employed in or affected by those activities; and 
(b) such a failure may be regarded as a cause of a person’s death 
notwithstanding that the immediate cause is the act or omission of an 
individual”. 
The “management failure” test was central to the LC’s proposed offence and they 
confirmed it was “… an attempt to define what, for the purposes of a corporate 
counterpart to the individual offence of killing by gross carelessness, can be fairly be 
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regarded as unacceptably dangerous conduct by a corporation”21. However it remains 
imperative that the death was caused as a result of the defendant’s conduct, which in 
relation to this proposed offence, means the management failure. As stated above, the 
draft bill contained clause 4(2)(b), as “… an express provision to the effect that in this 
kind of situation the management failure may be a cause of the death, even if the 
immediate cause is the act or omission of an individual. Whether in all the 
circumstances the management failure is a cause of the death, in spite of the 
intervening act or omission of an individual, will be a matter for the common sense of 
the jury”22.  
A number of commentators have considered the “management failure” test as 
proposed by the LC. Pinto and Evans believed that “[t]he concept of “management 
failure” would obviate the need to prove the requisite fault of an individual identified 
as the directing mind of the company. Management failure which was a cause of 
death, would be sufficient for corporate liability to be established even if the 
immediate cause was the act or omission of an individual”23.  
To see the proposed offence in practice, the LC posed a hypothetical illustration of it 
in action, in relation to the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster
24
. As discussed 
previously, the prosecution failed against P & O European Ferries. The LC stated that 
“[t]he principal ground for this decision in relation to the case against the company, 
was that, in order to convict it of manslaughter, one of the individual defendants who 
could be “identified” with the company would have himself to be guilty of 
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manslaughter. Since there was insufficient evidence on which to convict any of those 
individual defendants, the case against the company had to fail”25.  
The LC was of the view that if the same set of circumstances occurred again, that the 
company could be convicted of their proposed new offence. The basis for this 
conclusion was that they thought “… it would probably be open to a jury to conclude 
that, even if the immediate cause of the deaths was the conduct of the assistant bosun, 
the Chief Officer or both, another of the causes was the failure of the company to 
devise a safe system for the operation of its ferries; and that that failure fell far below 
what could reasonably have been expected”26.  
By applying the proposed new offence in this hypothetical way, it opened up the 
possibility that a number of the unsuccessful prosecutions discussed in the second 
chapter could have had alternative outcomes, or at least led to the cases being tested 
in court, if this new offence was enacted. It is not suggested that this proposed offence 
was the perfect solution to the difficulties experienced when applying the 
identification doctrine, but it would perhaps remove some of the problems that had 
been previously encountered.  
 
3.1.2.5. Other issues considered by the Law Commission  
 
The LC considered a number of ancillary issues that were required to further elaborate 
upon its proposed new offence including potential defendants, territorial jurisdiction, 
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mode of trial and powers on conviction. These issues will be considered in turn 
below.  
The LC confirmed in paragraph 8.58 that they had no intention for an individual to be 
liable for prosecution for the corporate matter as a secondary party and they made this 
very clear in their list of recommendations (number 15). 
With regard to territorial application, the LC considered a number of statutory 
provisions, such as the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 and the Civil Aviation Act 1982. 
In light of these provisions and also generally “that nothing done outside England and 
Wales is an offence under English criminal law”27. Therefore the LC recommended 
that “there should be liability for the corporate offence only if the injury that results in 
the death is sustained in such a place that the English courts would have had 
jurisdiction over the offence had it been committed by an individual other than a 
British subject”28. Therefore, as the LC stated, their proposed offence would have had 
jurisdiction and would have applied to the disaster at Zeebrugge.  
With the creation of any offence it is imperative that the procedural issues are 
considered. Insofar as the practicalities involved in a prosecution for the proposed 
offence of Corporate Killing, the view of the LC was that it would be inappropriate 
for the matter to be heard before a Magistrates’ Court. Therefore, the proposed mode 
of trial was that this offence would be triable on indictment only
29
. This would be in 
line with other offences of a similar significance and gravity and as seen below would 
allow for greater sentencing powers given the limitations of the Magistrates’ Court.   
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Equally, with any new offence it is important the sentencing powers are stated with 
clarity. Contained within the draft Bill
30
, the LC identified that following a trial and 
conviction on indictment that the sentence would be a fine. 
With all cases that involve a death that has occurred within a work context, there will 
be a clear overlap with the provisions of Health and Safety legislation, particularly 
sections 2 & 3 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. The LC took the view that 
“where the jury finds a defendant not guilty of any of the offence … it should be 
possible (subject to the overall discretion of the judge) for the jury to convict the 
defendant of an offence under section 2 or 3 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 
1974”31. A clause to this effect was included in the draft Bill mentioned above32.  
The LC considered the other powers that the courts should have on conviction of the 
proposed offence of corporate killing. It took the view that the court should be able to 
order compensation as per its usual powers. An additional option for the courts to 
consider is the power to order remedial action. This option will be further discussed in 
the next chapter where remedial orders are now contained within section nine of the 
CMCHA. 
However, at this juncture it is appropriate to focus upon the LC’s view of this 
potential order at the time in 1996. Bearing in mind that the reason the jury have 
found the defendant guilty as a result of a management failure as per the proposed 
offence, the LC took the view it was “necessary to make it clear that the court’s 
remedial powers will extend to requiring the corporation to remedy any matter which 
appears to the court to have resulted from the failure and been the cause or one of the 
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causes of the death”33. Again a clause to this effect was included in the draft Bill34. 
The purpose of remedial orders is to take steps to ensure that a similar occurrence, 
such as a death or serious injury, does not flow from a similar set of circumstances. 
Therefore, the options available to the court would not be solely punitive they would 
also have the option to approach sentencing with a preventative aspect in mind.       
The final recommendation of the LC was that “the ordinary principles of corporate 
liability should apply to the individual offences that we (they) propose”35. Although it 
was made clear that there should not be individual liability for the corporate killing 
offence. 
 
3.1.2.6. Would this report provide the catalyst for reform? 
  
The proposals suggested by the LC were commonsensical and provided a good test 
with the “management failure” test. The hypothetical application of the proposed 
corporate killing offence to the facts of the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster gave 
some indication that this proposed offence could be successfully applied to larger 
corporate structures that had eluded conviction before as discussed in the second 
chapter.  
The consultation paper was released in 1994 but it took thirteen years for the CMCHA 
to be enacted in 2007. The report did provide the catalyst for reform, but this process 
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was slow moving. Despite the good intentions offered, these intentions were mired 
with inactivity. 
 
3.2.  Progress or lack of progress post Law Commission Report (237) 
 
The recommendations of the LC were included within the General Election manifesto 
of the Labour Party who were at the time in opposition and confirmed they would 
implement them if they were elected. Its manifesto of 1997 reiterated this intention. 
However, many years passed and nothing made its way before Parliament, therefore 
the recommendations contained in the report were not acted upon. 
The lack of progress with the reform process was recognised by the judiciary and the 
following observation has been noted by a number of commentators
36
. Scott Baker J., 
at the 1999 trial of GWT, commented: - 
“There are many who say that the present state of the law is unsatisfactory and that 
the present obstacle to prosecuting large corporations for manslaughter should be 
removed. However, if the law is to be changed it is up to Parliament to do so. The 
Law Commission recommended legislation over three years ago but nothing has been 
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forthcoming. There is little purpose in the Law Commission making recommendations 
if they are to be allowed to lie for years on a shelf gathering dust”37. 
The above comment by Scott Baker J. has been referred to by Slapper as being “in the 
finest tradition of measured criticism delivered from the bench”38, thus illustrating the 
independence of the judiciary, separated from the legislature.  
 
3.2.1.  Corporate Homicide Bill 2000 – “10 minute rule” procedure 
 
During the 1999-2000 session of Parliament, a backbencher MP, Andrew Dismore, 
presented a corporate homicide Bill under the 10-minute rule procedure to the House 
of Commons on 18
th
 April 2000. The Bill did share some similarity with the LC’s 
proposals with regards to the basics of the offence of corporate killing by a 
corporation.  
The significant distinction between the LC’s draft Bill, and Dismore’s Bill, was that 
clause two of the latter proposed an offence of corporate killing by an officer, an 
offence of individual liability. The proposed offence of corporate killing by an officer 
was fundamentally based upon the offence that could be committed by a corporation. 
The proposed penalty for this offence on indictment would be a fine, imprisonment or 
both for the individual. Clause five of the draft Bill defined an officer as “the 
chairman, managing director, chief executive or secretary of a corporation”.   
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However, as mentioned above, this Bill was introduced implementing the “10 minute 
rule” procedure. Zander states “Standing Order No.13 allows any MP to make a 
speech of up to ten minutes in support of the introduction of some piece of 
legislation”39. There are a number of procedural obstacles that a Bill presented to 
Parliament under this rule has to overcome. The most sizeable hurdle is Government 
opposition. If the Bill is backed by the Government, there is a good chance that it will 
receive Royal Assent and become law.   
This Bill however, was not supported by the Government and like the vast majority of 
Bills with Government opposition; it did not proceed beyond the second reading. 
However, as Sheikh stated “… it was understood that the Government would use 
some of the provisions of this Bill for the new offence of corporate killing”40. The 
Government proposals will be considered below.  
Arguably, the inclusion of individual liability proposed within this Bill was highly 
contentious. Given that the creation of such an offence would require considerable 
thought from the Government and would entail significant Parliamentary scrutiny; as 
such this is possibly one of the underlying reasons why this Bill did not succeed.  
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3.3.  The Home Office’s proposals – May (2000) 
 
The Labour Government published a consultation paper in May 2000
41
 (HO 2000). 
The then Home Secretary, the Rt. Hon Jack Straw MP, confirmed that their 
consultation paper had embraced “the vast majority of the Law Commission proposals 
… (and)… the law relating to corporate liability for involuntary manslaughter is in 
need of radical reform”42. The foreword further stated that the law as it stood in 
relation to corporate manslaughter was ineffective, therefore the Government was 
acknowledging that the law at that time was not fit for purpose.    
This paper stated that it accepted the LC’s proposal for the new offence of corporate 
killing. However, they stated “that while there may prove to be difficulties in proving 
a “management failure” there is a need to restore public confidence that companies 
responsible for loss of life can be properly held accountable in law”43.  
As mentioned below, a significant part of the document focussed upon the potential 
defendants other than corporations, such as unincorporated bodies and the impact the 
proposed offence would have upon Crown bodies. The Home Office (hereafter HO) 
stated they would welcome the view or comments of those with regard to the 
application of Crown immunity to the proposed offence and again this was one of the 
reasons for the delay in progressing reform in this area. With regard to unincorporated 
bodies, the Government’s proposals, “favours the extension of the offence of 
corporate killing to non-corporate “undertakings”, an undertaking being, “any trade or 
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business or other activity providing employment”44. Sullivan continues “the 
consultation paper is under no illusion as to the ramifications of this proposal; on its 
own estimation a total of three and a half million enterprises could become potentially 
liable for the offence of corporate killing”45. This is a significant widening of the 
impact of the proposed offence, as stated a great number of organisations would be 
included.  
However, a significant difference between the recommendations of the LC and those 
preferred by the HO related to the liability of individuals. As discussed above, the LC 
took the view that there should be no liability for individuals, yet the HO made it very 
clear that they did not agree with this contention. Contained within the HO 2000, is a 
copy of the draft Bill prepared by the LC with a number of observations. The HO 
stated “the Government considers that there is no good reason why an individual 
should not be convicted for aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring an offence of 
corporate killing and therefore proposes that clause 4(4) of the Law Commission’s 
draft Bill should be removed”46.  
Sullivan is of the view that “[t]he proposal for secondary liability for corporate 
liability is misconceived. The elements of liability are not easy to identify. Liability of 
this kind would constitute a significant extension of the law of homicide”47. The HO’s 
view was also not welcomed by those in business “who were troubled by the potential 
damage to their personal reputation which could result merely from the bringing of a 
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prosecution – even if it subsequently failed – and by the possible prospect of jail if it 
were to succeed”48. This perspective from those in the business community could be 
seen as stating the obvious. No individual or organisation would welcome an 
investigation or prosecution, but few are in such a beneficial position to be able 
consult with the Government with such influence. Nevertheless, as discussed below 
and in the next chapter, the business leaders lobbied successfully and s. 18 CMCHA 
provided that there would be no individual liability.     
Evaluating HO 2000, Matthews stated “the proposals set out a number of issues and 
posed various questions upon which the government thereafter started a protracted 
period of consultation”49. The main reason for this delay was due to application of the 
proposed offence to organisations other than companies and also the issue of Crown 
immunity. Sullivan suggested that “[t]he Government’s proposals go considerably 
beyond the Law Commission’s recommendations”50. The Government did receive a 
large number of responses to this paper and this in part could have added to the delay 
that occurred before the Government took the next step.  
It is worthwhile pausing here and looking beyond the legal dimension and considering 
the wider implications that would flow from the creation of the offence of corporate 
killing from a political perspective. The Government would be mindful of the 
implications of creating a new offence that would apply to corporations and to 
individuals within corporations. The Government would consider the impact it may 
have on the economy and future growth of the economy. For example, if a law was 
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passed that created an additional form of liability for corporations, it could make the 
UK a less attractive business option and could deter companies from operating within 
the UK and companies could choose to do their business in another country with less 
onerous laws.  
Additionally, under these proposals with the suggested introduction of individual 
liability, this could have the effect of dissuading senior corporate executives from 
operating in this country due to this new form of liability. It could create, in theory, a 
reverse “Delaware” effect.    
 
3.4.  The Government’s draft Bill for reform – March (2005)  
 
It was not until after the Hatfield and Potters Bar disasters, that the Government again 
stated its desire to legislate in this area. In 2003, the Government confirmed that it 
would be producing a Bill to create the new offence of corporate killing. The 
Government propounded that they would not be pursuing any form of individual 
liability and that they intended to focus upon corporate liability.    
However, the Government Bill was not published until March 2005 and by this time 
the name of the offence had changed from corporate killing to corporate 
manslaughter
51
. There was no explanation provided by the Government as to why the 
name of the proposed offence had changed from corporate killing to corporate 
manslaughter. It is possible that this change of name was as a result of further 
lobbying by the business community. Clarkson argued “that “corporate killing” better 
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describes the wrongdoing involved in such cases … The more neutral term “corporate 
killing” should be employed”52. Nevertheless, the proposed offence retained the title 
of corporate manslaughter and it remains as this.  
Alongside the 2005 draft Bill, the Government published a further consultation 
document seeking comments upon the draft Bill. Following lobbying from a number 
of organisations including the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the 
Institute of Directors (IoD) who were generally in favour of the reforms but had some 
reservations on some aspects and these views will be considered at the relevant points 
in the discussion below.  
The then Home Secretary, the Rt. Hon Charles Clarke MP, confirmed that the Bill 
would be published for pre-legislative scrutiny and that the 2005 draft Bill proposed 
“a new test that looks more widely at failings within the senior management of an 
organisation”53. 
Clause 13 proposed that the application of the common law offence of gross 
negligence manslaughter to companies be abolished and replaced by a new offence of 
corporate manslaughter.  The Government hoped that this proposed offence would 
“capture truly corporate failings in the management of risk … therefore applies to 
management failings by an organisation’s senior managers”54.  
The Government broke down the offence into this simple analysis: - 
“The organisation must owe a duty of care to the victim that is connected with 
certain things done by the organisation … 
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... The organisation must be in breach of that duty of care in the way its senior 
managers manage or organise a particular aspect of its activities. This 
introduces an element of “senior management failure” into the offence … 
... This management failure must have caused the victim’s death. The usual 
principles of causation in the criminal law will apply to determine this 
question … 
... The breach of duty must have been gross”55. 
As Clarkson recognised, the proposed new offence, in light of the aspects specific to 
corporations, “broadly follows the contours of the current law of manslaughter by 
gross negligence”56.   
It’s most significant difference, compared both to the LC’s draft Bill and the 
recommendations contained within HO 2000
57
, was that the central test had altered 
from the management failure test recommended by the LC now to the “senior 
management failure” test. The HO contended that the “heart of the new offence lies in 
the requirement for a management failure on the part of its senior managers. This is 
intended to replace the identification principle with a basis of corporate liability that 
better reflects the complexities of decision taking and management within modern 
large organisations, but which is also relevant for smaller bodies”58. Therefore, in 
suggesting the “senior management failure” test, the HO intended to move the law 
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away from the requirement under the identification doctrine whereby “liability (was) 
contingent on the guilty of a particular individual”59.  
However, it has been contended “the “senior management test” reintroduces the 
problems of the “identification principle”, with the requirement of identifying a 
“directing mind” simply being replaced by that of identifying senior management … 
By focusing on failures made by individuals within an organisation it is maintained … 
does little to address the problems that plagued the common law offence of gross 
negligence manslaughter”60. However, this is a moot point as it is dependent upon 
how the courts interpret this. The HO stated that its “intention is to target failings 
where the corporation as a whole has inadequate practices or systems for managing a 
particular activity”61.  
Arguably, it could be suggested that identification of the senior managers within a 
corporation could lead to lengthy arguments in court when trying to establish who is 
or is not a senior manager, a concern shared by the CBI
62. For this reason, the LC’s 
approach could be seen as a preferred alternative. 
Therefore, the question is raised as to whether the adoption of this new test would be 
stepping back into the problems that dogged the prosecutions discussed in the second 
chapter using the existing doctrine of identification. Clarkson preferred the LC’s test 
as it “removed the need to identify “managers” and placed the emphasis on the 
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activities of the company … This places the focus where it should be: on the activities 
and organisational practices of the company”63. 
As explained within the explanatory notes to the 2005 draft Bill, there must be a gross 
breach of duty due to the senior management failure, whereby the conduct fell far 
below what could be reasonably be expected of an organisation in the circumstances, 
such as death or serious injury. The paper confirms that this has some symmetry with 
the level required under gross negligence manslaughter. The paper on this point was 
similar to the proposals of the LC and HO 2000, although as Clarkson states, the 
“problem … is how to identify conduct that does fall far below what can be 
reasonably be expected in the circumstances”64. 
With regard to the application of this proposed offence, the HO changed the view 
stated in 2000. The new offence would not apply to unincorporated bodies, although 
the Police Forces would be considered separately during this process of consultation. 
However, understandably corporations were the primary recipients of the paper’s 
attention. As mentioned above, the application to Crown bodies had caused delay 
during the reform discussion sparked by HO 2000 but contained within this 
document
65
 was the decision that there would be no general Crown immunity for the 
proposed offence.   
However, the Government had altered its view in relation to individual liability from 
its previous stance in 2000. The Government confirmed that it’s “proposal to tackle 
this focuses on changing the way in which an offence of manslaughter applies to 
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organisations, and this is a matter of corporate not individual liability”66 and therefore 
decided not to pursue individuals or indeed impose secondary liability, again this was 
a decision “welcomed” by the CBI67. The possibility for an individual to face a charge 
under the Health and Safety legislation or a charge of gross negligence manslaughter 
still remained, however the decision of the Government not to pursue individual 
liability could be viewed as a key deficiency in their proposals and Clarkson added 
“the fact that individuals cannot be liable under the proposals represents a grave 
shortcoming”68. There had been significant feeling that individual liability of some 
form should have been included within the Bill, as opposed to the Bill focussing 
entirely on the corporate offence.       
The remainder of the paper discussed issues such as causation, appropriate sanctions 
and extent. These will be considered in turn beginning with causation. The 
Government stated the usual rules of causation would apply meaning “that the 
management failure must have made more than a minimal contribution to the death 
and that an intervening act did not break the chain of events linking the management 
failure to death”69. The position in the 2005 draft Bill was different from the position 
taken by the LC whereby a specific provision in their draft Bill dealt with causation. 
However, the HO argued that the law of causation had sufficiently developed and 
therefore there was no need for a specific provision in the Bill. Given the passage of 
time between the LC report in 1996 and the 2005 draft Bill, the law had developed 
sufficiently.     
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With regard to proposed sanctions, the Government considered that the correct 
punitive approach would be that of a financial penalty and that it would be an 
unlimited fine. Additionally, the imposition of remedial orders was deemed 
acceptable so that the offending corporation could be ordered by a court to remedy the 
failures that led to the death or deaths.  
Insofar as jurisdictional extent was concerned, the new offence would apply to 
England and Wales and also to places where the English courts have jurisdiction. The 
paper confirms that the offence would not be applied extra-jurisdictionally as this 
would pose a number of significant practical difficulties that could lead to the offence 
being unenforceable.  
 
3.5.  Pre-legislative scrutiny of the Government’s draft Bill  
 
The 2005 draft Bill was subjected to pre-legislative scrutiny. When a draft Bill and its 
clauses are explored through pre-legislative scrutiny, it allows for a freer debate to 
occur where less partisan views can be offered.  It has been suggested that if a draft 
Bill has undergone this process, it ultimately produces better and more informed law. 
Smookler states that the usage of pre-legislative scrutiny “has become an important 
tool in the exercise of Parliament’s legislative function and achieves far more then the 
“pre-legislative” part of its title would suggest”70. However, despite the 
recommendations of the pre-legislative committees, the Government can decide to 
dismiss them if it disagrees with the recommendations.     
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A report was produced by the House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and 
Pensions Committees and published in December 2005
71
. The Committee welcomed 
the introduction of the 2005 draft Bill albeit after some delay and recognised the 
deficiencies of the current law namely the use of the problematical identification 
doctrine. However, the Joint Committee claimed
72
 that the introduction of the “senior 
management failure” test was taking the law back to the problems associated with the 
identification doctrine which is disadvantageous given that the desirability of a new 
offence/ test was to avoid the previous difficulties that were encountered.  
One point that the Joint Committee made early in the report was to remind the 
Government of the period of time that had elapsed between the LC report and the 
Government taking any action and they reminded the Government of their frequent 
commitments to reform of this area of law. Furthermore, the Joint Committee made it 
clear that they wished the Government would ensure no further unnecessary delays 
occurred and that the Bill be introduced, in light of the Joint Committee’s 
recommendations, within the same Parliamentary session.  
 
3.5.1.  The title of the new offence  
 
On this point, the Joint Committee heard evidence from a number of eminent scholars 
who viewed the use of the term manslaughter as outdated and criticised the decision 
to alter the name from “corporate killing” to “corporate manslaughter”. However, 
given that at that point a review of the law of murder was proposed to commence 
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whereby the term manslaughter could be obsolete, which would be a lengthy process 
in itself, the Joint Committee confirmed they were satisfied with the name change.  
 
3.5.2  Causation  
 
On the subject of causation, the Joint Committee took the view that the LC’s approach 
was the appropriate one and that the 2005 draft Bill was uncertain as it did not have a 
specific provision to deal with causation.  
As mentioned above, the Government took the view that the law of causation had 
sufficiently developed whereby a specific provision was unnecessary. However, the 
Joint Committee received evidence from the Law Reform Committee of the Bar 
Council who stated that the insertion of a causation clause “would give statutory 
effect to the development in the case law and have the merit of clarity within the 
provisions specifically drafted for the purpose of corporate manslaughter”73. 
 However, the view of the LC was sought and they stated “although the clause does 
add “some value” they “do not regard this point as one of major importance””74. The 
Joint Committee were of the view that the insertion of a causation clause would be of 
benefit as it would state the position for this offence and it would have a statutory 
basis. Therefore, the Joint Committee recommended that the Government should 
include the LC’s causation clause into their Bill.  
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3.5.3.  The Joint Committee’s view on the “Senior Management Test”  
 
Some of the Joint Committee’s most stringent criticism was reserved for the senior 
management test, which the Joint Committee considered a step back to the existing 
doctrine of identification. The proposed offence, as drafted: - 
“ … does appear simply to broaden the identification doctrine into some form of 
aggregation of the conduct of senior managers. This is a fundamental weakness in the 
draft Bill as it currently stands. By focusing on failures by individuals within a 
company in this way, the draft Bill would do little to address the problems that have 
plagued the current common law offence”75.    
Additionally, the Joint Committee observed that if this proposed offence was to be 
tested within a court, it would undoubtedly lead to legal argument as to who is and 
who is not a senior manager. The Joint Committee heard evidence from a number of 
witnesses who described the definition of a senior manager as too vague and also as 
too broad. Therefore, the Joint Committee recommended that the HO review the 
senior management test.  
The Joint Committee further confirmed their view that the test should be based upon 
the LC’s test as a starting point, namely that of a management failure, but that “related 
to either an absence of correct process or an unacceptably low level of monitoring or 
application of a management process”76. The Joint Committee acknowledged that the 
LC test was not without its issues, primarily that it has been contended that the 
management failure test is too vague and that this “test could cover failings within a 
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company that occur at too low a level to be fairly associated with the company as a 
whole”77. In light of this as mentioned above, the Joint Committee recommended that 
the HO should deal with this, but to bear in mind the LC’s position.   
 
3.5.4.  Other relevant considerations raised by the Joint Committee  
 
The Joint Committee considered other aspects contained within the draft Bill and they 
are considered in turn below.  
On territorial application, the Joint Committee took the view that the offence should 
apply to the entire UK and in due course to also apply to the entire European Union. 
This is significantly more then was proposed within the 2005 draft Bill and this 
recommendation would not be without its procedural difficulties particularly given 
the differences between the law in England and Wales with that in Scotland. 
The 2005 draft Bill proposed that as sanctions, corporations could be subject to an 
unlimited fine or a remedial order. The Joint Committee recommended that following 
the successful passage of the Bill that Sentencing Guidelines should be produced and 
the fines to be imposed “should reflect the gravity of the offence”78. The Joint 
Committee stated that they were of the view that before sentence, a Judge should have 
the benefit of a pre-sentence report that has been prepared and it should contain the 
company’s financial position and also a record of the company’s health and safety 
issues.  
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With regard to remedial orders, the Joint Committee did see them as “an additional 
safeguarding power”79, but also heard evidence that suggested ways in which 
remedial orders could be enforced. The Joint Committee recommended that the Bill 
have a provision added that would provide a mechanism to ensure that remedial 
orders were complied with. Secondly, with an emphasis placed on the director’s 
shoulders, that the Bill be amended “in order to make it possible for directors to be 
charged with contempt of court if the company has failed to take the steps required by 
the court”80.  
The Joint Committee did hear suggestions of other sanctions that could be 
implemented into the 2005 draft Bill. However they confirmed that due to time 
limitations, they were not in position to make any formal specific recommendations, 
although they did state that corporations should be made to pay compensation. They 
recommended that the HO look again at the issue of sanctions and try to provide the 
courts with suitable room for manoeuvre when dealing with the “broad range of cases 
that might come before them”81. 
On the issue of individual liability, the Joint Committee heard evidence whereby half 
agreed with the HO and the contents of the 2005 draft Bill in that there should be no 
individual primary or secondary liability. The Joint Committee heard from Lord 
Justice Judge (as he was then) who stated that if the Bill were enacted, the offence of 
corporate manslaughter would exist, but that the law relating to ordinary 
manslaughter would still exist and that individual responsibility would still remain.  
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Unsurprisingly, the Joint Committee heard other evidence that “the lack of proposed 
punitive sanctions against individuals would provide an insufficient deterrent and 
would be unsatisfactory for those who wish to see justice delivered for the families of 
victims”82. In light of the evidence heard, the Joint Committee recommended that the 
2005 draft Bill should allow for secondary liability and that the offence should carry a 
maximum term of imprisonment that could be set at 14 years, by analogy to that of 
causing death by dangerous driving. Additionally, the Joint Committee stated that 
upon conviction, individuals should then face director disqualification proceedings so 
that it would act as a further method of control over non-effective or poor directors.  
With regard to the final relevant issue namely the requirement to obtain the consent of 
the DPP before the commencement of a private prosecution. The HO 2000 suggested 
that it was not required, although following the responses received; the HO took the 
view that there was a requirement to add this to the 2005 draft Bill. This was based 
upon the responses received that stated that without the necessity for consent that 
“this would lead to insufficiently well-founded prosecutions, which would ultimately 
fail, and would place an unfair burden on the organisation involved with possible 
irreparable financial and personal harm”83. The Joint Committee were of the view that 
this should be removed from the draft bill in the interests of justice.   
The Joint Committee made some detailed observations and appropriate criticisms of 
the 2005 draft Bill. As mentioned above, the criticism of the new test contained 
within the 2005 draft Bill was well made and did recognise that the proposed test 
could be seen as a step backwards and would open up the problems experienced with 
the doctrine of identification. Clarkson stated that the Joint Committee did “strongly 
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support(ing) the Government’s plans to introduce such a new offence”84 but the report 
did require the Government to consider again its proposals on a number of fronts. The 
Government had the opportunity to consider the number of recommendations outlined 
above and their response will be outlined below in the next section.  
 
3.6.  The Government’s response to the pre-legislative scrutiny  
 
The Government published its reply to the Joint Committees’ report in March 200685. 
The Government stated within the introduction to their response that they had “given 
very careful consideration to the Committees’ comments and recommendations” and 
they “warmly welcome(s) the Committees’ strong support for a statutory offence of 
corporate manslaughter”86. However, it was made clear by the Government that they 
would not be accepting all of the recommendations suggested by the Joint Committee. 
Therefore, it is questionable as to how effective the process of pre-legislative scrutiny 
is, if the Government has the option to disregard its suggestions and observations and 
press on regardless.        
This next section will detail and comment upon some of the more pertinent issues 
contained within the response, such as the issue of causation, the “senior 
management” test, sanctions, individual liability of directors and the consent from the 
DPP to commence private prosecutions.  
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Firstly, on the issue of causation, the Joint Committee were of the view that the 2005 
draft Bill should incorporate the LC’s clause so as to provide certainty within the 
legislation. However, the Government retained its 2005 position stating that they felt 
the inclusion of an explicit clause was unnecessary as the law had developed since the 
LC report was published in 1996. The Government referred to a recent decision
87
 that 
outlined the position on causation and felt that if the clause was included that this 
would lead to uncertainty with its inclusion rather than what it would with its 
exclusion. Additionally, the Government stated that if this specific clause was inserted 
into the Bill that it would apply only to this offence. Therefore it would create a 
difference between the causal test applied to the corporate to that that would be 
applied to the individual offence and the Government were of the view that this would 
not “be either equitable or satisfactory”88.   
Secondly, as mentioned above, the Joint Commission had concerns with the “senior 
management” test proposed by the 2005 draft Bill. The Government recognised that 
this new test was central to the draft Bill and acknowledged that the “Achilles heel of 
the current law”89 was the focus upon the actions of individuals rather than the new 
test that would be concerned with the “systems of work and their implementation”90. 
The Government were concerned that the new proposed test had been interpreted 
differently to how they had intended and expressed the following view: - 
“… the test represented a minimal development of the Law Commission’s proposal, 
designed primarily to ensure that systems and processes throughout an organisation 
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for managing a particular activity were considered and that, properly applied, would 
not in practice have had the adverse impacts that witnesses were concerned about”91.  
However, in light of the Joint Committee’s recommendations, the Government 
confirmed that test should be revaluated as the offence needs to be “clear, properly 
understood and command(s) confidence”92. 
The third relevant area to consider is the Government’s response to the Joint 
Committee’s recommendations in relation to sanctions. In light of the Joint 
Committee’s recommendations, with which the Government agreed with and 
confirmed that guidelines should be produced by the Sentencing Guidelines Council 
to “ensure sentences are set at an appropriate level”93 and additionally that those 
guidelines hopefully would be in existence before the offences exist in law. The 
Government also shared the view of the Committee with regard to knowledge that the 
judiciary should have certain information at their disposal before passing sentence, 
such as the financial position of the defendant company along with their previous 
health and safety record.  
On the additional sanction available to courts, the Government stated they were 
pleased that the Joint Committee were similarly aligned in relation to the use of 
remedial orders, although accepted they could be used rarely. The Government, on the 
issue of enforcement of remedial orders did state they would consider the issue of 
whether the Bill could be enhanced by implementing a procedural framework for 
them. However, in light of the recommendation by the Joint Committee to allow for 
contempt of court proceedings whereby a remedial order had not been complied with, 
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the Government was more resistant. The Government suggested that this route would 
be both “complicated … and contentious94” and provided what they believed to be a 
better and preferred alternative, whereby if an order was not complied with, that the 
matter would be returned to the court where the judge would have the option to 
impose an unlimited fine. 
In answer to the Joint Committee’s concern that alternative sanctions were not 
provided the Government replied by confirming that a consultation was underway and 
that it would take some time to conclude.  
The fourth relevant area the Government considered was the key recommendations in 
relation to individual liability of directors. The Government again referred to the 
difficulties associated with the identification principle as discussed in the previous 
chapters. The Government’s view was that existing law of manslaughter and Health 
and Safety offences was sufficient and could be implemented against individuals. The 
Government acknowledged that there would be difficulties with secondary liability 
given that “the tests for secondary liability generally require that an accessory has a 
similar state of mind as the main offender or at least knew or intended that the offence 
would be committed”95.  
However, the Government contended that if an individual was aware of any failing in 
the company and then act in a way that supported the negligence act/s could face an 
individual charge separate from this proposed legislation. On the subject of director 
disqualification, the Government suggested that the current legislation provides for 
the disqualification if a director was convicted of an indictable offence but that the 
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Government would review how that worked in practice and the symbiosis between 
the two areas of law.    
Finally, with regard to the consent from the DPP to initiate a prosecution and the view 
of the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee recommended that the provision be 
removed from the 2005 draft Bill. The Government referred to the tests applied by the 
CPS namely that the prosecution must be in the public interest and that there must be 
sufficient evidence to prosecute and that the DPP is governed by the same tests.  
The Government believed it would be a sensible filter to apply whereby an 
independent view would be obtained upon a proposed private prosecution. The 
Government did note that the decision of the DPP whereby consent is refused is open 
to judicial review. In light of the above, the Government confirmed that the provision 
would remain in the Bill.   
In evaluating the Government’s response to the Joint Committee’s report, the 
Government did agree with a number of the recommendations and a limited re-
working of the Bill did occur. However, the Government did retain their resolute 
stance on a number of key issues, such as the “senior management” test and the 
individual liability of directors.  
Wells evaluated the reform process and the 2005 draft Bill and accurately summarised 
the position: - 
“It is hard to escape the impression that this Bill is akin to an unwanted pregnancy. 
The government began the reproductive process with promises made in the reckless 
and carefree days at the start of Labour’s period in office in 1997. By the time the egg 
was fertilized, a strong case of parental cold feet appeared to have set in. It might 
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have been too late to renege the consent entirely but the infant has by no means 
received the loving care that would nurture its full potential”96. 
 
3.7.  Conclusion 
 
Law reform is typically not a swift process and this area of the law is no exception. 
We have looked at a number of stages in the reform process starting with LC report in 
1996, the HO 2000 and the 2005 draft Bill. Now, we will now move to the CMCHA 
itself in the next Chapter. 
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Chapter Four – The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 
 
This chapter will consider the CMCHA and its legislative passage through both 
Houses of Parliament. This Act followed the process of reform discussed at length in 
the third chapter. The Sentencing Guidelines Council’s intention to provide 
sentencing guidelines for criminal offences will also be considered.  
Since enactment, only one case involving this new legislation has been fully heard by 
the Courts. The first prosecution under the CMCHA was heard at Winchester Crown 
Court against Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings. It was the first opportunity for the 
new legislation to be tested and determine whether the pitfalls associated with the pre-
legislation approach could be overcome. The second prosecution under this legislation 
has recently commenced against Lion Steel Limited, but will it will be well into 2012 
before any trial is heard.  
The first section of this chapter will consider the passage of the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill through both the House of Commons 
(HC) and the House of Lords (HL). This Bill was passed backwards and forwards 
between both Houses due to a number of disagreements causing some delay in the 
Bill receiving Royal Assent. The reasons for this delay will be considered alongside 
the relevant excerpts from Hansard.   
The second section will analyse the CMCHA itself. The nature of the CMCHA will be 
considered and in particular determine whether it has revolutionised this area of the 
law or whether, the law has taken a step backwards towards the problems associated 
with the identification doctrine. 
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The third section will discuss the Sentencing Guidelines that have been produced and 
will look at the options available to sentencing judges.  
Finally, the CMCHA will be tested in relation to the prosecution against Cotswold 
Geotechnical Holdings. It is only when an offence is tested before the courts that its 
effectiveness can be assessed properly as to whether the difficulties associated with 
the previous law have been removed or at the least reduced. Comment will be made 
upon the second prosecution, as this is still awaiting trial at the present time.  
 
4.1. The passage of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill  
 
The purpose of this section is to consider the relevant debates that occurred during the 
passage of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill through both 
Houses of Parliament. The Bill received its first reading/ introduction before the HC 
on 20
th
 July 2006.  
The intention of this Bill was to apply to all jurisdictions of the UK. The Bill featured 
no individual liability for directors, despite concerns raised by the Joint Committee
1
 
following the process of reform discussed in the previous chapter.  
One issue identified by the Joint Committee was the concerns over the use of the 
“senior management” test and whether this would potentially take the law back 
towards the deficiencies associated with the identification doctrine. However, under 
the terms of the Bill the definition of the “senior management” test was unchanged 
                                                        
1
 House of Commons – Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees “Draft 
Corporate Manslaughter Bill” First Joint Report of Sessions 2005-06 December 
(2005) HC 540 I-III 
129 
 
but that now “the way that the organization’s activities were managed or organized by 
senior management now had only to be a “substantial element” in the breach”2 as 
opposed to the whole element in the breach.  
The then Home Secretary, John Reid M.P., during the second reading, made the 
Government’s intention clear in that they wanted the law relating to corporate 
manslaughter to be just and also that the “Bill aims to create a clear and effective 
criminal offence”3.   
 
4.1.1. Concerns in the House of Commons 
 
In general, the Bill received support from all political parties during its time in the 
HC. However, reservations with the Bill were made clear during the second reading 
of the Bill on the 10
th
 October 2006.  
The Home Secretary confirmed that it was his intention that some of the 
disagreements would be resolved and that the Bill would be subject to the “greatest 
scrutiny possible”4. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there were reservations about the punitive 
sanctions available under the Bill particularly that the proposed maximum sentence 
was an unlimited fine. This issue was raised by Simon Hughes, M.P. for North 
Southwark and Bermondsey and the Home Secretary responded that the “extent of the 
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fines should have some effect”5. Furthermore, the issue of imprisonment as a means 
of punishment was dispensed with by the Home Secretary who confirmed that 
individuals would not be liable but that it was more important that organisations were 
seen by the public and victims to be held to account for this offence. 
During this debate, the detail of the Bill was analysed carefully by the members of the 
HC. The debate considered the impact of the sanctions available under the Bill. 
However, yet again the removal of any individual liability was lamented, particularly 
by Andrew Dismore, M.P. for Hendon. Mr Dismore had in 2000, introduced his own 
Private Member’s Bill, as discussed in the previous chapter, and stated: - 
“Since 2003, the Government have ruled out individual directors’ liability in criminal 
law, which I consider to be a tragic mistake. The strongest incentive for an individual 
director would be that he could stand in place of his company in the dock as a result 
of its failings, leading to the deaths of employees or members of the public”6. 
In addition, comments were made alluding to the lengthy delay that had passed before 
this Bill was presented to the House by Mr Edward Davey, M.P. for Kingston and 
Surbiton. Mr Davey was also concerned that the Bill had been “watered-down” by the 
delay and that it was his hope that following proper debate, the HC could “put some 
teeth back into it”7. 
However, on the point of individual liability, there were views suggested that 
individual liability did not need to be contained within this Bill as there already 
existed law to deal with individuals beyond this Bill. The then Under-Secretary of 
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State for the Home Department, Mr Gerry Sutcliffe M.P. clarified the view of the 
Government upon the Bill not creating individual liability and stated that the Bill 
“establishes a new basis for liability that shifts the focus from the conduct of 
individuals and places it on the management of systems and processes. The Bill is 
concerned with creating an effective corporate offence, not individual liability”8. The 
focus of the Government was on corporate, not individual, liability. 
On the subject of the “senior management” test this was repeatedly commented upon 
by members of the HC and a number stated they were grateful that the Home 
Secretary was prepared to reconsider this issue if appropriate as they had a number of 
concerns. The Under-Secretary, Mr Gerry Sutcliffe M.P. further clarified this by 
confirming that they would “bring forward a new test in Committee that will achieve 
our aims in a way that does not risk the reintroduction of an identification obstacle”9. 
It is clear from comments such as this, that the Government were alive to the concerns 
of re-introducing the identification doctrine under a different title.    
The Bill was carried over into the next session of Parliament on 16
th
 November 2006 
where the Bill received its second reading.  
The amendments of the Committee were considered on 4
th
 December 2006 at the 
report stage and third reading of the Bill. The first amendment suggested was a new 
first clause providing for the individual liability of an officer of a corporation and a 
new second clause provided the penalties that would apply against individual liability.  
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The members of the HC debated these amendments, at some length. The House voted 
against the amendments in relation to individual liability for officers of an 
organisation and this aspect was considered by the Lords in due course.  
The other key amendment tabled dealt with deaths in custody as a result of gross 
negligence. This particular issue would lead to significant delay as the Bill was passed 
backwards and forwards between the two Houses as the Lords ultimately wanted this 
included in the CMCHA immediately which was contrary to the view of the 
Commons.    
The most significant concern however, in relation to the “senior management” test 
taking the law back towards previous problems associated with the identification 
doctrine, was addressed by the Under-Secretary, Mr Gerry Sutcliffe M.P.: - 
“The test for the offence has been improved during the Bill’s consideration. The 
“senior manager” test has been removed, replaced by a wider formulation that is 
based on the management of the organisation’s activities. There remains a need to 
show a substantial failing at a senior level. We are satisfied that that gets the balance 
right”10. 
However as will be discussed below, the test despite the re-shaping was still not 
perfect and the relevant critical views will be discussed below during the 
consideration of the Act.  
The Bill was then passed to the HL and it received its introduction on 5
th
 December 
2006, with the second reading on 19
th
 December 2006.  
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4.1.2. The House of Lords considers the Bill 
 
Baroness Scotland, the Minister of State for the Home Office in the Lords moved for 
the Bill to be read for the second time in the HL. The Minister referred to the 
limitations of the existing law with it being “a narrow and artificial basis for assessing 
corporate negligence”11. Baroness Scotland confirmed the Government’s desire to 
develop the law and expressed the two ways in which the CMCHA will achieve this: - 
“First, it will provide a new test for the application of corporate manslaughter to 
companies. This will allow the courts to look at collective management failure within 
an organisation, enabling for the first time a proper examination of corporate 
negligence. Secondly, it will remove Crown immunity. This is a far-reaching 
development. For the first time, government departments and other Crown bodies will 
be liable to prosecution in the criminal courts”12. 
In response to some of the concerns surrounding the new proposed test, Baroness 
Scotland referred to the “senior management” test and how it had been amended in 
the HC so as “to introduce a wider and more effective test which seeks to strike a 
balance between taking into account the management of the fatal activity generally 
within the organisation and not allowing a prosecution to succeed unless a substantial 
element of the organisations failure lay at a senior management level”13. As 
mentioned above, the proposed test was not perfected during the passage through both 
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Houses and received criticism for this from commentators when the CMCHA received 
Royal Assent and this will be discussed below.  
Again the Government’s view was clear that this new proposed offence should not 
apply to individuals but should be entirely concerned with corporate offenders. In 
addition, it was confirmed that the existing law of manslaughter and Health and 
Safety offences were more than sufficient to deal with any individual offending. 
However, Lord Cotter took the view that in light of the amended Bill that 
“[i]ndividual liability is a key issue that must be scrutinized”14 and the first proper 
opportunity would be when the Bill went before the Grand Committee of the House. 
There was some support at this early stage to segregate corporate and individual 
offending. Lord Lyell was of the view that “[t]he Government are quite right to 
divorce corporate manslaughter from individual liability”15 and Lord Brennan agreed 
and stated “that the target should be the company”16. Lord Hunt seemed to concur 
with his colleagues and stated “[t]o add individual sanctions to the Bill would dilute it 
and confuse people as to the intentions of Parliament”17. 
Following the Grand Committee in the HL and the report and third reading, the Bill 
was passed backwards and forwards between the two Houses of Parliament for 
amendments to be made to the Bill. There was some difference of opinion between 
the views of the two Houses as to the final form of the Bill. In particular, the Lords 
made recommendations that ultimately were included within the CMCHA that 
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widened the number of organisations that would be covered by the CMCHA. The type 
of organisations included trade unions and employer’s associations.  
However, the most significant issue that delayed the passage of this Bill was not the 
arguably contentious issue of individual or secondary liability of individuals or the 
reservations and concerns with the new test for the proposed offence. It was the 
application of the offence to those persons detained in custody which the HC was 
reluctant to include and the HL wished to include.  
The compromise, given that the 12-month passage limit of the Bill was already 
extended by one week, was that the section relating to deaths in custody would be 
included in the CMCHA. However, this was with the caveat that it would require 
approval and consent from both Houses of Parliament before it could be brought into 
force. The reason for the reluctance in the Commons in relation to the impact of this 
section that if brought into force immediately it would place substantial pressure on 
the prison service and police forces. 
Following significant delay as the Bill was passed between the two House of 
Parliament, ultimately the CMCHA received Royal Assent on 26
th
 July 2007, but 
came into force largely by 6
th
 April 2008. The next substantive section will consider 
the provisions contained within the CMCHA. 
 
4.2. The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act (2007)  
 
After many years of waiting and delays, through many years of proposed reforms 
promised by politicians, the CMCHA was finally on the statute books, some thirteen 
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years after the LC Consultation Paper in 1994. This section will consider the 
implications of the new law by analysing the key sections and reflect whether the 
CMCHA has gone far enough especially given the criticisms of its supposed 
limitations.  
Initially, this section will consider the new statutory offence of Corporate 
Manslaughter and the requisite elements of the offence that need to be proved for the 
offence to be made out. Critically, it will assess and consider whether the new test is 
sufficiently robust to be tested against a large corporation, compared to the problems 
with the old approach. 
Secondly, this section will analyse the other relevant sections of the CMCHA such as 
the sentencing powers (s.1(6)) including remedial orders (s.9) and publicity orders 
(s.10), the required consent of the DPP to bring proceedings (s.17), no individual 
liability (s.18) and the abolition of liability of corporations for manslaughter at 
common law (s.20). 
 
4.2.1. The offence of Corporate Manslaughter  
 
The most significant part in this new piece of legislation is the brand new statutory 
offence of corporate manslaughter that is contained within section one of the 
CMCHA: - 
(1) An organisation to which this section applies is guilty of an offence if the way 
in which its activities are managed or organised- 
(a) causes a person’s death, and 
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(b) amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the 
organisation to the deceased 
(2) The organisations to which this section applies are- 
(a) a corporation; 
(b) a department or other body listed in Schedule 1; 
(c) a police force; 
(d) a partnership, or a trade union or employers’ association, that 
is an employer. 
(3) An organisation is guilty of an offence under this section only if the way in 
which its activities are managed or organised by its senior management is a 
substantial element in the breach referred to in subsection (1).” 
 
4.2.2. The elements of the offence 
 
For this offence to be made out, the prosecution will need to prove the requisite 
elements of the offence, which will be considered and analysed individually in turn. 
Compared to the difficulties associated with the common law approach, there is now a 
statutory guide to each element. 
 
4.2.2.1 Qualifying Organisation 
 
Firstly, the CMCHA applies to organisations and therefore the organisation must be a 
qualifying organisation such as a corporation. However, the CMCHA goes beyond 
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mere corporate liability and applies to trade unions, police forces and a large number 
of Government departments listed in Schedule One of the CMCHA such as the 
Attorney General’s Office, the Forestry Commission and the Royal Mint for example.  
Section 11 unusually expressly removes Crown immunity for the purposes of this Act.  
 
4.2.2.2 A relevant duty of care? 
 
Secondly, the organisation must have owed a relevant duty of care to the victim. The 
meaning of this relevant duty of care is provided within section 2(1): - 
(1) A “relevant duty of care”, in relation to an organisation, means any of the 
following duties owed by it under the law of negligence- 
(a) a duty owed to its employees or to other persons working for the 
organisation or performing services for it; 
(b) a duty owed as occupier of premises; 
(c) a duty owed in connection with – 
(i) the supply by the organisation of goods or services (whether 
for consideration or not), 
(ii) the carrying on by the organisation of any construction or 
maintenance operations, 
(iii) the carrying on by the organisation of any other activity on a 
commercial basis, or 
(iv) the use or keeping by the organisation of any plant, vehicle or 
other thing; 
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(d) a duty owed to a person who, by reason of being a person within 
subsection (2), is someone for whose safety the organisation is 
responsible. 
Section 2(1)(d) relates to persons in custody was brought into force on 1
st
 September 
2011
18
. This was discussed above during the passage of the Bill through both Houses 
of Parliament and was one of the main points of delay and consternation between the 
Houses.  
This is a question of law, it is for the judge and not for the jury to make the requisite 
determination as to whether the particular organisation owes a duty of care to a 
particular individual and this is made clear within s.2(5) that the “judge must make 
any findings of fact necessary to decide that question”.  
As Matthews recognises the “corporate offence under the Act is unique in including 
an element of the offence to be determined by a judge who will then direct the jury of 
its existence, as a matter of law”19. However, it is for the prosecution to prove that 
there is a duty of care and thereafter the judge must make findings of fact and 
determine whether the criminal standard of proof is reached. The Judge will consider 
the three-point approach
20
 devised by Lord Bridge in the HL decision in Caparo 
Industries plc v. Dickman
21
 to decide whether a duty of care is present.     
In addition, the duty of care contained within this section is subject to sections 3 to 7, 
which contain the exceptions to the duty of care and they are briefly as follows, 
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 The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (Commencement 
No. 3) Order 2011 (2011/1867) 
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 See note 2 (Matthews) at p.34 
20
 Firstly, there must be a forseeability of harm; secondly there must be proximity 
between the victim and the defendant; and finally it must be reasonable to impose the 
duty of care 
21
 [1990] 1 All ER 568 
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section 3 – Public policy decisions, exclusively public functions and statutory 
inspections, section 4 – Military activities, section 5 – Policing and law enforcement, 
section 6 – Emergencies and section 7 – Child-protection and probation functions. 
Again, as the cases appear before the courts, it will be seen how these will be applied.  
However, there has been criticism of the insertion of a relevant duty of care being 
included in the CMCHA. Gobert suggests that it is “in fact otiose”22 explaining that 
the LC
23
 and HO 2000
24
 did not include this requirement. Equally, the Joint 
Committee
25
 that considered the 2005 draft Bill, as discussed in the previous chapter 
suggested that the relevant duty of care should not be included. Gobert’s argument 
that the inclusion of the relevant duty of care is superfluous is because he suggests 
that companies are “already under a duty not to kill innocent persons”26. Nevertheless 
despite the criticism, the relevant duty of care provisions was included by Parliament 
within this Act and it will be seen how it is applied and interpreted by the judiciary. 
  
4.2.2.3 Causation 
 
This aspect is contained within section 1(1)(a): - 
“… the way in which its activities are managed or organised –  
                                                        
22
 Gobert, J. “The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 – 
Thirteen years in the making but was it worth the wait?” Modern Law Review (2008) 
Vol.71(3) 413-433 at p.416 
23
 Law Commission, “Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter” Law 
Com. Report No.237 (1996) 
24
 Home Office, “Reforming the law on involuntary manslaughter: the Government’s 
proposal” May (2000) 
25
 See note 1 (Joint Committee) 
26
 See note 22 at p.416 
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 (a) causes  person’s death”. 
The Explanatory Notes to the Act at paragraph 15 refer to how “[t]he usual principles 
of causation in the criminal law will apply to determine the question. This means that 
the management failure need not have been the sole cause of death; it need only be a 
cause (although intervening acts may break the chain of causation in certain 
circumstances)”27.  
This can be contrasted with the common law offence of manslaughter, discussed in 
the second chapter, where as Forlin notes “the law that required the failure to be a 
substantial cause of death. The courts might imply a “substantiality” requirement into 
the new offence. We will have to wait and see!”28. This point will only be clarified 
when the offence has been properly tested against a number of defendant 
corporations.  
Gobert is critical of the Government’s decision to reject the LC’s “conception of 
causation in favour of the more conventional approaches used by the courts, which 
themselves have long been a source of controversy and confusion”29. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the LC did recommend at paragraph 8.39 of the 1996 report, that 
there should be an express provision “to the effect that in this kind of situation the 
management failure may be a cause of the death, even if the immediate cause is the 
act or omission of an individual”. Given the passage of time between the 1996 report 
and the time of this piece of legislation, there have been a significant number of 
judicial decisions on causation such as the HL decision in R. v. Kennedy (No.2)
30
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 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill HL 19 at Para 15 
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 Forlin, G. and Smail, L. “Corporate Liability: Work Related Deaths and Criminal 
Prosecutions (2010) 2
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whereby the chain of causation can be broken by voluntary acts of compos mentis 
adults. In light of this and other decisions, “the Law Commission’s formulation may 
be needed more than ever if the Act is to have any bite”31.  
 
4.2.2.4 A “gross breach” of the relevant duty of care 
 
Fourthly, as per s.1(1)(b), the death must amount to a “gross breach” of the relevant 
duty of care. Section 1(4)(b) states as follows: - 
“(b) a breach of duty of care by an organisation is a ‘gross’ breach if the conduct 
alleged to amount to a breach of that duty falls far below what can reasonably 
be expected of the organisation in the circumstances”. 
This is a matter for the jury to determine. Section 8 specifies factors for the jury to 
consider, including whether the corporation/ organisation “failed to comply with any 
health and safety legislation that relates to the alleged breach”. In light of that the jury 
must consider “(a) how serious that failure was” and “(b) how much of a risk of death 
it posed”32. In contrast to the obligation within s.8(2), the jury may under s.8(3) 
consider Health and Safety policies and guidance along with the corporate culture of 
the defendant organisation and under s.8(4) provides the wide discretion to consider 
“any other matters they consider relevant”.    
As Forlin states, given the infancy of this offence, “how far does a company’s 
management failure need to fall below what can reasonably be expected? The answer 
                                                        
31
 See note 22 at p.419 
32
 s.8(2) 
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is uncertain, as it will take considerable time and a series of appellant decisions to 
build up significant binding case law”33. Until then, we might turn to the existing case 
law on “gross negligence” manslaughter. In the decision in R. v. Bateman34, Lord 
Hewart C.J. stated that “gross negligence” required that: - 
“... the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation 
between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others, as to 
amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving of punishment”.35 
 
4.2.2.5 The “senior management” test 
 
Finally, as per s.1(3), the way in which the organisation activities were managed or 
organised by its senior management is a substantial element in the gross breach. The 
“senior management” test has received significant criticism and many commentators 
have suggested that this test has taken the law back towards the deficiencies 
associated with the identification/ “directing mind and will” doctrine. The CMCHA 
provides some clarity as to what it means by use of the term “senior management” in 
s.1(4)(c): - 
“(c) ‘senior management’, in relation to an organisation, means the persons who 
play significant roles in- 
(i) the making of decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of 
its activities are to be managed or organised, or 
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 See note 28 at p.6 
34
 (1925) 19 Cr. App. Rep. 8, CCA 
35
 Ibid. at p.11 
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(ii) the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of 
those activities”.   
Given that the legislation has been enacted and this new test is at the heart of the new 
offence, Matthews states that “[o]n its face, the definition of an organisation’s senior 
management under the Act has a far wider compass than merely those, under common 
law, who constituted the “directing minds” of a company, which was effectively 
limited to a company’s Board of Directors”36. Therefore the view is that the test itself 
is wider than that applied when utilising the directing mind and will approach.  
Conversely, Card recognises that this new test “still restricts the range of people 
whose misconduct can result in liability for corporate liability”37. Furthermore, Card 
contends that the test is in fact “too narrow” and that there “is a risk that cynical 
organisations will delegate their decision-making and management and organisation 
in areas related to health and to safety to people falling outside the definition”38. This 
is a fair criticism, given that organisations and corporations will always try to limit 
their liability on a number of fronts, such as tax liability. Indeed, companies receive 
training so as to limit their various liabilities and many legal firms and accountants 
firms actively advise companies on how to limit liabilities. It is not inconceivable that 
law firms will provide advice on how to deal with this legislation, so as to prepare 
organisations for it. It goes without saying that this training will not attempt to pervert 
the course of justice, but nevertheless organisations and their representatives will be 
“prepared” for the implications of this legislation.     
                                                        
36
 See note 2 (Matthews) at p.113 
37
 Card, R. “Card, Cross and Jones Criminal Law” (2010) 19th Edition at p.314 
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The key point in relation to this new test is, as Matthews recognises, the “difficulty 
with the definition of “senior management” is that it is constructed of terms that have 
no established meaning in either legislation or case law”39. This will undoubtedly 
cause problems when this new offence is tested in courts and will lead to a number of 
appeals. To echo Forlin’s point raised earlier, it will take a significant number of 
appellant decisions that will in due course provide guidance in the form of binding 
decisions that will assist the trial courts on this very difficult aspect of the new 
offence.    
 
4.2.3. Other relevant aspects contained within the legislation 
 
For completeness, this section will address the other relevant issues contained within 
the CMCHA. This section will analyse the other relevant sections of the CMCHA such 
as the sentencing powers (s.1(6)) including remedial orders (s.9) and publicity orders 
(s.10), the required consent of the DPP to bring proceedings (s.17), no individual 
liability (s.18) and the abolition of liability of corporations for manslaughter at 
common law (s.20). 
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4.2.3.1 Sentencing Powers under the Act 
 
The sentencing powers under this Act stipulates that on conviction on indictment
40
 for 
corporate manslaughter the sentence will be a fine. Sentencing Guidelines have been 
produced and these are discussed in full below.  The CMCHA also provides two 
further options to be placed at the disposal of the sentencing judge and these are 
Remedial orders and Publicity orders and are discussed in the next sub-section.  
 
4.2.3.2 Remedial orders/ Publicity Orders 
 
The CMCHA provides sentencing judges with two additional orders that can be 
imposed following a conviction for corporate manslaughter; namely remedial orders
41
 
and publicity orders
42
.  
The remedial order contained within this legislation is similar to the power available 
under s.42 Health and Safety at Work Act (1974). However, the power available 
under s.42 is not exercised with any great frequency as the offending health and safety 
infringement is usually rectified during the proceedings. The order available under 
this legislation can require the offending organisation to undertake the steps so as to 
remedy: - 
“(a) the breach mentioned in section 1(1) (“the relevant breach”) 
                                                        
40
 s.1(6) 
41
 s.9   
42
 s.10   
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(b) any matter that appears to the court to have resulted from the relevant breach 
and to have been a cause of the death; 
(c) any deficiency, as regards health and safety matters, in the organisation’s 
policies, systems or practices of which the relevant breach appears to the 
court to be an indication.”43 
The prosecution must apply for the remedial order to be imposed and the terms of the 
order must stipulate the terms of the order they require
44
. However, the prosecution 
must consult and seek the input of the appropriate regulatory authority such as the 
Health and Safety Executive
45
. The order itself must state a period for the remedial 
work to be completed, but this period can be extended by order of the court
46
.  The 
CMCHA provides that a fine can be imposed for failure to comply with the remedial 
order
47
.  
The other order available to the sentencing judge is to impose a publicity order. 
However, publicity orders only apply to offences of corporate manslaughter 
committed on or after 15
th
 February 2010. The court can order that the offending 
corporation publicises the following: - 
“(a) the fact that it has been convicted of the offence; 
(b) specified particulars of the offence; 
(c) the amount of any fine imposed; 
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(d) the terms of any remedial order made.”48 
The approach taken in relation to publicity orders is similar that of remedial orders, 
but in this instance, the court must seek the view of the regulatory/ enforcement 
authorities but also acknowledge any representations made by the prosecution
49
. In a 
similar vein to remedial orders, the court must stipulate the period in which the 
publicity order is to be complied with
50
 and failure again to comply with this order 
can result in a fine
51
.  
Considering the impact of these orders, companies and shareholders will not welcome 
the name of the company/ organisation being publicised in a detrimental light. The 
“name and shame” approach may be very effective if it is used regularly and this 
could prove to be a significant deterrent to potential offending corporations. However, 
in relation to remedial orders, it is questionable how effective these will be. In legal 
proceedings, the offending companies would be advised by their legal teams that they 
should remedy the cause of death to ensure that it doesn’t occur again to illustrate 
contrition and learning and that this would be used as a point of mitigation at the 
sentence hearing. It is to be seen how often these orders are made and whether they 
will have the impact intended.  
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4.2.3.3 Consent of the DPP to commence proceedings 
 
Section 17 stipulates that the DPP must give consent for criminal proceedings to be 
commenced under this Act. This is in direct contrast with the recommendations of the 
LC
52
 and HO 2000
53
.  
The inclusion of this requirement creates a potential political dimension that could 
cause some significant criticism of the DPP and bring into question that individual’s 
impartiality. The DPP is required to report to the Attorney General, who is a member 
of the Government. Given that this legislation removes Crown immunity, this issue 
could cause significant furore if consent to prosecute a Crown department was 
withheld.  
 
4.2.3.4 No Individual liability under this Act 
 
Section 18 stipulates that there will be no individual liability under this Act. The 
inclusion of this particular section is controversial, as it limits the CMCHA solely to 
the organisational/ corporate level and the “offending” directors and chief executives 
are not covered within this legislation. As a result of this section, there is no 
possibility of secondary liability of directors for corporate manslaughter.   
Some commentators consider this to have been a glaring error on the part of the 
Government. Gobert states that “[t]he lobbying efforts of the business community 
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against personal liability bore fruit”54 but nevertheless that “[t]he government’s 
rationale for eschewing accessorial liability in the corporate manslaughter context – 
its professed desire to focus on the liability of organisations – is hardly a convincing 
reason for ignoring the culpability of corporate executives, senior managers and 
directors”55.  There is still the option for charges of gross negligence manslaughter to 
be preferred against the individual directors/ chief executives/ senior managers if the 
prosecution are satisfied that the two tests for prosecution are satisfied.  
 
4.2.3.5 The Abolition of liability of corporations for manslaughter at common law 
 
For completeness and to confirm the current position, the terms of section 20 are 
clear: - 
“The common law offence of manslaughter by gross negligence is abolished in its 
application to corporations, and in any application it has to other organisations to 
which section1 applies”. 
In essence, this means that this legislation has now replaced the former system. 
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4.3. Was the Act worth waiting for? 
 
I’ll argue that, on balance, it was indeed worth waiting for, notwithstanding certain 
deficiencies. The central question to this thesis is whether we have replaced one 
deficient system with a new system with similar deficiencies? The benefits and 
detriments of the new legislation will be considered in turn below.  
On a positive note, we do now have a statutory offence compared to the previous 
common law doctrine. It could be suggested that having a defined statutory criminal 
offence gives more significance to deaths in the workplace, rather than them being 
seen simply as a regulatory matter. Conversely, given that the penalties available to 
the sentencing judge are analogous to those available following conviction for 
regulatory offences, will this offence be considered as anything more than an 
extension to regulatory law? As there is no individual liability to enforce, the CMCHA 
has no individual to imprison as a punitive sanction; it simply puts a price on the life 
lost by way of a fine which is significantly different to the sentences available for 
murder or for other types of manslaughter.  
The question that flows from this is whether the CMCHA will present a suitable 
deterrent for companies. For example, if a company ignores health and safety laws 
and saves money by doing so, will the fine imposed for this offence be sufficiently 
high to act as an effective deterrent against its illegal activities? As the main sentence 
that can be imposed is a financial one, it is questionable whether this could be seen as 
a business expense and the cost of the fine is simply passed onto the consumers to 
make up the shortfall. By doing so the company could suffer competitively, but if the 
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company has a monopoly, such as a train operating company, then the competitive 
impact can be nullified.     
Griffin takes the view that the CMCHA “is to be welcomed as a statute which 
identifies a company’s liability for the offence of manslaughter in a manner that 
extends the probability of a successful prosecution”56. Yet, and this point is discussed 
further below, Griffin identifies arguably the CMCHA’s greatest deficiency in that it 
“discards a golden opportunity in its failure to contain provision for the secondary 
liability of a culpable senior manager”57.  
However, as identified in the third chapter the CMCHA could have gone further, for 
example by allowing for individual liability, and the potential deficiencies in the 
CMCHA may be highlighted once it is tested in a prosecution against a large 
corporation.  
Elliott and Quinn take the view that the CMCHA “is disappointing, as it significantly 
waters down the original proposals to the point that the new offence looks very 
similar to the old common law, and will be almost as difficult to prosecute. The Home 
Office has stated that the 2007 Act will allow easier prosecution of big companies, but 
this is far from certain”58. There are aspects to the legislation that will cause problems 
for the first courts and judges that encounter it. There are a number of points that will 
require elucidation from the appellate courts and this will take some time for a wealth 
of judicial guidance and jurisprudence to come into existence.  
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As mentioned above, a further key criticism of the new legislation is that individual 
liability is not allowed under this Act. This is despite the role that the “offending” 
directors and chief executives play “who significantly contribute to their 
organisation’s offence”59. Gobert argues that Parliament had its attention focused 
upon the corporate failing and that it “appears to have lost sight of the fact that senior 
managers and directors are responsible for conceiving, formulating, approving and 
implementing corporate policies, including those which turn out to be 
criminogenic”60. There is of course, the option for the Crown to pursue charges of 
gross negligence manslaughter against the individual directors.    
With the focus of the CMCHA being solely on the corporate entity, there is the 
possibility that if a company is convicted of corporate manslaughter, the directors 
may make the decision to simply wind the company up and move onto a different 
venture with another company. If that occurs, all the impact of this legislation, 
whether it is the deterrent effect or the punishment becomes irrelevant as the original 
company is treated as dissolved within the law. There is however the possibility that 
the directors could be pursued under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 
1986, although this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
From a practical perspective, it will need to be seen how often charges of corporate 
manslaughter are preferred. In light of this, given the current economic climate and its 
associated austerity measures proposed in the public sector, mounting a prosecution 
for corporate manslaughter will be costly for the prosecuting authorities. Further to 
this is whether the CPS is the appropriate body to prosecute such an offence. Should it 
not be dealt with by a body that has experience or knowledge of corporate culture? 
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The CPS does have specialist prosecution departments, but will these have the 
required knowledge of corporate structures. Allied to this is whether the Police have 
sufficient resources in the current climate to have a specialised team of officers that 
will be able properly investigate this crime. It is unlikely that each of the 43 Police 
forces in England and Wales will each be able to sustain a specialist department, 
when they are undergoing significant cuts to their budgets.  
    
4.4. Sentencing Guidelines 
 
Following a consultation process, the Sentencing Guidelines Council published its 
definitive guidelines
61
 on 9
th
 February 2010 for sentencing for corporate manslaughter 
and Health and Safety offences causing death. The guideline properly acknowledges 
that offences that fall within this guideline will always involve harm that is very 
serious.  
The aggravating and mitigating factors provided within the guidelines are non-
exhaustive and are listed within the body of the document and therefore it is not 
relevant to repeat them here.  
However, one aspect of the document requires close examination due its potentially 
controversial implementation. As with all criminal proceedings, an individual or 
corporation must provide a breakdown of its financial position, company accounts or 
statement of means so that the sentencing court is aware of its available funds. In light 
of this, the sentence guidelines deals with this in Annex A the type of information the 
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court should have at its disposal such as for companies, it should have published 
audited accounts, whereas for local authorities and public bodies should provide the 
Annual Revenue Budget. The guidelines make it clear at paragraph 15 that “a fixed 
correlation between the fine and either turnover or profit is not appropriate”62, yet the 
court should still be conscious of the turnover and/ or profit of the organisation if 
relevant. 
The nature of the guidelines could be problematical in that the defendant corporations 
that will be subject to the financial penalty will be significantly varied in their size 
and ability to meet the financial penalty imposed by the sentencing court. The aim of 
the Sentencing Guidelines in respect to all offences and offenders is not just limited to 
the offence of corporate manslaughter, is for sentencing to be consistent and not be 
dependent upon which court the offender appears before. This is the aim, but in 
practice there will always be differences and nuances in sentencing practices between 
the many different courts and different members of the judiciary. This may lead to a 
number of appeals to the Court of Appeal on the grounds that the fines imposed by 
the courts are “manifestly excessive”.  Given that this is a new area of the law, it is 
likely that a large number of the first sentences for corporate manslaughter offences 
will be appealed and hopefully the appellate courts will provide clear guidance for the 
first instance courts.    
When a court imposes the financial sanction, the guidelines outlines’ a number of 
financial consequences that the courts should take into account. The list at paragraph 
19(i) includes the consequence, namely the “effect on the employment of the innocent 
may be relevant”63; this factor did not apparently weigh heavy upon the sentencing 
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judge’s mind in the Cotswold Geotechnical case discussed below. However, one of 
the consequences that was relevant in the Cotswold Geotechnical case is at paragraph 
19(viii) namely “whether the fine will have the effect of putting the defendant out of 
business will be relevant; in some bad cases this may be an acceptable 
consequence”64.  
The guidelines carefully state that a financial penalty imposed by a court does not 
“attempt to value a human life in money”65; however it does state a figure should 
rarely be below £500,000 and that the amount could be into the millions of pounds.  
Finally, the sentence guidelines do cover the other options available to the courts such 
as compensation that can be ordered, publicity orders and remedial orders.  
 
4.5. The first prosecution – R. v. Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Limited 
 
The first prosecution under the CMCHA followed an accident that occurred in 
September 2008. A junior geologist, Alexander Wright an employee of the firm was 
involved in an accident whilst he was obtaining soil samples. Mr Wright was working 
alone in a trench that collapsed and he died from crushing and traumatic asphyxiation. 
The CPS made a charging decision on 23
rd
 April 2009 and authorised a number of 
charges. The CPS authorised a charge of corporate manslaughter against the 
company, Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Limited. Additionally, it charged one of 
the directors, Peter Eaton with gross negligence manslaughter. Furthermore, it 
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authorised Health and Safety charges against the company and against Mr Eaton. This 
demonstrated clearly that the CPS had contemplated its strategy carefully and had 
covered a number of potential eventualities and as Bastable suggests the approach 
taken by the CPS showed it was “willing to deploy the full arsenal of applicable 
criminal offences following a fatal accident”66. 
The trial was listed to commence at Winchester Crown Court in February 2010, but 
was adjourned. During the period of adjournment, the proceedings against Mr Eaton 
for gross negligence manslaughter and health and safety offences were stayed due to 
his ill health as he was unfit to stand trial.  Nevertheless the proceedings against the 
company continued. However and strangely the Judge, Mr Justice Field, suggested 
that the Health and Safety offence alongside the Corporate Manslaughter charge could 
confuse the jury and therefore the Health and Safety offence was discontinued. This is 
surprising given that the new legislation is designed to work hand in hand with the 
Health and Safety offences.  
One of the key aspects raised by the Prosecution was the depth of the trenches. Mr 
Wright was working alone in a 3.5 metre deep trench, at the end of the day finishing 
up the day’s activities when the company director left.  
On Tuesday 15
th
 February 2011, the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict in under 
90 minutes. The jury found that the depth of the trenches, which should be no deeper 
that 1.2 metres according to industry standards, was wholly dangerous. 
Mr Justice Field on 17
th
 February 2011 sentenced the company to pay a fine of 
£385,000. This was despite the Judge hearing representations as to the company’s 
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 Bastable, G. “Corporate Convictions” Criminal Law and Justice Weekly (2011) 
16
th
 April Vol.175, 237-238 at p.238 
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financial state that was described as “parlous”. The Judge directed that the company 
could pay the fine over a period of ten years and that no costs were to be paid. 
The case itself was not formally reported, but the following sentencing remarks of Mr 
Justice Field have been widely referred to in a number of articles: - 
“It may well be that the fine in the terms of its payment will put this company into 
liquidation. If that is the case it’s unfortunate but unavoidable. But it’s a consequence 
of the serious breach …”  
As discussed above, in light of the sentencing guidelines, judges when passing 
sentence should not allow the issue of company liquidation to affect the level of the 
fine if the breach was so gross.  
The company appealed the sentence decision on the basis that it was manifestly 
excessive. Given the nature of the appeal and that it was the first conviction under the 
new legislation the matter was heard before the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge in the 
Court of Appeal on 11
th
 May 2011
67
. The central contention of the company was 
based upon the level of the fine in that represented 250% of its turnover and therefore 
would ultimately result in liquidation of the company.  
Despite the arguments that were propounded by the appellant company, the appeal 
was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. Lord Judge held that even though as a result of 
this fine the company could go into liquidation, this was “unfortunate but unavoidable 
and inevitable”. The original sentence of Mr Justice Field was not criticised as he had 
properly referred to the fact that the company had been convicted of corporate 
manslaughter following a gross breach of duty.    
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4.5.1. The impact of the first prosecution? 
 
The first prosecution under this legislation was much anticipated and it was hoped 
that it would demonstrate the effectiveness of the new legislation compared to the 
deficiencies associated with the old approach. Sadly, despite the conviction of the 
company, the expectation was not completely satisfied. The company involved in this 
case was a small “one man band” and therefore the failing of the “senior 
management” was not examined in depth and was not thoroughly considered. 
However, as McCluskey states: - 
“The true test of the new legislation will come with a prosecution of a large company 
which has multiple directors which already purports to have compliant health and 
safety procedures”68. 
The point suggested by McCluskey is absolutely pertinent, the new legislation and the 
“senior management” test must undergo rigorous legal debate in court proceedings. 
However, this will only occur when it is tested in a prosecution against a large 
corporation with a complex and sophisticated management structure.  
Nevertheless, the conviction was treated as a success by the CPS and also the Health 
and Safety Executive. However, the conviction was not significantly overemphasised 
                                                        
68
 McCluskey, D. “Legal Update: corporate manslaughter” Law Society Gazette 
(2011) 3
rd
 March, 16-17 at p.17 
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by the Crown given that the “nature of this case is such that it unfortunately tells us 
nothing whatsoever about how these new principles operate”69. 
A further issue commented upon by academics was the level of the fine. Mr Justice 
Field suggested that level of the fine was commensurate with the offence. As with all 
criminal proceedings, the judge does have the discretion with regard to the level of 
sentence and the guidelines are indeed guidelines and not law. However as discussed 
above, the sentencing guidelines at paragraph 24 state that “the appropriate fine will 
seldom be less than £500,000 and may be measured in millions of pounds”70. Field 
and Jones argue that by awarding a fine less than the starting point suggested by the 
guidelines “will be viewed by some as an indication that the Act lacks bite”71. On 
reflection, given that this is the first conviction under this legislation, it is arguably 
premature to suggest that the Act lacks teeth, the option to award a higher fine when 
required is available to sentencing judges.  
It is understood that the CPS are considering a number of cases that may involve 
corporate manslaughter. In the next subsection, a recent prosecution has commenced 
that is in the early stages of court proceedings and will be discussed briefly.  
 
4.5.2. The second prosecution – Lion Steel Limited 
 
The second prosecution under the CMCHA received its first hearing before Tameside 
Magistrates’ Court on 2nd August 2011. The CPS authorised charges of Corporate 
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 See note 61 (Sentencing Guidelines) at p.7 
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 Field, S. and Jones, L. “Death in the workplace: who pays the price?” Company 
Lawyer (2011) Vol.32(6), 166-173 at p.173  
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Manslaughter against Lion Steel Limited, along with individual charges of gross 
negligence manslaughter against three of the company directors. In addition, charges 
for Health and Safety offences have been preferred against the company and also the 
three directors.  
The charges arise from an incident on 29
th
 May 2008 where an employee of the 
company, Steven Berry, fell through a roof and died as a result of his injuries.  
In contrast to the first prosecution against Cotswold Geotechnical, Lion Steel Limited 
is a larger company with 100 employees. Therefore, the new law should face a greater 
test given the size of the company structure. However, Lion Steel is not a large 
company with a complex management structure, as those described in the second 
chapter and therefore the law still awaits its first true significant test. 
The trial has been listed at Manchester Crown Court and will commence on 12
th
 June 
2012. Unfortunately, this is beyond the time-limits permitted for the submission of 
this thesis.   
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
The central question to this thesis is whether the CMCHA has resolved the former 
doctrine’s deficiencies. There are significant concerns that the same problems will 
exist but in slightly different forms. However, the CMCHA has provided a statutory 
offence of corporate manslaughter, but the offence with its new test is not perfect.  
162 
 
Law reform is supposed to develop and take the law forward, not to hold station or to 
carry the deficiencies of the old system with it. We appear to now have an 
identification “plus” model with the focus on the senior management. This may well 
provide a lacuna in the law whereby the test in practical terms could be either too 
narrow or oddly, too wide.  
It was hoped that the first prosecution would provide an example of how effective the 
new legislation would or could be. However, the company involved was not a large 
corporation therefore the first real test is still awaited. This case demonstrated the 
sentencing powers available to the court, with the fine imposed causing significant 
difficulty for the offending corporation that resulted in an unsuccessful appeal.  
The impact, extent and effectiveness of the CMCHA, is still very much in its infancy. 
In contrast, in the next chapter we will consider a different approach that is applied in 
Canada that is very much moving into adolescence.  
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Chapter Five – an alternative approach to corporate criminal liability for 
manslaughter 
 
This chapter will consider the approach taken by Canada to corporate criminal 
liability for manslaughter.  
The similarities with the new system in the UK will be discussed along with the 
differences and areas that could have been adopted that could have improved our new 
law.  
The first section will consider the historical Canadian approach to corporate criminal 
liability that was based on the identification doctrine much maligned on both sides of 
the Atlantic.   
The second substantive section will consider the reform process that followed the 
Westray Mine Disaster in 1992 that ultimately resulted in the passage of Bill C-45
1
 
that amended the Criminal Code
2
 in Canada. In a similar vein to the delay 
experienced in the UK, it took 11 years between the Westray Mine Disaster and the 
Federal Government of Canada tabling Bill C-45.  
The chapter will then discuss both the first prosecutions that followed under Bill C-45 
and briefly the sentencing position.  
 
 
                                                        
1
 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, S.C. 2003, c.21, proclaimed in force 31
st
 
March (2004) (save for s.22). Introduced as Bill C-45, 2
nd
 Sess., 37
th
 Parl., (2003) 
2
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 
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5.1.  The Canadian Approach 
 
Historically in Canada the approach taken to corporate criminal liability was based 
upon the identification doctrine. Canada approved the identification doctrine as a 
basis of corporate criminal liability before it was accepted into the criminal law in 
England
3
.  
 
5.1.1.  The identification doctrine in Canada 
 
The leading case in Canadian Law in this area is the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision in R. v. Canadian Dredge & Dock Company
4
. Prior to this Supreme Court 
decision, the application was similar to the narrow approach taken by the courts in 
England and Wales. The Supreme Court considered the approach taken by the HL in 
Tesco Supermarkets Limited v. Nattrass
5
, as discussed in the first chapter, with the 
general view being that it was too narrow.  
However, the doctrine was widened by the Supreme Court in Canadian Dredge and 
the Court held that a corporation could have more than one “directing mind”. The 
difference between the approach taken by the HL in Tesco and the Supreme Court in 
Canadian Dredge is that the Canadian courts were prepared to identify the directing 
mind at a lower and broader level within a corporation compared with the English 
approach. 
                                                        
3
 R. v. Fane Robinson Ltd. [1941] 3 D.L.R. 409 (Alberta Court of Appeal) 
4
 [1985] S.C.J. No. 28, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662 (S.C.C.) 
5
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There are a number of examples of where the Canadian courts have indicated an 
ability to implement a broader approach to the identification doctrine
6
. As Hanna 
confirms and compares the situation between Canada and England at the time of 
preparing his article: - 
“In Canada it seems evident that the directing mind of the corporation may reside in 
fairly low-level officials. This is to be contrasted to the position taken by the House of 
Lords in the leading English case of Tesco Supermarkets v. Nattrass”7.  
The approach and application of the identification doctrine has developed in Canada 
as it has in the UK. The Supreme Court of Canada revisited this issue in the case of 
Rhone (The) v. Peter A.B. Widener (The)
8
. This case dealt with civil damages and on 
some level suggested that in future cases, the directing mind could only be found in 
the higher echelons of the corporation where there are higher levels of authority. 
                                                        
6
 Hanna, D. “Corporate Criminal Liability” Criminal Law Quarterly (1988-1989) 
Vol.31, 452-480 at p.464: - “The following results have been reached in Canada: a 
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road surface treatment contract by a company superintendent, held to be a directing 
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Construction Co. [1967] 1 C.C.C. 301, [1966] 2 O.R. 867, 50 C.P.R 97 (H.C.J.), affd. 
[1968] 2 C.C.C. 5, 65 D.L.R. (2d) 260, [1968] 1 O.R. 5 (C.A.); theft by an accountant 
was held to be an act of the corporation (R. v. Spot Supermarket Inc. (1979) 50 
C.C.C. (2d) 239 (Que. C.A.)); and the only employee of a realty company who was 
responsible for renting properties was held to be a directing mind and will for the 
purpose of holding the company liable under the Ontario Human Rights Code (Karen 
Reese v. London Realties & Rentals (1986) 7 C.H.R.R. D3587 (Ont. Bd. Of 
Enquiry)”.   
7
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8
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In a similar vein to the experiences in England discussed in the first chapter, the 
identification doctrine in Canada has not been without criticism. Norm Keith a 
leading expert on Occupational Health and Safety Law in Canada acknowledged that 
“[l]egal and policy criticisms of the narrow nature of the identification theory were 
widespread”9 and Manning and Sankoff echo this view where “[a]pplication of these 
principles has proven somewhat troublesome given the intricate ways in which 
corporations are established and organized”10. 
The uneven development of the law relating to the identification theory has yielded 
uncertainty and this has caused difficulties when focussed upon corporations with 
large and diffuse corporate structures. As Keith shows “[t]he identification theory, 
therefore, had the effect of reducing the likelihood of corporations being held 
criminally responsible for offences committed by lower level managers and mere 
representatives of the corporation”11.  Macpherson explains the main deficiency with 
the identification theory and there are significant correlations that can be drawn with 
the experience in the UK: - 
“…. at common law, the corporation is generally immune from criminal sanction for 
the actions of mid- to low-level managers and other employees”12. 
Historically the development of the identification doctrine in Canada was also 
disjointed which caused problems thereafter, not too dissimilar from our experiences 
in the UK as considered in the first chapter.  
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167 
 
5.2.  The Westray Mine Disaster (1992) 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, law reform usually requires a catalyst. On 9
th
 
May 1992, 26 miners were killed in the Westray Mine disaster in Pictou County, 
Nova Scotia. 
Very shortly after the disaster, Justice Peter Richard was appointed to chair an inquiry 
into the disaster. However, the inquiry was temporarily stayed, pending any resolution 
of potential criminal charges, following an application to the Nova Scotia Supreme 
Court
13
. However, the Supreme Court of Canada
14
 overruled this decision some years 
later and allowed the Inquiry to continue albeit the decision was “on very narrow 
legal grounds”15.  
 
5.2.1.  The criminal proceedings 
 
An investigation into the Westray Mine disaster was commenced by the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police. There were a number of attempts made to hold the 
management of the mine, both the company Curragh Inc. and two individuals (Gerald 
Phillips, the manager of the mine and Roger Parry – the underground manager) 
legally responsible, however all of the attempts were unsuccessful.  
                                                        
13
 Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy) 
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The first charges of manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death under the 
Criminal Code were laid on 20
th
 April 1993. However, on 20
th
 July 1993 the Judge 
decided
16
 to stay the charges that had been laid as it was decided that the charges were 
unclear but left open the possibility for new charges to be laid in the future.  
New charges were laid against the same defendants and the Judge resisted an 
application for those to be stayed and a trial date was secured. The trial started in 
February 1995
17
, however most of the trial focussed upon the limited disclosure 
provided by the Crown rather than on the issues in dispute. The trial took a peculiar 
twist when the Judge made a telephone call and requested the prosecutor be taken off 
the case. On the basis of the lack of disclosure, the defendants were able to stay the 
prosecution. 
An appeal
18
 was made to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in December 1995 who 
overturned the trial judge’s decision to stay the proceedings and ordered that a new 
trial should take place. This decision was further appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada
19
 who upheld the decision in March 1997 of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
and confirmed that a new trial should be heard. However, despite this decision from 
the highest court in Canada, no new trial was ever commenced and this was 
announced over a year later on 30
th
 June 1998. The basis for this decision was that 
there was no reasonable prospect of a conviction. As Keith recollects “[t]his 
dissatisfaction, not completing the first trial and then the decision not to proceed with 
a second trial, was a central factor in the call for political action and changes to the 
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 R. v. Curragh Inc [1993] N.S.J. No.279, 124 N.S.R. (2d) 59 (N.S. Prov. Ct.) 
17
 R. v. Curragh Inc [1995] N.S.J. No.275, 146 N.S.R. (2d) 163 (N.S.S.C.), revd 
[1995] N.S.J. No.512, 146 N.S.R. (2d) 161 (N.S.C.A.), affd [1997] S.C.J. No.33, 113 
C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) 
18
 R. v. Curragh Inc [1995] N.S.J. No.512, 146 N.S.R. (2d) 161 (N.S.C.A.) 
19
 R. v. Curragh Inc [1997] S.C.J. No.33, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) 
169 
 
Criminal Code”20. This echoes the point raised in the second chapter whereby society 
wishes to see justice being done and when that justice is not seen through it creates 
displeasure and raises concerns with the legal system and its capabilities. 
 
5.2.2.  The Inquiry 
 
As discussed above, there was a delay to the inquiry due to the above proceedings or 
lack of proceedings. Justice Peter Richard of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court chaired 
the inquiry
21
 that was given a wide remit. The United Steel Workers of America 
attended the inquiry and called for a specific offence of corporate killing to be 
included in the Criminal Code in a similar vein to the specific “offence” approach 
taken by the UK. Justice Richard was very damming of the approach taken to safety 
at the Westray Mine and made a number of comments similar to those outlined by the 
Sheen Inquiry, following the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster, such as “there was a 
palpable disregard for even the most basic rules of safety”22. 
The final report made 74 recommendations and the 73
rd
 recommendation is to be 
considered as the true catalyst for reform. The report did not recommend a specific 
offence of corporate killing but recommended at 73 that: - 
“The Government of Canada, through the Department of Justice, should institute a 
study of the accountability of corporate executives and directors for the wrongful or 
negligent acts of the corporation and should introduce in the Parliament of Canada 
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such amendments to legislation as are necessary to ensure that corporate executives 
and directors are held properly accountable for workplace safety.”                
In a similar experience to the process of law reform in the UK where the LC’s report 
was not acted upon for some time, the Canadian approach to law reform in this area 
seemed to suffer from delay also. One explanation for the delay in reforming this area 
of the law, given that both the UK and Canada appeared to take a number of years to 
progress the reform may well be indicative of the difficulties associated with 
reforming corporate criminal liability. Law reform is not a simple process and a 
number of alternatives demand consideration and a loss of time is somewhat 
inevitable.  
 
5.3.  Reforming the Canadian approach to Corporate Criminal Liability 
 
Following the unsuccessful attempts at the prosecution following the Westray Mine 
disaster, the Canadian Government took some time to respond with new legislation. 
Initially, the reform was taken forward with two private members bills C-259
23
 in 
October 1999 and C-284
24
 in February 2001. Both bills were ultimately unsuccessful, 
however as Keith states “[t]he introduction of Bill C-284 marked the beginning of a 
move towards broad legislative change in Canadian criminal law, and away from the 
directing mind theory of corporate liability”25.  
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5.3.1.  Bill C-45 – An Act to Amend the Criminal Code  
 
When the Government finally responded, they decided to move away from the 
liability being at the door of the director to a much broader approach that was in 
contrast to recommendation 73 of the Westray Inquiry. In a similar timescale to that 
experienced in the UK, the Canadian Government tabled the proposed new legislation 
contained within Bill C-45
26
. This Bill went before Parliament over eleven years after 
the Westray Mine disaster. During the passage of Bill C-45 it received wide support, 
for example Ms. Sarmite Bulte M.P. for Parkdale-High Park stated that: - 
“… Bill C-45 would give Canada rules that are appropriate for the complex, modern 
corporate world where often a company has many places of business, various 
subsidiaries, parts of the business contracted out to specialists, decentralized control 
over some parts of the business and a great deal of discretion vested in its 
managers”27. 
The Bill received Royal Assent on 7
th
 November 2003 after passage through 
Parliament and came into force on 31
st
 March 2004.  
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5.3.2.  Bill C-45 – The key elements 
 
There are two key aspects that were introduced by Bill C-45. Firstly, the extension of 
potential liability to organizations including companies and secondly the two 
formulae under which organizations can now be held criminally liable.  
Section 1 of Bill C-45 amended Section 2 (Interpretation) of the Criminal Code and 
added the definitions of an “organization”, “representative” and “senior officer”. The 
key new term is that of “organizations”28 rather than “corporations”.  The reason 
behind this usage was so that a broad approach could be taken that didn’t just focus 
on corporations but could affect other bodies as well such as trade unions or public 
bodies.   The other two new terms mentioned above are relevant when considering the 
two formulae under which organizations can be held criminally liable.  
The first formula is now contained within Section 22.1 of the Criminal Code: - 
“22.1 In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove negligence, an 
organization is a party to the offence if 
(a) acting within the scope of their authority 
 
(i) one of its representatives is a party to the offence, or 
(ii) two or more of its representatives engage in conduct, whether by 
act or omission, such that, if it had been the conduct of only one 
                                                        
28
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 Section 2 “organization” – “means (a) a public body, body 
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representative, that representative would have been a party to the 
offence; and 
(b) the senior officer who is responsible for the aspect of the organization’s 
activities that is relevant to the offence departs – or the senior officers, collectively, 
depart – markedly from the standard of care that, in the circumstances, could 
reasonably be expected to prevent a representative of the organization from being a 
party to the offence”. 
Section 22.1 deals with offences that require negligence to be proved. As stated 
above, the new definitions of “representative”29 and “senior officer”30 are highly 
pertinent. It has been suggested by Macpherson
31
 that the definition of “senior 
officer” “appears largely to codify the common law” and that the second portion of 
the definition “clearly extends the attribution of criminal corporate liability to the 
actions of mid-level managers” with the ultimate result being that “Bill C-45 extends 
corporate criminal liability”. 
Section 22.2 of the Criminal Code now contains the second formula for offences not 
based on negligence (such as intention/ recklessness or wilful blindness): - 
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“22.2 In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove fault – other than 
negligence – an organization is a party to the offence if, with the intent at least in part 
to benefit the organization, one of its senior officers 
(a) acting within the scope of their authority, is a party to the offence; 
(b) having the mental state required to be a party to the offence and acting 
within the scope of their authority, directs the work of other 
representatives of the organization so that they do the act or make the 
omission specified in the offence; or 
(c) knowing that a representative of the organization is or about to be a party 
to the offence, does not take all reasonable measures to stop them from 
being a party to the offence”. 
As discussed at length in the third chapter, the central question that has to be raised is 
whether the law reform has been successful and whether it is an improvement on the 
old common law system. Given the limited academic coverage on this subject, it has 
been difficult to obtain a full and detailed critique. This is in contrast to the position in 
the UK where the academic commentary on the CMCHA has been extensive. Keith 
confirms that: - 
“Bill C-45 was intended, among other objectives, to modernise the law of establishing 
criminal liability for a corporation. Sections 22.1 and 22.2 of the Code – for the first 
time – provided a statutory framework for the mens rea and of organisations, 
including corporations …  
Both provisions significantly redefined how an organisation, including a corporation, 
may be proven to have committed an offence. These changes lowered the mens rea 
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threshold from the identification theory to senior executives to the conduct of all 
representatives of the corporation”32.  
Dusome in certain aspects extols the virtues of the new law and suggests that: - 
“Bill C-45 makes two significant changes to the criminal law. First, it broadens the 
scope of the identification theory of corporate criminal liability well beyond the 
directing mind theory of the common law, and perhaps beyond what the drafters 
foresaw … Secondly, Bill C-45 greatly broadens the category of persons who may be 
charged and convicted, beyond the individual and the corporation, to trade unions, 
partnerships and “association of persons”, then applies the expanded identification 
theory of corporate criminal liability to those additional persons”33. 
However, it is debatable whether the new law has achieved its aim. It has arguably 
broadened the identification doctrine and has it simply replaced the term “directing 
mind” with that of the “senior officer”. It could be said that the UK has done exactly 
the same thing. Macpherson argues that “the new legislation codifies the common 
law”34 and if that is the case then surely that is not law reform that is merely changing 
the form of the law but not the substance?  
Some of the commentators do see limitations with the new law and problems for the 
future. Dusome suggests that “Bill C-45 does not go far enough. Even with the 
changes … the law remains firmly within the very confining limits of the 
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identification theory … it remains necessary to identify the senior officer(s) who have 
the requisite fault, in addition to identifying the representative who is a party to the 
offence”35. Further to this point is whether the new law will be effective and the one 
true test for any new law is whether it will be effective in court in actual proceedings. 
Dusome suggests that “[t]he most likely outcome of the Bill C-45 provisions is no 
additional prosecutions of organizations in the foreseeable future”36. To date, there 
have been a limited number of prosecutions under Bill C-45 particularly against 
individuals and these will be discussed in the section below.  
 
5.3.3.  The first prosecutions under Bill C-45 
 
There have been a number of prosecutions that have commenced as a result of the Bill 
C-45 amendments to the Criminal Code. 
The first was against an individual, Mr. Fantini
37
, who was charged with one count of 
criminal negligence causing death and eight matters under the Ontario Health and 
Safety Act. Mr Fantini was in charge of a construction site and a worker was killed 
when a trench collapsed. However, following plea bargaining and pleas of guilty to 
three Health and Safety matters, the charge of criminal negligence causing death was 
withdrawn by the Crown
38
; on the basis that it was not in the public interest to 
proceed with this charge and therefore there was no trial on this point. The 
commencement of this case was much heralded in a similar vein to the prosecution 
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against Cotswold (Geotechnical) Holdings as discussed in the fourth chapter. 
However, the result was a significant anti-climax, again similar to the view post 
Cotswold. Mr Fantini received a fine of $50,000 which is relatively modest. However, 
Gorewich J. did indicate that “if this were a corporate defendant that the fines would 
be far greater than it is with respect to you, a small contractor”39.      
The second was against a company, Transpave Inc.
40
 where a death was caused in 
October 2005 and this was the first conviction of a company/ organization under Bill 
C-45. This matter was not contested at trial and the company pleaded guilty and 
received a fine of $100,000 and a victim surcharge of $10,000 (a form of tax). There 
were a number of points forwarded in mitigation, such as the company employed a 
psychiatrist to come in to assist the employees the day after the accident, which were 
accepted by the court and was reflected in the amount of the fine. This illustrated that 
if a company was prepared to engage with the court, that the level of the fine would 
reflect that.     
The terms of Bill C-45 were finally tested at trial in R. v. Scrocca
41
. Mr Scrocca was 
convicted of criminal negligence causing death and received a custodial sentence of 
two years less a day and the sentence will be spent in the community with condition, 
including a curfew.  
However, it is the pending prosecutions that will be of most interest as they illustrate 
the usage of Bill C-45 against another company
42
 and also a number of prosecutions 
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of individuals, in particular an individual in relation to a ferry disaster
43
 in British 
Columbia. These matters are awaiting trial at the current time.  
There have been acquittals that have followed prosecutions under Bill C-45
44
, but as 
seen above the new provisions have received some usage.  However, as Beeho 
confirms “it is difficult to discern any reliable trends or patterns on the case law”45. 
This can be contrasted with the position in the UK, where we await the second trial 
under the CMCHA. The UK is very much in its early stages of trying to ascertain 
whether our new law will be effective.  
 
 5.3.4.  Sentencing under Bill C-45 
 
The Criminal Code provides a fundamental principle when sentencing offenders 
whereby it must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence
46
. Furthermore, Bill    
C-45 further amended the Criminal Code by adding s.718.21 and this provided 
additional factors that must be taken into account when sentencing organizations.   
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5.4.  The Canadian view of the position in the United Kingdom 
 
The focus of this chapter has been upon the Canadian system and how the UK could 
learn from their experiences. In a similar vein, the Canadians have considered the 
developments in the UK with interest. However, as discussed above, the Canadian 
approach is holistic so that the new formulas can be applied to a large number of 
criminal offences rather than focussing on a specific offence. The Canadian 
Government decided against a specific corporate killing offence when they were 
reforming their law and decided that it would “be too narrow … as it would not 
respond to corporate crimes against the environment and other corporate harms”47. 
However, the most significant concern of the new law in the UK was that “[t]he major 
limitation of the CMCHA is the fact that it only applies to corporations and does not 
apply to individuals, even corporate directing minds”48. This concern from a major 
voice in Occupational Health and Safety in Canada was well rehearsed by a large 
number during the passage of the CMCHA as discussed in the fourth chapter. 
  
5.5. Conclusion 
 
Despite the similarities between the UK and Canadian legal systems, there are also 
distinct differences. Canada has taken a holistic approach to corporate criminal 
liability at the Federal level. It is debatable as to whether such a system would 
successfully apply in the UK. 
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Wells
49
 speaks positively of the Canadian approach and takes the view that the 
reforms in Canada “capture(s) the essence of organizational decision-making in more 
imaginative way(s)” and that “[t]his seems far more likely “truly” to capture corporate 
failings than the proposed senior-manager test” we now have in the UK.  
The Canadians have taken a non-specific offence approach to corporate criminal 
liability rather than focussing on the specific offence of manslaughter as has been 
done in the UK. The Canadian approach is tailored to offer wide coverage over a 
number of offences. It is unlikely that the test that we have enacted in the UK would 
suit a similarly large number of offences. Given that we do not have a Criminal Code 
and our criminal law is a mixture of common law offences and statutory offences it is 
unlikely that it would work or indeed it would prove very difficult. However, if our 
criminal law was codified into one document, this approach could be re-visited and it 
could have the potential to work. Although, the possibility of our criminal law being 
codified in the near future is extremely unlikely given that it would be a mammoth 
undertaking that would have serious cost implications and given the current financial 
situation this makes the possibility even more unlikely.   
One similarity between the jurisdictions is the time taken to reform the law in this 
very complex area. It is arguable that given the difficulties reforming this area of the 
law that a significant passage of time is likely. It is an evocative subject matter, but 
one that is contended would not be at the top of the list of reforms within any country 
and this appears to have been the case in both Canada and the UK. 
The Canadians appear to have considered every scintilla, but has the time been spent 
wisely or do they simply have an identification “plus” model of corporate criminal 
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liability albeit not focussed on a specific offence as we have in the UK? Despite the 
concerns with the identification doctrine on both sides of the Atlantic, arguably both 
the UK and Canada now have a development on the identification doctrine albeit that 
it is now called something different in the two jurisdictions.  
Unfortunately, the Canadian approach does not offer any real model for improvement 
with the law that we now have in the UK. However, there are parallels with the 
Canadian experience of law reform. For example as discussed in the previous 
chapters, those with vested interests such as large corporations or powerful business 
representative bodies such as the CBI in the UK have had an effect upon the reform 
process and has the same occurred in Canada whereby ambitious reforms were 
mitigated and watered down? The most significant parallel however, given the long 
standing usage of the identification doctrine in both the UK and Canada, is whether 
the process of moving away from it has been too difficult to achieve? Law-makers are 
often reticent to dispose of established, albeit flawed legal concepts, particularly when 
they are very difficult to replace effectively.  
Given that the Canadian reforms occurred before those in the UK, the Canadians have 
seen more prosecutions under their new law, than we have in the UK to date. 
However, as discussed above, it takes significant time for any true patterns to emerge 
and it may take decades before either system can be truly analysed for effectiveness 
or otherwise.  
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Chapter Six - Conclusion 
 
The central issue for this thesis is whether the CMCHA has overcome the difficulties 
associated with the identification doctrine or whether the CMCHA has carried the 
same problems with it. We will consider below the relevant points identified within 
the thesis discussion.  
In answer to the central issue, we do now have a statutory offence of Corporate 
Manslaughter. However, the new “senior management” test does appear to have 
strong echoes with the former identification doctrine. It could be said that despite the 
time it took to pass the CMCHA into law, that it was worth the wait but the ultimate 
result is disappointing. We now have a statutory offence that can be amended if 
required in a manner that is more transparent than if it were still a common law 
matter.   
The identification doctrine has proved to be an ineffective theory when posed against 
a large corporate structure. The doctrine was not assisted by its fractured and 
disjointed development. The doctrine was widely criticised, particularly following the 
narrow approach favoured by the House of Lords in Tesco Supermarkets Limited v. 
Nattrass
1
 and this caused the problems outlined in the Second Chapter. However, 
there were no apparent arguments in favour of the retention of this doctrine. It was 
suggested in the thesis, that the only proponents of this doctrine were the large 
corporations that benefitted from its lack of ability to identify anyone within their 
respective companies.  
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The Second Chapter considered the successful and unsuccessful prosecutions for 
corporate manslaughter. The clear pattern that formed was that if the prosecution 
featured a “one-man” type company with a simple corporate structure, then the 
identification was relatively straightforward. Conversely, when the doctrine was faced 
with a large corporate structure it simply failed either when tested in court or before 
court when the CPS decided not to charge. It was these large-scale disasters that drew 
significant attention to the deficiencies of the identification doctrine when tested in 
this way. The narrowness of the Tesco approach caused significant problems given 
that the proximity of the directors to the disaster lacked the requisite immediacy and 
the nexus was insufficient for the doctrine to be effective. The Court of Appeal
2
 
considered this issue and had they answered the two questions posed differently it 
could have altered the development of the doctrine. If the Court of Appeal had 
decided to move away from the narrowness of Tesco, the CMCHA may not have been 
required.  
The thesis also considered the law reform process. This process was not swift and 
took thirteen years from the Law Commission consultation paper in 1994 to the 
enactment of the CMCHA in 2007. The Law Commission did consider other 
alternatives, but recommended that a specific offence of corporate killing be created 
based on management failure. 
The Government decided to “enhance” the test of the Law Commission and turned it 
into the “senior management” test. It is arguable that the Law Commission’s original 
test could have been more effective. Despite commentators and those involved in the 
pre-legislative process suggesting that this new test was a step back towards the 
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identification doctrine, the Government carried on regardless. It was suggested that 
under the proposed new test arguably courts would be trying to “identify” the senior 
management. The new test was identified by the Joint Committee as a “fundamental 
weakness” in the Bill and that it could be interpreted as a broadening of the 
identification doctrine.  
The proposed new test polarised commentators. Some suggested that it could be 
perceived to be too wide, but alternatively some contended that it could be too 
narrow. The Government claimed that their test had been misinterpreted and that they 
considered it to be a mere development of the Law Commission’s test.  
This can be seen as a missed opportunity. The Law Commission test was not perfect, 
but it was an improvement on the “senior management” test that ultimately is now 
within the CMCHA. It is arguable that we now have an “identification-plus” model. 
This claim would be denied by the Government, but on the face of the test, it appears 
that Courts will now have to establish who is and who is not the senior management.  
It is the inclusion of the “senior management” test that will ultimately decide whether 
the new law will be an improvement on the old. Given that all law reform should 
improve the law and move away from well-known deficiencies, it is surprising that 
the Government wished to carry with it some of the same potential problems. 
It may well be the case that despite the concerns raised in this thesis, the new test may 
work with some success and that the concerns outlined in the thesis are proved to be 
incorrect. This will only be gauged appropriately when a number of prosecutions have 
occurred. To date, the CMCHA has featured in two prosecutions, firstly, the 
completed prosecution of Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Limited and secondly 
the recently commenced prosecution of Lion Steel Limited. However, the first 
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prosecution provided a limited view of what the new legislation was capable of given 
that the company concerned was a relatively small entity. Although, this first 
prosecution did give an indication of the sentencing approach albeit in a limited 
capacity. The sentencing decision in this case was appealed to the Court of Appeal
3
 
and this is likely to be indicative of the approach taken in the early cases whereby 
defendant companies will be testing the limits of the guidelines.  
The second prosecution is due to be tried in summer 2012 against a larger company. 
The CMCHA will receive a more robust test but it still awaits a significant test against 
a corporation such as the size of P & O or a train company with a diverse corporate 
structure. 
Also contained within the thesis was the brief discussion on the contentious issue of 
individual liability. This is an argument that could justify a full thesis discussion on 
this point alone. It has been discussed in passing as it was a major issue contained 
within the passage of the CMCHA. The exclusion of individual liability for this 
offence under the CMCHA was seen to be a massive oversight.     
The fifth chapter consider the Canadian approach to see if there was anything the UK 
could learn or adopt from their approach. The Canadian’s have adopted a holistic 
approach to corporate criminal liability and have integrated new sections into the 
Canadian Criminal Code in contrast to the UK’s offence specific approach. However, 
when one considers the Canadian approach it is arguable that they despite the long 
law reform process they have amended their law with an “identification plus” theory 
as well. It was hoped that the Canadian experiences would be able to shed some light 
on where the UK’s law could be improved. The Canadian’s have seen more 
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prosecutions under Bill C-45 than we have under the CMCHA, yet they still await a 
sizeable test against a large corporation.  The key similarity between the UK and 
Canada’s experiences with this area of the law is that the law reform process was not 
swift and despite the time being spent, the result is arguably a gloss on what was there 
before.  
In conclusion, as discussed at length above, the central aim of law reform is to 
improve and develop the law and improve upon what was there before. The CMCHA 
does have some merits, but the central test is simply a gloss on the identification 
doctrine and the same problems linger in the background. It is with some concern and 
trepidation of what the outcome will be when it is finally tested against a large 
corporation. It is contended that the same problems will exist although we now have a 
new test to blame.   
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